THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Elliott Abrams:
Why Everyone Hates State

ANSWERING FUKUYAMA

No Exit: The Errors of Endism
Samuel P. Huntington

Spoilers at the Party
Leon Wieseltier

JAPAN

Their Behavior, Our Policy
Chalmers Johnson

The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing
David Brock

GERMANY

The Revisionists
Josef Joffe

A Political Culture in Crisis
Jeffrey Herf

Essays & Comments:

Irving Kristol, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Semyon Reznik, Craig Snyder, Benjamin Frankel, Timothy Fuller, David Satter, David Stove, Frederick L. Will, & Owen Harries

Number 17/ Fall 1989/$5.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TAKE ANY 3 FOR $1 EACH

Plus a 4th at the low Member's price.

NO RISK, NO COMMITMENT.



1057. $19.95/**$17.50**



1644. $24.95/**$17.50**



1198. $16.95/**$14.95**

1594. $39.95/**$18.50**



1677. $29.95/**$22.95**

6767. $29.95/**$18.95**



3012. $14.95/**$10.95**



1578. $24.95/**$18.95**



6080. $22.95/**$17.50**



1495. $24.95/**$18.50**



2568. $22.95/**$17.95**



6007. $24.95/**$17.95**

7526. $17.95/**$15.50**



8615. $22.95/**$19.50**



4473. $18.95/**$15.50**



1503. $29.95/**$19.95**



2535. $22.95/**$16.95**



1081. $24.95/**$18.95**

1024. $22.95/**$17.95**

3988. $35/**$22.50**



6130. $18.95/**$15.95**



1701. $24.95/**$18.95**

3327. $24.95/**$17.95**



1560. $29.95/**$22.95**

(First price is Publisher's List. **Boldface** is Member's Price.)

History Book Club®
Camp Hill, PA 17012-8805

Please enroll me in History Book Club according to the no-risk, no-commitment terms outlined in the accompanying ad. Send me the four books whose numbers I have listed below. Bill me $1 each for the 3 choices on the left, and the fourth at the low Member's price—plus shipping and handling. **H365-9-0**

9-13

Name_____
(Please print clearly.)

Address_____ Apt. #_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

All orders subject to approval. Prices generally higher in Canada.
© 1989 History Book Club, Inc.

Save on the best recent history titles.

No matter what area of history you enjoy reading about most, you'll find that History Book Club offers some of the finest selections being published today. And no book club we know of offers greater savings—as much as 30% off publishers' list prices.

You can save even more by taking advantage of our Introductory Offer. Select any three books on this page for $1 each when you take a fourth book at the low Member's price—plus shipping and handling. Thereafter, you're not obligated to order any more books. You may cancel membership at any time by notifying History Book Club. We may cancel your membership if you elect not to buy at least one book in any six-month period.

How the Club works. You'll be able to choose from 150 to 200 books featured each month. History Book Club always offers its members well-made, long-lasting editions.

You'll receive our *Review* and a dated Reply Form 14 times a year (about every 4 weeks), plus up to 4 more offers of special selections. If you want the "Editors' Choice," do nothing—the book will come automatically. If you want another book, or no books at all, return the Reply Form by the date specified. A shipping and handling charge is added to each shipment.

Your HBC Guarantee: If you receive an unwanted "Editors' Choice" because you had less than 10 days to decide, simply return it and pay nothing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 17, FALL 1989

Contents

ARTICLES

The Future of History

No Exit—The Errors of Endism
Samuel Huntington ____ 3

Spoilers at the Party
Leon Wieseltier ____ 12

More Responses to Fukuyama
Timothy Fuller, David Satter, David Stove, Frederick L. Will ____ 93

Japan

Their Behavior, Our Policy
Chalmers Johnson ____ 17

The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing
David Brock ____ 29

Germany

The Revisionists—Moscow, Bonn, and the European Balance
Josef Joffe ____ 41

A Political Culture in Crisis—The Case for Kohl
Jeffrey Herf ____ 55

DEPARTMENTS

Books

A Good Word for Imperialism
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard ____ 63

The Way We Were
Irving Kristol ____ 71

Chutzpah by Any Other Name
Benjamin Frankel ____ 75

Democracy and the Vitality of Evil
Craig Snyder ____ 81

Shorts

Why Everyone Hates the State Department—And What To Do About It
Elliott Abrams ____ 85

The Rifle on the Wall
Semyon Reznik ____ 89

Quarterly
Owen Harries ____ 101

THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues by National Affairs, Inc. EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 1112 16th Street NW, Washington D.C. 20036. SUBSCRIPTION PRICES: $21 for one year, $38 for two years, $54 for three years (add $7 annually outside the United States). Second-class postage paid at Washington D.C. and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The National Interest*, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. NI, Denville, NJ 07834. "The National Interest" is a registered trademark of News Group Publications, Inc., and is used by National Affairs, Inc. under license; it may not be used without permission of News Group Publications, Inc. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life;* and available on microfilm from *University Microfilms International.* © 1989 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by William Byrd Press, Richmond, Virginia.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

PUBLISHER
Irving Kristol

ADVISORY BOARD
Eliot A. Cohen
Midge Decter
Martin Feldstein
Samuel P. Huntington
H.J. Kaplan
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Henry A. Kissinger
Charles Krauthammer
Edward N. Luttwak
Daniel Pipes
Robert A. Scalapino

VISITING FELLOW
Gary J. Schmitt

EDITORS
Owen Harries
Robert W. Tucker

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Mary Tedeschi Eberstadt

MANAGING EDITOR
Jamie Wellik

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITOR
Stephanie Abbajay

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITOR
Liesl Koch

ASSISTANT EDITORS
Aileen C. Hefferren
Jacob E. Heilbrunn

EDITORIAL OFFICES
1112 16th Street NW, Suite 540, Washington, DC 20036 (202) 467-4884
FAX: (202) 467-0006

ADVERTISING
Correspondence should be addressed to the managing editor.

SUBSCRIPTION ORDERS AND INQUIRIES
$21 for one year, $38 for two years, $54 for three years. Write to:
The National Interest, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. NI, Denville, NJ 07834
Credit card orders call 1-800-543-4860

NEWSSTAND DISTRIBUTORS
Bernhard DeBoer, Inc., 113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110
Ingram Periodicals, 1117 Heil Quaker Boulevard, La Vergne, TN 37086-7000

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No Exit

The Errors of Endism

Samuel P. Huntington

FOR A SECOND year serious discussion of international affairs has been dominated by a major theoretical and academic issue. In 1988 the issue was American decline. The theory of declinism, articulated by many thinkers, but most notably by Paul Kennedy, became the focus of extended and intense debate. Was the United States following in the path of Great Britain and declining as a great power? To what extent was its economic base being undermined by spending too much on defense and/or too much on consumption?

The major issue in 1989 is very different. The theory of declinism has been displaced by the theory of endism. Its central element is that bad things are coming to an end.[1] Endism manifests itself in at least three ways. At its most specific level, endism hails the end of the Cold War. In the spring of 1989 the *New York Times* and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, George Kennan and George Bush, all set forth this proposition in one form or another. The end of the Cold War became the Foreign Policy Establishment's Established Truth.

At a second level, endism manifested itself in the more academic and more general proposition that wars among nation states, or at least among some types of nation states, were coming to an end. Many scholars pointed to the historical absence of wars between democratic countries and saw the multiplication of democratic regimes since 1974 as evidence that the probability of war was declining. In a related but somewhat different version of this proposition, Michael Doyle argued that wars were impossible between liberal states. In a still more sweeping formulation, John Mueller contended that the advance of civilization was making war obsolescent and that it would disappear the same way that slavery and duelling had disappeared in advanced societies.[2] Wars still might occur among backward Third World countries, but among developed countries, communist or capitalist, war was unthinkable.

The third and most extreme formulation of endism was advanced by Francis Fukuyama in a brilliant essay called "The End of History?" in the Summer issue of this journal. Fukuyama celebrates not just the end of the Cold War or the end of wars among developed nation states, but instead "the end of history as such." This results from the "unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism" and the "exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives." Like Mueller, Fukuyama concedes that wars may occur among Third World states still caught up in the historical process. But for the developed countries, the Soviet Union, and China, history is at an end.

Samuel P. Huntington is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and director of the John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Endism—the intellectual fad of 1989—contrasts rather dramatically with declinism—the intellectual fad of 1988. Declinism is conditionally pessimistic. It is rooted in the study of history and draws on the parallels between the United States in the late twentieth century, Britain in the late nineteenth century, and France, Spain, and other powers in earlier centuries. Its proponents and its critics debate the relevance of these parallels and argue over detailed, historical data concerning economic growth, productivity, defense spending, savings, and investment.[3] Endism, on the other hand, is oriented to the future rather than the past and is unabashedly optimistic. In its most developed form, as with Fukuyama, it is rooted in philosophical speculation rather than historical analysis. It is based not so much on evidence from history as on assumptions about history. In its extreme form, declinism is historically deterministic: nations naturally, and perhaps inevitably, evolve through phases of rise, expansion, and decline. They are caught in the inexorable grip of history. In the extreme form of endism, in contrast, nations escape from history.

The message of declinism for Americans is "We're losing"; the message of endism is "We've won!" Despite or perhaps even because of its deterministic strand, declinism performs a useful historical function. It provides a warning and a goad to action in order to head off and reverse the decline that it says is taking place. It serves that purpose now as it did in its earlier manifestations in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Endism, in contrast, provides not a warning of danger but an illusion of well-being. It invites not corrective action but relaxed complacency. The consequences of its thesis being in error, hence, are far more dangerous and subversive than those that would result if the declinist thesis should be wrong.

The End of the Cold War

"THE COLD WAR is over" was the prevailing cry in the spring of 1989. What does this mean? It typically referred to two related developments: the changes usually referred to as glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union and the improvements that were occurring in Soviet-American relations. "The cold war," as the *New York Times* put it, "of poisonous Soviet-American feelings, of domestic political hysteria, of events enlarged and distorted by East-West confrontation, of almost perpetual diplomatic deadlock is over."[4] Several questions can be raised about this proposition.

First, is it really true? The easing in Soviet-American relations in the late 1950s was followed by the Berlin and Cuban crises; detente in the early 1970s was followed by Angola and Afghanistan. How do we know that the current relaxation is not simply another swing of the cycle? One answer is that the changes occurring within the Soviet Union are far more fundamental than those that have occurred in the past, and this is certainly the case. The opening up of political debate, limited but real competition in elections, the formation of political groups outside the Party, the virtual abandonment, indeed, of the idea of a monolithic party, the assertion of power by the Supreme Soviet—all these will, if continued, lead to a drastically different Soviet political system. The price of attempting to reverse them increases daily, but it would be rash to conclude that they are as yet irreversible, and the costs of reversing them could decline in the future.

On the international level, the Soviets have cooperated in resolving regional conflicts in the Persian Gulf, southern Africa, and Indochina. They have promised to reduce their overall military forces and their deployments in Eastern Europe. As yet, however, no perceptible changes have taken place in Soviet force structure, Soviet deployments, or Soviet output of military equipment. Even if these do occur, the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence and power in world affairs will still go on. It has been continuing as President Bush and President Gorbachev attempt to woo Eastern and Western European publics. Europe, it is well to remember, is where the Cold War started. It is the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

overwhelmingly preeminent stake in the Cold War, and Gorbachev's public relations can be as much a threat to American interests in Europe as were Brezhnev's tanks (which, for the moment at any rate, Gorbachev also has).

Let us, however, concede that in some meaningful and not transitory sense the Cold War is over and that a real change has occurred in Soviet-American relations. How do the proponents of this thesis see the post-Cold War world? The "we-they world" that has existed, the editors of the *New York Times* assure us, is giving way "to the more traditional struggles of great powers." In a similar vein, George Kennan alleges that the Soviet Union "should now be regarded essentially as another great power, like other great powers." Its interests may differ from ours but these differences can be "adjusted by the normal means of compromise and accommodation."[5]

Russia was, however, just "another great power" for several centuries before it became a communist state. As a great power, Russia frequently deployed its armies into Europe and repeatedly crushed popular uprisings in central Europe. Soviet troops bloodily suppressed the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and trampled the embryonic Czech democracy in 1968. Russian troops bloodily suppressed the Hungarian revolution of 1848–49 and violently put down uprisings in Poland in 1831 and again in 1863–64. Soviet forces occupied Berlin in 1945; Russian troops occupied and burnt Berlin in 1760. In pursuit of Russia's interests as a great power, Russian troops appeared many places where as yet Soviet troops have not. In 1799 Russian troops occupied Milan and Turin and fought a battle on the outskirts of Zurich. The same year, they occupied the Ionian islands off Greece and stayed there until 1807. These excursions preceded Napoleon's invasion of Russia. As a great power, Russia regularly participated in the partitions of Poland. In 1914 Nicholas II directly ruled more of Europe (including most of Poland) than Gorbachev does today.

The past record of Russia as a "normal" great power, therefore, is not reassuring for either the liberty of Eastern Europe or the security of Western Europe. Some suggest that the liberalizing and democratizing trends in the Soviet Union will prevent that country from bludgeoning other countries in the manner of the tsars. One cannot assume, Fukuyama argues, that "the evolution of human consciousness has stood still" and that "the Soviets will return to foreign policy views a century out of date in the rest of Europe." Fukuyama is right: one cannot assume that the Soviets will revert to the bad old ways of the past. One also cannot assume that they will not. Gorbachev may be able to discard communism but he cannot discard geography and the geopolitical imperatives that have shaped Russian and Soviet behavior for centuries. And, as any Latin American will quickly point out, even a truly democratic superpower is capable of intervening militarily in the affairs of its smaller neighbors.

THE ERA OF the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis reminds us, has also been the era of the Long Peace, the longest period in history without hot war between major powers. Does the end of the Cold War mean the end of the Long Peace? Two central elements of both have been bipolarity and nuclear weapons: they have in considerable measure defined both the Soviet-American rivalry and its limits. The end of the Cold War will mean a loosening of bipolarity even if it does not mean, as some declinists predict, a world of five or more roughly equal major powers. The delegitimation of nuclear weapons and the increasing constraints on their deployment and potential use could increase the probability of conventional war.

Active American involvement in world affairs has been substantially limited to two world wars and one prolonged and ideologically-driven cold war. In the absence of the Kaiser, Hitler, Stalin, and Brezhnev, the American inclination may well be to relax and to assume that peace, goodwill, and international cooperation will prevail: that if

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Cold War is over, American relations with the Soviet Union will be similar to its relations with Canada, France, or Japan. Americans tend to see competition and conflict as normal and even desirable features of their domestic economy and politics and yet perversely assume them to be abnormal and undesirable in relations among states. In fact, however, the history of the relations among great powers, when it has not been the history of hot wars, has usually been the history of cold wars.

The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of political, ideological, diplomatic, economic, technological, or even military rivalry among nations. It does not mean the end of the struggle for power and influence. It very probably does mean increased instability, unpredictability, and violence in international affairs. It could mean the end of the Long Peace.

The End of War

A SECOND manifestation of endism postulates the end of war between certain types of nation states. A number of authors, including Dean V. Babst, R.J. Rummel, and Bruce Russett, have pointed to the fact that no significant interstate wars have occurred between democratic regimes since the emergence of such regimes in the early nineteenth century. Michael Doyle has similarly argued that a "pacific union" exists among liberal regimes (which includes and is slightly broader than the class of democratic regimes, as defined by most scholars). *"[C]onstitutionally secure liberal states,"* he says, *"have yet to engage in war with each other. Even threats of war have been regarded as illegitimate."*

Given the large number of wars between non-democratic regimes and between democratic regimes and non-democratic regimes, the almost total absence of armed conflict between democratic regimes is indeed striking. It is, as Bruce Russett says, "perhaps the strongest non-trivial or non-tautological statement that can be made about international relations." It is also plausible to believe that this absence of war may stem from the nature of the regime. Democracy is a means for the peaceful resolution of disputes, involving negotiation and compromise as well as elections and voting. The leaders of democracies may well expect that they ought to be able to resolve through peaceful means their differences with the leaders of other democracies. In the years since World War II, for instance, several conflicts which could or did lead to war between countries tended to moderate when the countries became democratic. The controversies between Britain and Argentina, Guatemala, and Spain over the remnants of empire (one of which did lead to war and one of which produced significant military deployment) moderated considerably when those three countries became democratic. The conflict between Greece and Turkey similarly seemed to ease in the 1980s after both countries had democratically-elected regimes.

The democratic "zone of peace" is a dramatic historical phenomenon. If that relationship continues to hold and if democracy continues to spread, wars should become less frequent in the future than they have been in the past. This is one endist argument that has a strong empirical base. Three qualifications have to be noted, however, to its implications for the end of war.

First, democracies are still a minority among the world's regimes. The 1989 Freedom House survey classified 60 out of 167 sovereign states as "free" according to its rather generous definition of freedom. Multiple possibilities for war thus continue to exist among the 107 states that are not free, and between those states and the democratic states.

Second, the number of democratic states has been growing, but it tends to grow irregularly in a two-step forward, one-step backward pattern. A major wave of democratization occurred in the nineteenth century, but then significant reversals to authoritarianism took place in the 1920s and 1930s. A second wave of democratization after World War II

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was followed by several reversals in the 1960s and 1970s. A third wave of democratization began in 1974, with fifteen to twenty countries shifting in a democratic direction since then. If the previous pattern prevails, some of these new democracies are likely to revert to authoritarianism. Hence the possibility of war could increase rather than decrease in the immediate future, although still remaining less than it was prior to 1974.

Finally, peace among democratic states could be related to extraneous accidental factors and not to the nature of democracy. In the nineteenth century, for instance, wars tended to occur between geographical neighbors. Democratic states were few in number and seldom bordered on each other. Hence the absence of war could be caused by the absence of propinquity.[6] Since World War II most democratic countries have been members of the alliance system led by the United States, which has been directed against an alliance of non-democratic regimes and within which the hegemonic position of the U.S. has precluded war between other alliance members (e.g., between Greece and Turkey). If American leadership weakens and the alliance system loosens, the probability of war between its erstwhile members, democratic or otherwise, could well increase.

The "democratic zone of peace" argument is thus valid as far as it goes, but it may not go all that far.

In his book, *Retreat from Doomsday*, John Mueller argues for the growing obsolescence of war on more general grounds. He sees the Long Peace since 1945 not as the result of bipolarity or nuclear weapons but rather as the result of a learning experience that wars do not pay and that there are few conflicts of interest among countries where it would be reasonable for either side to resort to war to achieve its goals. World War II was an aberration from the twentieth-century trend away from war due largely to the idiosyncratic and irrational personality of Hitler. As countries become more developed and civilized, they will become more peaceful. Denmark is the future model for individual countries, U.S.-Canadian relations the future model for relations between countries.

Mueller makes much of the argument that war will become "obsolete, subrationally unthinkable," and unacceptable in civilized society in the way slavery and duelling have become. Why, however, are those social practices the appropriate parallels to war? Why not murder? Murder has been unacceptable in civilized societies for millennia, and yet it seems unlikely that the murder rate in twentieth-century New York is less than it was in fifth-century Athens. While major wars between developed countries have not occurred since World War II, interstate and intrastate violence has been widespread with the casualties numbering in the tens of millions.

Mueller himself substantially qualifies his case. He agrees that wars will continue among less developed countries. He also concedes that irrational leaders on the Hitler model could involve their countries in future wars. Economic considerations motivate strongly against war, he says, but economic prosperity "is not always an overriding goal even now." Territorial issues exist even in the developed world that "could lead to wars of expansion or territorial readjustment." The Cold War is being resolved peacefully, "but there is no firm guarantee that this trend will continue."

A more general problem may also exist with the end-of-war or even a decline-in-war thesis. As Michimi Muranushi of Yale has pointed out, peace can be self-limiting rather than cumulative. If relations between two countries become more peaceful, this may, in some circumstances, increase the probability that either or both of those countries will go to war with a third country. The Hitler-Stalin pact paves the way for the attacks on Poland; normalization of U.S.-China relations precipitates China's war with Vietnam. If the Soviet threat disappears, so also does an inhibitor of Greek-Turkish war.

In addition, if more countries become like Denmark, forswearing war and committing themselves to material comfort, that in

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself may produce a situation which other countries will wish to exploit. History is full of examples of leaner, meaner societies overrunning richer, less martial ones.

The End of History

"THE END of history" is a sweeping, dramatic, and provocative phrase. What does Fukuyama mean by it? The heart of Fukuyama's argument is an alleged change in political consciousness throughout the principal societies in the world and the emergence of a pervasive consensus on liberal-democratic principles. It posits the triumph of one ideology and the consequent end of ideology and ideological conflict as significant factors in human existence. His choice of language suggests, however, that he may have something more sweeping in mind than simply the obsolescence of war highlighted by Mueller or the end of ideology predicted by Daniel Bell twenty-five years ago.

Insofar as it is focused on war, Fukuyama's argument suffers all the weaknesses that Mueller's does. He admits that "conflict between states still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history, would still be possible." At the same time he includes China and the Soviet Union among those states that are out of history. Current Soviet leaders, he says, have arrived at the "end-of-history view" and "assimilated the consciousness of the universal homogenous state that is post-Hitler Europe"; yet he also admits that the Soviet Union could turn to Slavophile Russian chauvinism and thus remain stuck in history.

Fukuyama ridicules the idea that Germany and France might fight each other again. That is a valid but irrelevant point. A hundred years ago one could have validly made the point that Pennsylvania and Virginia would not fight each other again. That did not prevent the United States, of which each was a part, from engaging in world wars in the subsequent century. One trend in history is the amalgamation of smaller units into larger ones. The probability of war between the smaller units declines but the probability of war between the larger amalgamated units does not necessarily change. A united European community may end the possibility of Franco-German war; it does not end the possibility of war between that community and other political units.

With respect to China, Fukuyama argues that "Chinese competitiveness and expansionism on the world scene have virtually disappeared" and, he implies strongly, will not reappear. A more persuasive argument, however, could be made for exactly the opposite proposition that Chinese expansionism has yet to appear on the world scene. Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, all became expansionist and imperialist powers in the course of industrialization. China is just beginning seriously to develop its industrial strength. Maybe China will be different from all the other major powers and not attempt to expand its influence and control as it industrializes. But how can one be confident that it will pursue this deviant course? And if it follows the more familiar pattern, a billion Chinese engaged in imperial expansion are likely to impose a lot of history on the rest of the world.

FUKUYAMA QUITE appropriately emphasizes the role of consciousness, ideas, and ideology in motivating and shaping the actions of men and nations. He is also right in pointing to the virtual end of the appeal of communism as an ideology. Ideologically, communism has been "the grand failure" that Brzezinski labels it. It is erroneous, however, to jump from the decline of communism to the global triumph of liberalism and the disappearance of ideology as a force in world affairs.

First, revivals are possible. A set of ideas or an ideology may fade from the scene in one generation only to reappear with renewed strength a generation or two later. From the 1940s to the 1960s, dominant currents in economic thinking were Keynesianism, wel-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fare statism, social democracy, and planning. It was hard to find much support for classical economic liberalism. By the late 1970s, however, the latter had staged an amazing comeback: economists and economic institutions were devoted to The Plan in the 1950s; they have been devoted to The Market in the 1980s. Somewhat similarly, social scientists in the decades immediately after World War II argued that religion, ethnic consciousness, and nationalism would all be done in by economic development and modernization. But in the 1980s these have been the dominant bases of political action in most societies. The revival of religion is now a global phenomenon. Communism may be down for the moment, but it is rash to assume that it is out for all time.

Second, the universal acceptance of liberal democracy does not preclude conflicts within liberalism. The history of ideology is the history of schism. Struggles between those who profess different versions of a common ideology are often more intense and vicious than struggles between those espousing entirely different ideologies. To a believer the heretic is worse than the nonbeliever. An ideological consensus on Christianity existed in Europe in 1500 but that did not prevent Protestants and Catholics from slaughtering each other for the next century and a half. Socialists and communists, Trotskyites and Leninists, Shi'ites and Sunnis have treated each other in similar fashion.

Third, the triumph of one ideology does not preclude the emergence of new ideologies. Nations and societies presumably will continue to evolve. New challenges to human well-being will emerge, and people will develop new concepts, theories, and ideologies as to how those challenges should be met. Unless all social, economic, and political distinctions disappear, people will also develop belief systems that legitimate what they have and justify their getting more. Among its other functions, for instance, communism historically legitimized the power of intellectuals and bureaucrats. If it is gone for good, it seems highly likely that intellectuals and bureaucrats will develop new sets of ideas to rationalize their claims to power and wealth.

Fourth, has liberal democracy really triumphed? Fukuyama admits that it has not won out in the Third World. To what extent, however, has it really been accepted in the Soviet Union and China? Between them these societies encompass well over one-quarter of the world's population. If any one trend is operative in the world today it is for societies to turn back toward their traditional cultures, values, and patterns of behavior. This trend is manifest in the revival of traditional identities and characters of Eastern European countries, escaping from the deadly uniformity of Soviet-imposed communism, and also in the increasing differentiation among the republics within the Soviet Union itself. Russia and China do not lack elements of liberalism and democracy in their histories. These are, however, minor chords, and their subordinate importance is underlined by the contemporary problems facing economic liberalism in the Soviet Union and political democracy in communist China.

More generally, Fukuyama's thesis itself reflects not the disappearance of Marxism but its pervasiveness. His image of the end of history is straight from Marx. Fukuyama speaks of the "universal homogeneous state," in which "all prior contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied." What is this but the Marxist image of a society without class conflict or other contradictions organized on the basis of from each according to his abilities and to each according to his needs? The struggles of history, Fukuyama says, "will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands." Engels said it even more succinctly: "The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production." Fukuyama says liberalism is the end of history. Marx says communism "is the solution to the riddle of history." They are basically saying the same thing and, most importantly, they are think-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the same way. Marxist ideology is alive and well in Fukuyama's arguments to refute it.

Two Fallacies

THE SOVIET UNION is increasingly preoccupied with its own problems and a significant political loosening has occurred in that country. The ideological intensity of the early Cold War has virtually disappeared, and the probability of hot war between the two superpowers is as low as it has ever been. War is even more unlikely between any of the advanced industrialized democracies. On these points, endist propositions are accurate. The more extensive formulations of the endist argument, however, suffer from two basic fallacies.

First, endism overemphasizes the predictability of history and the permanence of the moment. Current trends may or may not continue into the future. Past experience certainly suggests that they are unlikely to do so. The record of past predictions by social scientists is not a happy one. Fifteen years ago, just as the democratic wave was beginning, political analysts were elaborating fundamental reasons why authoritarianism had to prevail in the Third World. Ten years ago foreign policy journals were filled with warnings of the rise of Soviet military power and political influence throughout the world. Five years ago what analyst of the Soviet Union predicted the extent of the political changes that have occurred in that country? Given the limitations of human foresight, endist predictions of the end of war and ideological conflict deserve a heavy dose of skepticism. Indeed, in the benign atmosphere of the moment, it is sobering to speculate on the possible future horrors that social analysts are now failing to predict.

Second, endism tends to ignore the weakness and irrationality of human nature. Endist arguments often assume that because it would be rational for human beings to focus on their economic well-being, they will act in that way, and therefore they will not engage in wars that do not meet the tests of cost-benefit analysis or in ideological conflicts that are much ado about nothing. Human beings are at times rational, generous, creative, and wise, but they are also often stupid, selfish, cruel, and sinful. The struggle that is history began with the eating of the forbidden fruit and is rooted in human nature. In history there may be total defeats, but there are no final solutions. So long as human beings exist, there is no exit from the traumas of history.

To hope for the benign end of history is human. To expect it to happen is unrealistic. To plan on it happening is disastrous.

NOTES

1. Some have raised the question as to what extent endist writers are really serious in their arguments. The time and intellectual effort they have devoted to elaborating those arguments suggest that they are, and I will assume this to be the case. The arguments also deserve to be taken seriously because of their widespread popularity.
2. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12 (Summer, Fall 1983), pp. 205–235, 323–353, and "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Also see Dean V. Babst, "A Force for Peace," *Industrial Research*, vol. 14 (April 1972), pp. 55–58; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27 (March 1983), pp. 27–71; Ze'ev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 33 (March 1989), pp. 3–35; Bruce Russett, "The Politics of an Alternative Security System: Toward a More Democratic and Therefore More

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peaceful World," in Burns Weston, ed., *Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence* (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming 1989).

3. For a careful analysis of the evidence and arguments on this issue, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr.'s forthcoming book, *American Power: Past and Future* (New York: Basic Books).
4. "The Cold War Is Over," *New York Times*, April 2, 1989, p. E30.
5. "Just Another Great Power," *New York Times*, April 9, 1989, p. E25.
6. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1815–1965," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1 (Summer 1976), p. 67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spoilers at the Party

Leon Wieseltier

IN HEBREW, when you announce your intention to offer criticism in a friendly spirit, you say that the object of your criticism has left you a great deal of ground on which to build fences. There are a couple of fences I would like to build around Francis Fukuyama's surprising essay. For that reason I want to be clear about the areas of my agreement with him.

Methodologically and philosophically, I share Fukuyama's impatience with a materialist account of thought and action, though I would worry more than he does about the fate of idealism under liberalism: "a truly universal consumer culture" is not quite what Geist had, well, in mind. Substantively, though the loss of faith in totalitarianism began long before Gorbachev—who is only making official what the men and women of these lifeless places have been muttering to themselves for decades—Fukuyama is perfectly correct that the Leninist soteriology, its ideals of social perfection and human happiness, are being discarded everywhere, especially by Leninists, as are its ideals of economic organization. Emotionally, Fukuyama is easily supported in his view of this phenomenon as a great drama, a political and philosophical epiphany. It is hard not to be thrilled by the rout of so powerful a lie. Who did not rejoice that Saturday morning last summer to read in the *New York Times* that the prime minister of the Soviet Union deplores what he called "the de-ideologization of society?" In Eastern Europe a few months ago, I felt frissons by the hour. And so I take Fukuyama's eschatological vocabulary, about which I will have a few things to say, to be a measure of excitement. And that excitement is itself a measure of his grasp of the magnitude of this century's evil. To be relieved of such evil must indeed feel like an experience of an eschaton.

And yet eschatological excitement seems to me very premature. The more were my hours in Eastern Europe, the fewer were my frissons. I would put two fences around Fukuyama's argument. The first is historical. The second is philosophical. The first is that the defeat of communism is not quite—and, in all likelihood, never will be—the same thing as the victory of liberalism. The second is that it is an insult to liberalism to describe its success as an end of history.

Fukuyama believes, with the political philosopher Michael Doyle, that as liberalism increases, conflict decreases. In Doyle's important study of the relationship of liberal principles and institutions to the foreign policy of liberal states, he concluded that "even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with non-liberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another. No one should argue that such wars are impossible; but preliminary evidence does appear to in-

Leon Wieseltier is literary editor of the *New Republic*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states."[1]

So far, so good. But only so far. A generalization from the happy few would be a terrible mistake. For, if liberalism does retire certain causes of conflict and war, it does not retire others; and it even contributes a few causes of its own. I am not referring to the persistence of power politics past the collapse of totalitarianism; I leave it for another time to comment on the durability of interests as an explanation of conflict. I note only that one of the effects of glasnost upon American thinking will be a rehabilitation of Realism, a revival of the analysis according to interests by people who have had their view of the postwar world crushed by the collapse of communism as a living threat, or by people who hope to sneak that view of the world through the realpolitikal back door of Realism.

No, the sources of conflict after the "end of history" will continue to be also ideational or ideological. I count five such spoilers of Fukuyama's party.

Liberalism Itself

DOYLE'S CAREFUL study has a flip side, which is that "liberal states are as aggressive and war-prone as any form of government or society in their relations with non-liberal states." Outside the splendid orbit of liberalism, Doyle observes, "liberal regimes, like all other states, are caught in the international state of war Hobbes and the Realists describe."

The irony, though, is that liberal activism beyond the borders of the liberal states is not the result only of its interests, but also of its ideas. As John Stuart Mill proposed in his essay on intervention and non-intervention, the very commitment to freedom and independence which inhibits free and independent states from acting against other free and independent states encourages them to act against states that are neither free nor independent. What we now call "liberation," and what Mill and his political culture called "improvement," is the highest goal of liberalism in foreign policy. Liberalism has a weakness for crusades, a weakness that originates in its philosophical foundations. Colonialism (about which the less Mill, the better) was largely a liberal policy. The "containment" that President Bush wants to move beyond was a liberal policy. The invasion of Grenada was a liberal policy. And the support of the contras was a liberal policy.

I do not want to comment here on the moral justice or the strategic intelligence of any of those policies. I want only to submit them as examples of liberalism's own reasons for the resort to force, of liberalism's own justifications of war.

Incomplete Liberalism

SOMETIMES FUKUYAMA writes as if the appearance of an idea is the appearance of a reality. (Hegel was never guilty of this mistake.) And so he reassures himself, about states in which liberalism is in conflict with forms of anti-liberalism, that "this conflict does not arise from liberalism itself so much as from the fact that the liberalism in question is incomplete." Not so fast. Incomplete liberalism is also incomplete anti-liberalism.

It is hard to believe, even in our wildest dreams, that anything more than incomplete liberalism will be the consequence of reform in the Soviet Union and China. Not only a mixed economy, but also a mixed philosophy. For, as communism declines, there are traditions waiting in the wings to take its place, and they are not liberal traditions. (This is true also of Korea and Japan, also cited by Fukuyama; their powerful prior cultures, too, are hostile to modernity.) Unlike the societies of Eastern Europe, these are not societies in which liberalism has roots. In the Soviet Union, in particular, liberalization has

[1] "Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12 (Summer, Fall 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

released many old enemies of liberalism. Fukuyama fails to take account not only of the cultural and social power of those reactionary forces, and of their prospects for influencing policy or coming to power as a result of perestroika's disappointments, but also of the extent to which liberalization is a contentless thing. It was totalitarianism that marked the end of the war of ideas. Liberalization is an invitation to the war of ideas.

Nuclear Liberalism

IF WE'RE TALKING about the end of history, let's talk about the end of history. I do not believe that weapons cause war, that, as C. Wright Mills puts it, the cause of World War III will be the preparation for it; but it would be irresponsible not to speculate on the consequences of a rivalry between liberal powers who are also nuclear powers, specifically, between a liberal, nuclear United States and a liberal, nuclear Soviet Union. It may be that Fukuyama and Doyle are right, that wars between liberal states are not greatly to be feared. But surely grave crises between liberal states remain possible; and surely their outcome will be affected by the strategic realities in which the national leaders find themselves. And so, for as long as the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union are arranged in a way that gives the advantage to the offense, we must wonder whether the national security adviser briefing the president on the advantages of an American first strike will advise the president not to launch because the enemy has finally published Solzhenitsyn. I hope so. I doubt it.

Nationalism

FUKUYAMA admirably acknowledges this challenge to liberalism, but he dismisses it much too easily. There are a number of characteristics of nationalism that make it an especially thorny exception to, perhaps a fatal flaw in, his cheerful picture of the future.

First, nationalism is not an interest, it is an ideology, a theory of history, with its own proud notions of the beginning and the end; and so it is excellently equipped for a war against liberalism.

Second, nationalism is an ideology emphasizing differences between polities that may be otherwise similar. States whose political organizations are the same—states that are both liberal—may believe sincerely in the superiority of one over the other, in the destiny of one to master the other, and so on.

Third, the history of the relationship of nationalism to democracy is not reassuring. Nationalism has disrupted liberalism more than liberalism has pacified nationalism. (For reasons that I won't go into here, the United States is a great exception, a freak of history, in this respect.) Again, self-determination is also a contentless thing. It can be used very smartly as a reason for aggression, against one's own society or against another society.

Religion

HERE, TOO, Fukuyama shows an admirable interest in counterexamples, but his remarks puzzle me.

Naipaul, in the passage cited with approval by Fukuyama, is wrong: the Sonys and the Hitachis in Teheran did not vitiate Khomeini's theocracy, they were its very instruments. There is more and more evidence from around the developing world that technology is value-neutral, that Locke and Jefferson do not come, like batteries, with tape players and VCRs. Many of the new "liberals" of the developing world are interested in goods, not in checks and balances.

It would be extremely foolish to interpret the rise of capitalism in certain Asian countries as a rise of liberalism. Such an interpretation contradicts the facts of political life, say, in Singapore, where markets and prisons comport comfortably with each other. It also contradicts Fukuyama's own opposition to economic reductionism. So far, economic prosperity has not brought political freedom to many places; and in some places, like the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Philippines, freedom came where there was no prosperity.

I would pay more attention than Fukuyama does to Burkina Faso. It may be that Islamic fundamentalism is a matter of consequence only in the Islamic world, but that world holds a billion people. Fukuyama is right that religion is not likely to depose liberalism in our own societies, but about the rest of the world he is spectacularly Eurocentric, as in his description of decolonization as "an inevitable consequence of the Allied victory" and in such phrases as "the common ideological heritage of mankind." In Burkina Faso and Cairo and Teheran and Lahore and Madras there are also notions of the common ideological heritage of mankind, complicated and interesting notions, but they do not include Penguin paperbacks.

The people of the developing world want VCRs, but they will not be bought off with them, and they do not want them for the purpose of erasing their convictions and their cultures. For they have moral and social traditions of their own, living traditions, and they are more and more coming to the conclusion that modernization must not mean the immolation of those traditions. Increasingly they seem to believe that economic development must precede political development, and that economic gains must not become cultural losses. I think we shall all be surprised by how far these societies travel along the new technological and economic paths without becoming what we would call liberal.

There ends my political fence. Now, more briefly, to my philosophical fence, which is really a recoil, a little in horror, from this, or any other end of history.

For a start, Fukuyama's grasp of Hegel is weak and, for some reason not known to me, hostage to Kojève. Hegel's "Idea" is nothing like "the rubric of ideology." Hegel's outburst about Napoleon and Jena was firmly corrected by his mature work, according to which history is a process of infinite duration, the present being the richest period in history not because it is the last but because it is the latest, and therefore contains more of the past within itself. "The end of history" is not a Hegelian notion. It is Christianity's unwitting present to Marxism.

More to the point, it is the controlling concept of communist theory and practice. To celebrate the defeat of communism by announcing "the end of history" is a little like celebrating the defeat of Nazism by announcing "the final solution to the German question." It is a spectacular concession, one which no liberal should be willing to make. How many people have suffered and died in this century because somebody decided to put an end to history? Nobody will suffer or die, of course, because of Fukuyama's essay; but at this late date in the history of eschatological murder, it is beneath our dignity to use certain words in certain ways.

IT IS PRECISELY the memory of totalitarianism that should dissuade us from desiring such consummations. The liberal lives in the present and in the near future. He knows about the past, but he is wary of hanging around it. And the far future is a matter of indifference to him. He assumes that one day it will arrive, partly as the result of his own limited but real modifications of his society and his tradition; and he assumes that when it does arrive, it will feel only like a present, in which there is work to be done. History, for the liberal, is always profane, written with a lower case "h", an enemy of closure. He can find sense in history without punishing it with meaning.

In fact, one of the sources of liberalism's strength is that, almost alone among modern ideologies, it offers a basis for resistance against the tyranny of history. A fine example of this tyranny may be found in Kojève's silly remarks on Japan, and in Fukuyama's really alarming conclusion that after history (which he should properly write History) "there will be neither art nor philosophy." Neither art nor philosophy needs history to live. They need the world and the soul, senses and forms: that is all. What does history have to do with metaphysics, with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mathematics, with still life, with the fugue, with the sonnet? The world and the soul present problems enough; and the problems that they present are deeper, and more difficult and less dangerous to solve, than the problems of history. To believe that art and philosophy are in need of history is to believe that the purposes of human life are historical, which is to believe that the purposes of human life are political, which is to believe what the people who got us into this mess believed.

Virginia Woolf once remarked that human nature changed in 1910. Fukuyama seems to believe that it changed in 1985, when glasnost and perestroika ended the communist charade. To believe in the end of history, you must believe in the end of human nature, or at least of its gift for evil. I think we should be calmer than that. (There is something a little unstable about a conservative community that gives us "the end of history" while the ink on "the evil empire" is still wet.)

We are not witnessing the end of history. We are witnessing the end of the twentieth century, and good riddance. But just as some of the terribilities of the nineteenth century survived into the twentieth, so we may expect some of the twentieth's terribilities to survive into the twenty-first. For that reason Fukuyama's good news puts me in mind not of Hegel, but of Kant, of the slow but steady expansion of the "pacific union" of liberal states, which believes in "perfect peace" but does not expect to see it, which is always threatened and always incomplete.

Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History?" has attracted a great deal of attention both here and abroad. It is being reprinted in Paris, Tokyo, Rome, Sydney, and Amsterdam.

Further responses begin on page 93. Mr. Fukuyama will respond to his critics in our Winter issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Their Behavior, Our Policy

Chalmers Johnson

MY THESIS is a controversial one, and you have every reason to be skeptical of it. I will argue that the structure of world politics, including international economic relations, is at a genuine turning point. Skepticism is justified because the oldest and most shopworn gambit of all experts, pundits, and consultants is that he or she sees a new turning point, a major crossroads, or a situation that demands cardinal choices. In fact, genuine change is not nearly as common as our sensation-driven mass media and overworked but undereducated journalists would have us believe.

All of us who work in the field of modern Japan have files of articles from the past forty years claiming that "Japan is at the crossroads," when all that Japan actually did was look at the crossroads but not choose a new direction. Similarly, thirty years ago all of us read small libraries about "the uniting of Europe" that proved to be illusory because of de Gaulle's intransigence, and about how the Canadians would never risk the loss of their national identity in a free trade agreement with the Americans. But today Europe *is* uniting and the Canadians *have* ratified an agreement that ties their economy closely to that of the United States. Clearly, something is changing. I contend that it is the structure of international relations.

By structure I mean two things. First, I refer to those aspects of reality that can only be changed over a long term—such things as, for example, the fact that Japan is today the world's richest nation in terms of per capita income. The second meaning of structure is the set of ideas, or paradigm, through which human beings view reality and decide which events are of great importance and which are lower down on the list of priorities. The postwar view of an irreconcilable conflict between communist and capitalist versions of international order is an example of a structural paradigm. It seems to me that the postwar world's 'structure,' in both senses of the word, is starting to change. New realities demand new policies, and the old paradigm of a nuclear-armed bipolar world is losing its authority to set the priorities of nations. We are today in a period of transition in which nations are groping for new conceptual foundations for world order. This new idea of reality has not yet emerged, but we can begin to identify some of the trends and developments that have made the old paradigm obsolete.

It seems to me that there are six major trends changing the structure of global affairs and, interestingly enough, it is the sixth one that is decisively affecting the first five. The

Chalmers Johnson is Rohr Professor of Pacific International Relations in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

first trend is the American recognition that the United States is no longer a hegemonic power. *Second* is the growing awareness both within and outside the Communist bloc that the Soviet Union has become seriously decrepit. *Third* is the growing tendency of the Western allies to link issues of economics and security in light of the declining Soviet threat. *Fourth* is the scheduled uniting of Europe in 1992. *Fifth* is the dawning realization that the world's trade imbalances can never be corrected through so-called free trade alone. And *sixth* is a growing understanding that the economic dynamism of Japan and its emulators in East Asia cannot be explained away as due to temporary or contingent factors or as a result of culture, but must be explained in its own right and dealt with as a matter of specific strategy. I shall discuss briefly the first five of these trends in relationship to the sixth before addressing the problem of Japan itself.

The End of Hegemony

THE UNITED STATES enters the 1990s in a strange position compared to the 1980s. On the one hand, it is beset by serious macroeconomic imbalances—a national debt around $3 trillion, large fiscal deficits, huge trade imbalances, a Third World debt totalling over $1.2 trillion, and a domestic savings rate that is at an all-time low. These kinds of problems are caused by America's commitments around the world—its "imperial overreach" to use Paul Kennedy's concept in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*—and by a combination of mismanagement and infatuation with economic nostrums that promise easy and painless solutions.

There is growing evidence that the American people are prepared to sacrifice in order to deal with these problems. American public opinion polls are starting to tell a consistent story. Concerns about the future are making Americans less internationalist, more willing to cut the military budget, and much more wary and suspicious of Japan as an ally. In an *American Insight* poll of January 1989 Samuel Popkin concludes that "business leaders and government policy-makers are in a position to whip up public support for a major drive toward economic revitalization." Similarly, a Gallup Poll published in the March 13th, 1989 *New York Times* found some 79 percent of Americans believing that tensions among the superpowers had moderated and, as a result, they advocated balancing the national budget by cutting defense expenditures, governmental pensions, and foreign aid. Gallup also notes, "An inward-looking America is overwhelmingly opposed to increased foreign investment in the U.S. and sees Japan as supplanting the United States as the world's leading economic power."

As these polls suggest, Americans are slowly becoming aware that their economic problem with Japan is not entirely American-made and that living with a super-rich Japan will require specific measures that go beyond general support of the global trading system. According to a high-level report delivered to the new American administration's trade representative and supervised by the chief executives of American Express and Corning Glass, bilateral American trade with Japan reveals the following characteristics:

- The trade deficit with Japan is 40 percent of the overall United States trade deficit and is declining at a substantially lower rate than for the global deficit, despite a 60 percent appreciation of the value of the yen against the dollar since 1985.
- Japan's imports, particularly of manufactured goods, are between 25 and 45 percent below what would be expected of a country with Japan's economic attributes.
- Total liberalization of Japanese agriculture would result in an increase of crop imports by over 90 percent and livestock by over 40 percent.

It seems probable that the United States will deal with these problems through some form of managed trade, or what is today being called a "results-oriented trade policy," using the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 as a club to enforce it. I shall

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

return to this subject in the discussion of my fifth trend—the shift away from free trade in order to deal with global trade imbalances.

Any discussion of the decline of American hegemonism must include the issue of American military commitments. It has begun to dawn on some Americans that the single most effective way to regain American competitiveness vis-à-vis Japan would be to cut American defense expenditures to Japanese levels—around 1.5 percent of GNP. If the Americans did that they could balance their governmental budget and still have approximately $100 billion left over for productive investments. At the present time there are some 325,000 American service personnel stationed in Europe and another 144,000 afloat in the Pacific or based in Guam, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Expenditures directly related to European defense consume about 60 percent of the annual $300 billion U.S. defense budget.

Communist Decrepitude and the Pacific

IT IS of course the second main trend, the suddenly revealed decrepitude of the USSR, that makes it possible and even probable that the Yankees will finally start to go home. In May of this year the world witnessed the first summit meeting between the Soviet Union and China since Khrushchev met Mao in Peking in October 1959. Even a decade ago renewed friendly relations between Russia and China would have been seen as an unmitigated disaster. Sino-Soviet hostility was viewed as necessary to guarantee that Russian armies would not be aimed at the West and Chinese armies not aimed at Southeast Asia. Today, a Sino-Soviet summit seems not to threaten anyone and, in fact, Western nations are wishing at least the USSR well in its efforts to emerge from the straightjacket of discredited economic doctrine.

China is another story. The reactionary rule of Deng Xiaoping and his bloody repression of the Chinese people's aspirations for some degree of democracy and governmental accountability seem to have set back China's belated efforts to join the world's most rapidly developing economic area. Without doubt the reassertion of Communist party despotism in China will cripple China's next generation of leaders and managers, cause a flight of investment capital from the Chinese mainland, and accelerate the refugee flow from Hong Kong. It also underscores the correctness of Taiwan's developmental policies both economically and politically—something that the nations who have read Taiwan out of virtually every international organization will have to ponder. But an inward-looking Chinese mainland is unlikely to be a security threat to anyone—except those unlucky enough to live there, who will of course try to get out. The paradox of modern China is that all Chinese outside of China are among the world's richest and most productive people, whereas those inside China are among the world's poorest and least productive. The events of June 1989 have ensured that this will continue to be more or less true for the immediate future.

Nonetheless, Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts at perestroika do not automatically mean that it is safe for the United States to find the savings it needs by cutting defense spending radically. And this is not just because Gorbachev might fail. Even if he did fail, or if the Chinese became a renewed threat to Southeast Asia, the United States would not necessarily feel responsible for countering this threat. It is clear that Americans increasingly expect their allies in Europe and Asia to assume at least their own conventional defense. This is one of the secondary reasons for the movement toward a united Europe by 1992—to provide the economic foundations through which Europe can supply more of its own defense. Whether one regards the United States as being in decline or as having succeeded magnificently in its postwar policies of rebuilding Europe and Japan, or perhaps a combination of both, a situation has developed that calls for a new division of labor in providing for the common defense. And the end of superpower hegemony should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mean that both the U.S. and the USSR can turn some of their resources toward rebuilding their economic infrastructures.

However, in the short run Americans probably will not cut their defense expenditures drastically because their ability to project power remains a major source of leverage in the world, particularly in the Pacific. Differing from Europe, the nations of the Pacific do not have a common enemy—the Japanese fear the USSR, the South Korean enemy is North Korea, the Vietnamese distrust China, the Thai and Cambodian enemy is Vietnam, the Taiwanese oppose mainland China, and the Indonesians also still fear China. (For the Australians, it may be all or none of the above; and for New Zealand the chief enemy seems to be the U.S.) Under these circumstances the United States has a role to play as a power broker in the Pacific region. To what extent it actually can or will play this role is still an open question, depending on such things as the renegotiation of the treaty for the Philippine bases and the development of anti-Americanism in South Korea.

Meanwhile it seems likely that both the U.S. and the USSR will react to their changing environments by husbanding their resources and attempting to develop a sophisticated diplomacy of maneuver and balance. As the world shifts increasingly back to a situation in which economic performance is the primary index of national power, as it was in the late nineteenth century, military capability will become less important as an end in itself and resume its place as a means to an end.

Japan has contributed mightily to these trends. In the postwar dispensation Japan was understood to have strategic but not economic importance for the Free World. This was the reason why Japan was allowed to maintain an undervalued currency and to protect its domestic market so much longer after the war than any other advanced industrial democracy. But all that has changed. Without question the death this past year of the Showa Emperor marked the end of an era for Japan. Retrospectives, obituaries, and documentaries laid to rest not only him but also the image of Japan as a war-stricken, defeated country. Japan now stands revealed for what it is today: the world's richest big nation in terms of per capita income, the major source of long-term capital on earth today, the financier of America's budgetary and trade deficits, the leader of a campaign of foreign direct investment in North America and Western Europe that is unprecedented in scope and velocity, and the master of many new areas of technology such as telecommunications, semiconductors, robotics, nuclear power generation, and new materials. Nowhere do Americans see greater need for a new division of labor than in their relations with the Japanese.

The Trade-Defense Linkage

ONE REASON why current arrangements between Japan and the U.S. stand revealed as inadequate and outdated is that the issues of trade and defense have become linked in people's minds. This third trend is one that in the past both the Japanese and American governments have sought strenuously to avoid. With regard to Japan, three major events have helped to forge this linkage. The first was the 1987 revelation that the Toshiba Machine Company had illegally shipped machine tools to the USSR that significantly enhanced the ability of Soviet submarines to escape detection at sea by the U.S. The Americans were not pleased to see their costs of maintaining deterrence raised, particularly when the Japanese make no contribution to that deterrence.

The second event was the failure of Japan during the Iran-Iraq war to join the United States and Western Europe in their efforts to keep the Persian Gulf open to shipping. Even though Japan is more dependent on Mideast oil for its energy supply than any other advanced industrial democracy, its failure to participate in the Gulf operation also freed it from such difficult political issues as the attack on the USS Stark and the shooting down by a U.S. naval vessel of an Iranian

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

airliner. The U.S. does not advocate full Japanese rearmament, but it does advocate pricing such things as oil for Japan somewhat closer to their true cost.

The third event has been Japan's refusal to buy American (or for that matter European) fighter aircraft for its so-called self-defense forces, even though it has large trade surpluses with both regions and foreign aircraft are superior in terms of quality and price. Japan's protestations of pacifism have been undermined by its decision to produce its own fighter aircraft using domestic taxpayers' funds.

Europe and Japan

THE FOURTH trend, towards a united Europe, is also related to Japan's emergence as an economic power. The uniting of Europe is arguably the most important development in current international politics and the single most significant reaction thus far to Pacific economic dynamism. As Roy Jenkins recently observed in the London *Times*, "Previously in Europe the politicians led reluctant businessmen and hesitant economies toward the promised land of a more integrated market. Now it is the other way around." Economic necessity (or self-interest) is the primary reason for the European decision to integrate—as well as for the Canadians to enter into a free trade agreement with the United States. The Europeans, Canadians, and Americans are developing a united front in order to compete effectively with Japan and the other capitalist developmental states of East Asia. In an important sense both the Canadian-American and the European developments constitute a de facto shift to Japanese economic rules—such as a greater reliance on cartels—even though the Japanese do not like to be emulated in this way.

The Japanese have reacted sharply against both the Canadian-American agreement and the European 1992 proposal. The Canadian agreement is less threatening to them because they are already heavily involved in manufacturing and other forms of investment in both the United States and Canada. Moreover, the United States remains the easiest place on earth for foreigners to acquire assets or go into business without even having to report their activities to the U.S. government. As of 1988 Japanese direct investment was distributed roughly two-fifths in North America, a fifth each in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and only 15 percent in Europe. Until quite recently many Japanese looked on Europe with disdain and took pride in their immunity to "Eurosclerosis" or the "English disease" (*Eikokubyo*), meaning the rigidities, labor disputes, and lagging growth rates associated with the 1970s. *PHP Intersect*, a Japanese magazine, recently reported that "Many Japanese still have an outdated view of individual European states, tending to regard them as cultural museums—Beefeaters, cathedrals, Leonardo da Vinci, and so on." That view is changing fast. The numbers of Japanese manufacturers in Europe jumped from 280 subsidiaries or joint ventures in 1987 to around 400 by the end of 1988.

Is it accurate to regard "Europe, Inc." as a specific answer to Japan, Inc.? It would seem so. On March 19th of this year the *Washington Post* reported, "European officials indicate privately that any European Community trade barriers after 1992 are likely to be aimed at Japan." And in Tokyo, even one of the few relatively successful European exporters, the head of BMW Japan, told *PHP Intersect* in March that after 1992 the European Community will require reciprocity from Japan in the sense that "Japanese automakers will be permitted a 10 percent share of the European market only if their European counterparts receive a similar share in Japan." This insistence on reciprocity is virtually certain to be required in financial services, which are not at the present time covered by GATT. Japanese banks control some 10 percent of all deposits in European banks, but European banks control only 0.35 percent of all deposits in Japanese banks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan currently enjoys a trade surplus of $20 billion with the European Community, but it is the composition of that trade that concerns the Europeans as much as the size of the deficit. Japan sells to Europe cars, computers, videocassette recorders, and fax machines. In return Japan buys from Europe objects d'art, antiques, gold, diamonds, and woolen goods. In the automotive trade, Japan sells Europe some 1.2 million cars annually but buys from Europe only 120,000 cars, even though European cars are perfectly adaptable to Japanese roads in terms of size, fuel efficiency, and handling characteristics. In a very important sense, the movement toward unity in Europe is a clear-cut trade strategy aimed at recapturing competitive ability from Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

There is no question but that a European Community that successfully integrates its twelve nations into a single market will have a profound effect on the structure of international trade. The greater efficiency, economies of scale, and competitive pressures should overcome the traditional European failings of over-regulation, high and inflexible labor costs, and technological backwardness. Europe should also have the resources to provide for its own defense and to formulate a defense policy that is in accordance with its own, and not American, estimates of its needs. The European Community already provides some 17 percent of the world's exports, compared with 11 percent for the United States and 10 percent for Japan. With a population of 323 million, Europe's projected 1992 gross national product is $6.5 trillion, which exceeds that of both the United States (with 242 million people and a GNP of $6.4 trillion) and Japan (with 124 million people and a GNP of $4.4 trillion). A unified European market should mean that Europe will no longer lag behind the hitherto more dynamic and adaptable countries of the Pacific Rim. It could also mean a great expansion of trade among three roughly equal centers of advanced industrial activity.

Towards Adversarial Trade

OF COURSE, the Canadian-American agreement and the uniting of Europe might also mean an end to the era of free trade and a shift to economic blocs that offer free trade to insiders but protectionism to outsiders. As of now this seems to be the predominant trend. The movement away from multilateralism, the fifth of the major trends altering the structure of international relations, is occurring primarily because of the peculiar pattern exhibited by Japan in the global economy and the inability thus far to cause Japan to alter its behavior through normal commercial influences (e.g., better prices and equal quality of foreign products compared with domestically manufactured goods). It is not true that at present the Canadian-American or European movements are intended primarily to replace the multilateral trading system or to slow the advance of the Pacific economies. But they could easily turn in that direction if Japan continues to practice what Peter Drucker has called "adversarial trade." Adversarial trade means that a country tends not to import any of the products that it exports. This stands in contrast to "competitive trade," in which firms and consumers in a country manufacture, sell, and purchase a wide range of goods from all over the world depending only on their preferences and comparative shopping.

Japan of course denies that it practices adversarial trade. In a recent interview for the *Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry* (March-April 1989), Katsuo Seiki, director of the West Europe Division of MITI's International Trade Policy Bureau, said, "We like to think . . . that there are already fewer institutional barriers—tariffs, quotas, and what have you—in Japan than in Europe and the United States. What are the remaining problems?" The Japanese explain the anomalies in their trade—the low import penetration into Japan of manufacturers, the complete lack of change in U.S. semiconductor sales in Japan between 1973 and 1986, Japan's insensitivity to changes in the macroeconomic environ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment—as a result of a lack of effort, cultural barriers, an overly short-term perspective on the part of foreign salesmen, and poor quality. This is not the whole story, however, and Mr. Seiki deserves an answer to his question.

Let us take the easy items first. Japan's barrier against free trade in rice is one of the most blatantly illegal trade practices in the industrialized world and in clear violation of article XI of the GATT treaty. It was one thing to tolerate protectionism in this sector when Japan was still recovering from the effects of World War II; it is quite another thing, some two Asian wars later, for Japan to force its households to spend more than a third of their income on food. Similarly, even where Japan has agreed to end quotas and special levies on such products as imported beef, it still erects tariff walls that begin at 70 percent and decline slowly to a mere 50 percent. Why should Japanese consumers pay a 50 percent higher price for a common food item when the rest of the world accepts Japanese cars, cassettes, and cameras on the basis of free trade? Equally to the point, Japan's distribution system has evolved into a non-tariff barrier that artificially restricts the choices of Japanese consumers—an unusual burden to bear for the nation with the largest trade surplus as a share of GNP in human history.

BUT THESE CASES are only the obvious and best-known Japanese exceptions to the rules. Three other Japanese institutions are not non-tariff barriers to trade at all, but they create competitive conditions within Japan that consistently discriminate against foreigners. The Japanese understandably reject foreign proposals that they should remodel their society to make it work like other nations party to the GATT treaty. But they should understand that their rejection leaves their trading partners with only two options: either to remodel their own societies in the Japanese direction or to find some way of pricing Japan's exports so that Japan bears the costs of its peculiar national institutions.

The three institutions I have in mind are administrative guidance, industrial groups (*keiretsu*), and Japan's organization of research and development. Administrative guidance refers to the discretionary authority entrusted to Japan's governmental officials to find tailor-made solutions to problems or to implement policies that do not have a legal basis (for example, Japan's prohibition against the import of refined petroleum products). Because of administrative guidance, a foreigner can *never* master the rules of doing business in Japan. The rules change with the bureaucrats put in charge of implementing them, and the legal system does not function to ensure that government officials enforce the law in a predictable manner. Administrative guidance was a powerful tool for Japan's rapid economic development, but it makes trying to do business in Japan as difficult as it is in a communist country.

Keiretsu, or what before the war were called *zaibatsu*, are Japan's famous industrial conglomerates. They are held together by cross shareholding (with a portion of the shares never traded regardless of price in order to prevent foreign or domestic takeovers), interlocking directorates, intragroup financial commitments, and overlapping memberships in the councils and presidents' clubs of each group. *Keiretsu* activities include putting together complex economic ventures at home and abroad, sharing of technology, employment of redundant personnel from member firms, and research and development. The benefits to members include preferential service from a group's bank and trading company, relative insulation from business cycles, and the ability to devote more resources to expanding productive capacity and market share.[1] The *keiretsu* form of industrial organization is one of Japan's most important contributions to modern capital-

[1]Ulrike Wassmann and Kozo Yamamura, "Do Japanese Firms Behave Differently? The Effects of *Keiretsu* in the United States," in Kozo Yamamura, ed., *Japanese Investment in the United States: Should We Be Concerned?* (Seattle: Society for Japanese Studies, 1989), pp. 119–147.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ism. At the same time it clearly violates Western conceptions of anti-trust and makes a mockery of much of the economic theory that is predicated on the workings of "market forces." Western nations have yet to come up with a competitive match for the Japanese *keiretsu*, and the problem is becoming acute as *keiretsu* relationships are extended to North America and Western Europe through direct investment by Japan. *Keiretsu* are institutions uniquely suited to the protection of a domestic market while taking aggressive advantage of foreign markets where such arrangements are prevented by law.

My final case of a mismatch between Japan and the West is the way research and development is organized. Japan does its R&D in proprietary, company-owned research institutes, whereas the West does much of its research in universities and engineering schools that are open to all qualified students in accordance with the principle of academic freedom. The result is that the flow of technology still remains conspicuously in Japan's direction and not the other way around, even though Japan today spends almost as much on R&D as the United States and does not engage in military research. These problems are exacerbated by Japan's inadequate protection of intellectual property rights by international standards. As a consequence of these differences, there is today a marked trend toward the privatization of research as Western companies and universities try to compete with Japan.

The doctrine of free trade, together with related elements of classical economic theory such as comparative advantage and the ability of the price mechanism to correct imbalances in trade among nations, seems slowly to be losing ground in the face of these kinds of Japanese anomalies. Perhaps the best example of this is the American attempt from 1985 to the present to correct its disastrous trade deficit with Japan by lowering the value of the dollar against the yen. "Advocates of a lower dollar," writes Daniel Burstein in the February 19, 1989 *New York Times*, "base their case on econometric modeling showing how a weaker dollar makes American goods more competitive abroad and foreign goods less so at home. But several years of experience now make clear what should have been obvious from the beginning: the world we live in does not much resemble the model." To the extent that Japanese rules actually do become world rules, free trade will be replaced by such principles and practices as specific reciprocity, proprietary research, international cartels, orderly marketing agreements, and managed trade. It will not necessarily be a poorer world, economic theory notwithstanding, but it will be a different one.

Problems for Japan

WHAT ARE Japan's likely courses of action in response to these five trends? Other than a slow process of ameliorative change after considerable foreign pressure, Japan's only initiative thus far is its cautious exploration of a cooperative relationship among Pacific nations. This follows Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke's proposal of January 1989 in Seoul for a new Pacific economic cooperation body. Hawke argued that this proposed organization should be loosely modeled after the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in Paris, and he insisted that he did not have a trading bloc such as Europe 1992 in mind. His proposal parallels earlier ideas advanced by former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone for a Pacific Forum for Economic and Cultural Cooperation, by former U.S. Secretary of State Shultz for a Pacific intergovernmental forum, and by U.S. Senator Bill Bradley for a Pacific coalition on trade and economic development. On March 22, 1989, Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita ordered MITI to work out the details of an Asian-Pacific economic cooperation pact as soon as possible.

It seems probable that Japan is preparing the ground for a possible Pacific trading bloc in case the North American and European developments work against Japanese trade. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact, Prime Minister Hawke's proposal may have been intended to preempt a yen bloc comparable to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere of fifty years ago. In a press conference following his address in Seoul, Hawke acknowledged that in a worst-case, collapse-of-GATT type of situation, his proposed cooperative body might turn into a trading bloc.

There are obvious problems with all of these proposals. One of them is that economic relations among the Pacific nations have developed informally and any attempt to give them a formal structure tends to diminish these relationships. Thus, for example, both South Korea and Taiwan trade with mainland China, but none of them wants to talk about it. Two of the most powerful economies in the Pacific—Taiwan and Hong Kong—are not nation states, and one of them, Hong Kong, is scheduled to be turned over to the management of one of the most economically incompetent eight years from now. South Korea is already suspicious of a possible invitation to join the OECD because it fears that joining any group will blunt its economic efforts. In Southeast Asia, the members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) said to MITI Minister Shigeo Muraoka that they were willing to discuss Japan's economic cooperation pact but they wanted to include the United States in it, which Hawke's original proposal failed to do. Except in the cases of China, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the United States remains the most important market for both the newly industrialized economies and the ASEAN nations.

The larger unspoken problem is Japanese leadership in Asia. Japan has yet to come to terms with its history of imperialism and militarism in East Asia or with the fact that its postwar position as a client of the United States to some extent protected it from the scrutiny of its fellow Asians. Historically, Japan posed the greatest threat to China of any of the imperialist powers, and the Chinese have certainly not forgotten this. Ding Xinghao of Shanghai's Institute of International Studies notes, "Japan's view is always a flying goose format with Japan as the head goose. Our memories are long, so we aren't about to fly in Japan's formation."[2] Similarly, despite Japan's recent neonationalist revisions of its role in World War II, Robert Wargo warns, "One of the most dangerous courses [for Japan] is to try to argue that the war was fought to liberate Greater Asia from the Americans and the Europeans. If Japan wanted to liberate Asia, why didn't it start with Korea?"[3] None of this is to say that Japan cannot offer leadership in Asia. It is rather to stress that Japan has not yet confronted the real problems in doing so.

I conclude (like a symphony) by reiterating my opening statement. The combination of an end of American hegemony, a decrepit Soviet Union, a linkage between trade and defense, Europe 1992, an end to free trade, and the emergence of Japan as the world's leading industrialized nation adds up to a change in the structure of international relations. Although these forces are making the old institutions and paradigms obsolete, indications concerning the shape of the institutions of the future are thus far only tentative and experimental. What does seem certain is that the new paradigm when it emerges will confound virtually all of our old categories. It may well be true that Japan is the most advanced capitalist nation today. But it may equally well prove true, as many foreign observers of the Japanese government-business relationship have concluded over the years, that "Japan is the only communist nation that works."

---

[2]"Though Rich, Japan Is Poor in Many Elements of Global Leadership," *Wall Street Journal*, January 30, 1989. For a Japanese article that uses the concept of *ganko hatten* (flying-goose-formation development), see Takashi Inoguchi, "90-nendai 'keizai taikoku' no konnan-na sentaku" (Difficult Choices in the 1990s for the 'Economic Superpower'), *Ekonomisuto*, December 6, 1988, pp. 70–75.

[3]*PHP Intersect*, March 1989, p. 46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What America Should Do

IN THE MEANTIME the situation that exists today between Japan and the United States is profoundly unstable. The year 1989 marks the twenty-first anniversary of bilateral American trade deficits with Japan, deficits that are so large they threaten the stability of the political relations between the two allies. There are only two ways to reduce these deficits: Japan must buy more from the United States, or the United States must stop buying so much from Japan. The latter could be achieved overnight through a new version of former President Nixon's import surcharge, this time applied only to Japanese products. The better, but harder, solution would be for Japan genuinely to enlarge domestic demand, as its own analysis of the world's economic imbalances (known as the Maekawa Report) recommended. This would require political leadership to open up land for new housing and to end the hammer lock of mom-and-pop stores (*kado-mise*) on Japanese retail sales. In the mid-1980s stores with four or fewer employees still accounted for an astonishing 56 percent of retail sales in Japan, compared with 3 percent in the United States and 5 percent in Western Europe. Japanese family stores require a vast apparatus of wholesalers to keep them stocked. These wholesalers have a vested interest in restricting retail outlets that compete primarily on the basis of price, as do those in the United States and other Western nations. One Japanese bank economist recently calculated that Japanese retail prices are 4.2 times higher than wholesale prices, whereas the analogous U.S. ratio is 1.8 to 1. Those who speak for Japan, including those who are on a Japanese retainer regardless of nationality, conveniently forget about these Japanese barriers to trade when they accuse the United States of protectionism. If the United States is protectionist, it is without question the most incompetent protectionist in history.

The United States has tried to force resolution of some of these issues through section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988. Despite loud and intemperate criticism of this action in such places as Japan and Australia, including personal attacks on Carla Hills, the United States Trade Representative, for implementing a law that she had no role in enacting, section 301 is actually an effective reminder of the time-table that exists on the world trading system. It takes between twelve and eighteen months to implement section 301, and the so-called Uruguay Round of negotiations to try to make the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) workable and relevant to the 1990s also has about twelve to eighteen months to run. All that section 301 does is to warn the world of what is waiting if the world's richest nations continue to stall on fixing the GATT treaty. This is a more realistic approach toward encouraging serious negotiations than the continuous invocation of the name of Saint Adam Smith by the vestal virgins of the economics profession.

BUT THE Trade Act and Section 301 by themselves will not preserve the postwar system of international trade or halt the decline of the United States into the status of a second-class economic power (i.e., like the USSR). It will also be necessary for the Americans to do the following things:

- Start financing their own government and stop living off borrowings from Japanese savers.
- Recognize that Japan has replaced the USSR as America's most important foreign policy problem and that relations with Japan require specific, goal-oriented, closely monitored strategies.
- Create an American Department of International Trade and Industry (DITI) to coordinate American economic policy and end the situation in which Washington has become a (foreign and domestic) lobbyists' paradise.
- Adopt policies to get the United States back into consumer electronics and other industries of the future.
- Enact a foreign investor's disclosure law and demand specific reciprocity in foreign direct investment for both Americans and investors in America.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bashing Back

In a volume called *The Japan That Can Say No*, selling briskly in Tokyo bookstores these days, a dark-horse candidate to be the next Prime Minister argues forcefully that Japan no longer needs to act like the deferential stepchild of the United States.

When it comes to targeting American nuclear missiles, the candidate, Shintaro Ishihara, wrote, "if one doesn't use Japanese semiconductors, one cannot guarantee precision." He added, "No matter how much the Americans expand their military, they have come to the point that they could do nothing if Japan were one day to say, 'We will no longer sell you chips.' "

If Japan decided to sell its chips to the Soviet Union instead, he speculated in the book, "that would instantly change the balance of military power."

Until recently, such nationalistic themes have usually been voiced only on the far left and right of Japanese politics. But now, in the midst of Japan's biggest political upheaval in 35 years, a growing impatience with the United States is bubbling to the surface of mainstream political discussion here with increasing frequency. . . .

What makes *The Japan That Can Say No* unusual is that its authors could scarcely hold more establishment credentials. Mr. Ishihara, a former novelist known for his blunt views, has served in Parliament for 21 years and held two Cabinet posts.

The other author, more conciliatory in tone, is perhaps Japan's best-known entrepreneur: Akio Morita, the chairman of Sony Corporation. . . .

The *New York Times*
August 4, 1989

- Undertake reform of American economic institutions to build into them incentives that give managers a longer-term perspective.

Even if by some miracle the Americans should do all of these things, the need for which is well known to virtually all American business and political elites, the structure of international relations will still continue to change. It will just not change quite so obviously to the disadvantage of the United States.

The fundamental problems in Japanese-American relations are not in any sense conceptual but political. It is easy to envisage solutions to bilateral problems that preserve the most valuable transoceanic trading relationship that ever existed and that has made the parties to the relationship the richest people on earth. What threatens the relationship are entrenched interests in the preservation of the system of inequalities that characterized Japanese-American relations during the 1960s. For the Americans this means the interests of the defense establishment in the role of America as hegemon athwart the Pacific, of the diplomatic establishment in Cold War dualism, of the economic intellectuals in not having to recognize that they have been blind-sided by Japanese institutional inventiveness, and of the Atlanticists in not having to come to grips with problems for which they do not have the requisite skills. For the Japanese this means the interests of exporters over importers, of industrialists over consumers and environmentalists, of the ruling party in continuing to avoid the responsibilities of leadership, and of the cultural nationalists in their view of Japan as unique and not subject to the standards they routinely apply to foreigners. Given the insipid 1988 American electoral contest and the simultaneous Japanese discovery of "structural corruption" in the Recruit bribery case, the chances of political leadership to resolve Japanese-American differences are poor. Under these circumstances it seems that Pacific relationships will continue to deteriorate until crisis forces serious thinking in the countries that have the most to lose.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Malcolm Bradbury, Michael Foot, Henry Kissinger, Cecil Parkinson, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Helmut Schmidt, Rupert Murdoch, Duke of Devonshire, Yehudi Menuhin, John Cleese, Seamus Heaney, Milton Friedman, Mary Kenny, Alexander Chancellor, George Will, Bernard Levin, Michael Heseltine, Max Kampelman, Tom Stoppard, Milovan Djilas, Claus Von Bulow, Paul Nitze, Daniel Moynihan, William F. Buckley, Susan Sontag, Ian McShane, Jeffrey Archer, Anthony Thwaite, Kingsley Amis, Gavin Lyall, Lord Carrington, Arnold Beichman, David Frost, Leo Rosten, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Leon Levy, Leszek Kolakowski, Melvyn Bragg, Noel Annan, William Boyd, Robert Elegant, Max Beloff, Harold Lever, Anthony Burgess, David Owen, John O'Sullivan, Brian Redhead, Nikolai Tolstoy, Irving Kristol, Bruno Bettelheim, Conrad Black, Ron Burr, Edward Teller, Eric Rhode, David Pryce-Jones, James Goldsmith, Graham Greene, Octavio Paz, Michael Caine, William Simon, Donald Regan, Gerald Ronson, Andrew Knight, Studs Terkel, Walter Rostow, Peter Parker, David Hockney, Paul Volcker, Lord Bauer, Frank Shakespeare, Roy Jenkins, Harvey Tyson, Auberon Waugh

SEND $33.75 AND SUBSCRIBE FOR THE SAME REASONS THEY DO

There has got to be something special about a magazine that persuades people like these, along with many thousands of others to renew their subscriptions year after year.


ENCOUNTER
JAPAN TODAY
Brian Moeran: Homo Harmonicus & the Yenjoy Girls
George Webb: Japan in London
Make-up: A Play by Inoue Hisashi
Yasunari Takahashi: Japanese Theatre
Malcolm Rutherford on Sean O'Casey
E.E.Greenwood on Karl Löwith

The first issue in October 1953 featured prose by Albert Camus and Christopher Isherwood, poems by C. Day Lewis and Edith Sitwell, economics by J K Galbraith, literary criticism by Stephen Spender. Nearly 35 years later and with loyal subscribers in more than 90 countries, Encounter continues to thrive by presenting – each month – a constantly surprising mix of ideas. Opinions clash – important issues of contemporary life are debated and analysed – with poets and philosophers, journalists and historians, politicians and artists arguing it out together.

Take advantage of our special offer.

Send us your payment, US$33.75 or Canadian $39, this gives you a 25% discount and we will start your subscription with the next available issue.



Give yourself something to think about – Subscribe now!

☐ I enclose my cheque to Encounter Ltd

☐ I wish to pay by credit card ☐ American Express ☐ Access/MasterCard

Valid until _____ Signature _____

☐ Invoice me ☐ Invoice my company

Name _____

Address _____

EXCLUSIVE OFFER
25% off plus additional bonus: free copy of DJILAS interview.

N Encounter Ltd, 44 Great Windmill Street, London W1V 7PA, England.
Telephone 01-434 3063.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Theory and Practice of Japan-Bashing

David Brock

IT IS MORE than two years since eight members of Congress took sledgehammers to a Toshiba radio-cassette on the grounds of the Capitol to dramatize their protest of that company's sale of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. While that image may have all but disappeared in the minds of most Americans by now, if not most Japanese, the sentiments the event expressed continued to gather force in the months following it, and may have reached something of a high point this past spring in Washington in a series of less evocative but far more effectual episodes.

The stage for this round of U.S.-Japan confrontation was set last year, when Congress, over the objections of President Reagan, passed the 1988 Omnibus Trade Act. Attached to the act is the so-called "Super 301" provision requiring the president to cite "trade liberalization priority" countries, and then enter into negotiations with them to dismantle the tariffs, taxes, or other obstacles deemed to be either blocking U.S. imports or limiting the expansion of services. Failing that, the U.S. government is bound by the act to take retaliatory actions, such as barring those nations' exports to the U.S.

As the May 31 deadline for the citations approached, a wrenching debate broke out in the Bush administration (which won office on a free-trade platform that explicitly rejected the 301 approach) about whether any countries ought to be cited, and if so, which ones. Both Robert Mosbacher, the secretary of commerce, and Carla Hills, the U.S. trade representative, pressed to cite Japan—a move they said would signal American determination to pry open foreign markets. On geostrategic grounds, both the State Department and the Pentagon opposed any moves to single out allies, particularly Japan. It was thus left largely to outside economists to advance the argument that in practice the 301 process could be a slippery slope resulting in a round of fixed shares and tit-for-tat retaliations that would shrink world trade and stifle economic growth. But the law was written so as to make it virtually impossible for the U.S. *not* to cite Japan. So on May 26, Hills took the unprecedented step of charging Japan with restricting the import of U.S.-made supercomputers, satellites, and lumber products. (Brazil and India were also named to take the edge off the decision for the Japanese.) Missouri Democratic Representative Richard Gephardt, the main sponsor of 301, scolded the administration for its "feeble" use of the provision; he wanted a host of other barriers cited as well.

While the U.S.-Japan trade relationship has been deteriorating for some years, it was during the 301 machinations that the bad blood began to spill over to the defense and security relationship between the two countries, theretofore undisturbed. At issue was a

David Brock is a senior editor at *Insight* magazine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposed agreement (negotiated by the Reagan administration last November) for American and Japanese co-production of a new Japanese fighter bomber—the FSX—that would use secret U.S. technologies to improve on the existing American F-16. The Japanese originally wanted to build their own fighter jet, but the Pentagon persuaded them that they could get a better fighter with help from U.S. contractors, thereby countering more effectively Soviet air superiority in the region. Though the agreement required giving the Japanese access to advanced U.S. technologies, the Pentagon maintained that the U.S. would get as much as it gave. Critics of the deal, including Mosbacher, Hills, and Gephardt, said that Japan, which currently has no domestic aviation industry, would use the technology to build one, thus challenging the U.S. in one of its last areas of high-tech dominance. Others, notably a group of Reagan Pentagon officials led by Richard Perle, opposed the agreement out of fear of another Toshiba-like loss of advanced defense technologies to U.S. adversaries via Japan. Both sets of critics said Tokyo simply should buy the U.S.-made F-16s, in part to help offset the $50 billion U.S. trade deficit with Japan. After reconsidering the all-but-signed Reagan agreement, Bush approved it. He was then forced by Congress to renegotiate it, specifying that 40 percent of the FSX work would go to U.S. contractors, that certain commercially-viable technologies would not be transferred, and that the Japanese would never sell the FSXs to third countries. As with the 301 compromise, no one claimed to be happy, though the emerging nexus of executive branch and legislative officials who favor, as they put it, "getting tough" with Japan, had put two impressive notches in their belt in the opening months of 1989.

The Changing Climate

THESE VICTORIES can be understood only in the larger context of the changing way in which Americans are seeing Japan. Economic relations between the two countries have changed significantly over the past decade. At the beginning of the 1980s the U.S. had a small surplus in its current account balance—the broadest measure of a nation's economic transactions with the rest of the world—and Japan had a deficit. By 1987, the U.S. trade deficit had reached a high of $152 billion, while Japan had a trade surplus of $87 billion. While the U.S. trade deficit fell to $120 billion last year, 44 percent of the total deficit was with Japan (despite the increase of U.S. imports to Japan and a doubling of the value of the yen, which makes Japan's products more expensive in the U.S.). Throughout the decade, American companies one by one lost market shares to the Japanese in key industries worldwide, dropping out of the manufacture of the many basic goods—from semiconductor chips to television sets to rechargeable batteries—that form the high-tech infrastructure of the country. In computers and electronics there was additional concern about Japanese superiority in areas vital to U.S. national security. Compounding this problem was Japan's repeated unwillingness to open its markets to foreign products. Japanese banks and investors began playing a pivotal role in the American economy, financing with recycled trade surplus dollars a good portion of the U.S. federal budget deficit and commercial loan market, and buying up both real estate and businesses.

All of this sparked a good measure of fear, envy, and frustration in the American public, especially among the generation that not only remembers Japan as a war-time enemy but also remembers the benevolent U.S. role in the postwar reconstruction of the country, now the world's second largest economy and largest creditor. These bitter sentiments gained vivid expression most recently in the FSX debate, when North Carolina's Republican Senator Jesse Helms said: "They skinned us many a time. They skinned us real bad in December 1941, and they are skinning us with the FSX." Trade Representative Hills, who imposed the 301 provision on Japan, commented recently:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"It's hard to say that there is not antagonism toward Japan in this country, or that it is not growing." In May, a *Washington Post* poll found that almost half of those surveyed believe that Japan is a greater threat to the U.S. than is the Soviet Union.

For years reports of these trends tended to be dismissed routinely as Japan-bashing, an indiscriminate label for any and all complaints about Japan, whether or not they were well-founded. The term, often taken as a euphemism for racism, has been employed effectively by Western apologists for Japan, and by the Japanese themselves, as a way of cutting off debate by discrediting it. As James Fallows, in his book *More Like Us* (New York: Houghton Miflin, 1989), writes: "The American fraternity of Japan-handlers, which includes most diplomats and a number of businessmen, scholars and journalists, instinctively stifles outright complaints about Japan." According to a July 11, 1988 *Business Week* article, some have speculated indelicately that this is a result of the fact that about 80 percent of the money for U.S. academic research on Japan comes from Japanese sources. Stephen S. Cohen, director of the University of California at Berkeley's Roundtable on the International Economy, told *Business Week* that the Japanese have shaped U.S. perspectives on Japan by using their money to "determine which songs get played louder."

Fallows notes that with the publication of Harvard professor Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One* in 1979, the idea that America should be more like Japan has become the litany of the senior generation of Western Japanologists. In their analysis, the explanation for America's export woes could be found in the superior work ethic and team spirit of the Japanese worker, who produced higher-quality products than his lazy and selfish American counterpart. Ultimately, U.S. competitive shortcomings could be traced to a lax school system that was vastly inferior to the Japanese model. If American failure to penetrate the Japanese market had anything to do with Japanese trade barriers or cultural chauvinism, if low prices for the Japanese exporting juggernaut were offset by outrageously high prices paid by the Japanese at home, one rarely read much about it.

To say that this is no longer the case would be an understatement. In fact it is impossible to recall a time since the World War II "Yellow Peril" propaganda campaign when Japan has been the object of more negative attention from American intellectual and political elites. Though they are by and large still considered mavericks, Japan's critics are gaining prominence in the ranks of Japan analysts as well as a wide and sympathetic audience, and Japan-bashing is increasingly in vogue in both the popular press and in political circles left and right. One of the earliest and most influential articles in this genre was the late Theodore White's 1985 broadside in the *New York Times Magazine*, in which the respected journalist charged that Japan's trading practices amounted to the continued pursuit of World War II by economic means. In his new book, *Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), journalist Daniel Burstein picks up where White left off. In his fictionalized prelude he describes the year 2004 when Japan is imagined to have wrested entire control of the U.S. economy from Americans. A recent cover story in the *Atlantic* by James Fallows was entitled "Containing Japan," a term previously reserved only for America's ideological and military nemesis, the Soviet Union. MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch has even speculated that Japan is again building an Asian co-prosperity zone, one that may eventually forge a Moscow-Tokyo bloc. The reception these and similar works have met was captured well in a *Boston Globe* review of one of the most provocative and unforgiving books on Japan recently to appear—Dutch journalist Karel van Wolferen's *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). Ten years ago, said the *Globe*'s review, the book "would probably have been condemned to both a peripheral publisher and audience. But by 1989, the climate of perception has changed. Van Wolferen's publisher

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is prestigious, mainstream Knopf. His audience is likely to be well-placed, skeptical of Japan and hungry to make sense of the Japanese challenge." The *Washington Post*'s Tokyo correspondent began a recent dispatch: "It may be dangerous, in this trade-tension era, to admit to any sympathy for the Japanese point of view."

When They're Right, They're Right

IT MUST BE said nonetheless that the picture of Japanese society that is emerging from the Japan-bashing accounts is on the whole more realistic than the one painted by the old-line Japan-handlers. Much of the new writing is aimed at pointing out just how different Japanese society is from our own; but whereas earlier accounts commonly were paeans to Japanese "discipline" and "harmony," the new emphasis is on those Japanese qualities Americans presumably would least want to emulate. In the cultural realm, these include the Japanese emphasis on hierarchy, conformity, exclusivity, and racial homogeneity. Last year, Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr. published *Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), an influential memoir of his days first as a senior American executive living in Japan trying to market exports, and later as a top trade negotiator in the Reagan Commerce Department with responsibility for Japan. Recounting the early experiences of Japanese children in the schools, Prestowitz writes: "Many incidents are reported of children—sometimes led by a teacher—harassing, at times even brutally, those who seem different for one reason or another." Two more striking examples along the same lines come from Fallows, who writes: "The first time I took my sons to the public bath in the neighborhood where we were staying in Tokyo, we spent half an hour in the requisite scrubbing and cleaning rituals before entering the bath itself. Even so, all the Japanese men stepped out the instant our skin touched water." When Fallows asked the manager of a semiconductor plant in Kyushu why his chips had fewer defects than those made in California or Texas, the manager replied: "We are all Japanese working here, one race." Finally, in his new book *God's Dust: A Modern Asian Journey* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1989), journalist Ian Buruma scores Japan's "institutionalized xenophobia." He writes: "It is a shocking realization to a European, raised in the shadow of the Holocaust, that blood-and-soil mythology still exists in a state of innocence, that it exists among a people for whom it lacks the associations with Auschwitz and Treblinka."

Exposés of Japanese culture also have begun to appear in the popular press, where in the last year or so, and particularly in the period surrounding the Emperor's death in January, one suddenly began reading disparaging accounts of a resurgence of anti-Western political groups; increasing nationalism and arrogance among the young; an interest in nationalist anthropology by Japanese academics; the revival of the Shinto religion (which teaches the racialist cult of the Emperor) and Nihonjinron (the study of Japanese "uniqueness"); the common use of anti-Semitic themes in Japanese popular literature; and the proliferation of revisionist histories which distort and downplay Japan's aggression in Korea, China, and World War II.

All of this would be merely intriguing if there was little connection between Japan's culture and its economic prowess, but analysts of all persuasions have long recognized such a link as an important factor in Japan's emergence as a global economic powerhouse. The Japan-bashers, however, reject the notion that certain Japanese characteristics and techniques—for example their willingness to work a long week and not take holidays—allow them simply to compete in the economic game better than the West; Japan, they say, is playing an entirely different game, one which does not go by the name of free-market capitalism. Prestowitz quotes Naohiro Amaya, a former official of Japan's powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) as saying: "We violated all the traditional concepts. . . . The realization of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

myth that if you entrust things to the market mechanism, the invisible God's hand will bring about a rational result is quite limited."

Amaya's observation has application to both Japan's extraordinary export drive and to the failure of foreign companies to crack Japan's domestic market; the Japan-bashers stress that the Japanese officially practice "adversarial trade"—the phrase coined by the economist Peter Drucker to describe conditions in which one country uses trade barriers combined with policies favoring certain industries to obtain advantages over a trading partner. According to Prestowitz, these policies are the result of the Japanese understanding of the term "openness," which they take to mean permission from a government agency to do something (whereas in the U.S. "openness" means the absence of such government regulatory authority). Thus the Japanese are quite content to follow the government's encouragement of certain industries to exploit foreign markets, deciding which ones to favor with protection and government largesse in the form of development funds and tax exemptions. MITI targets the countries and markets to be penetrated. It can also bring together large producers into one company to achieve economies of scale—a practice U.S. anti-trust laws would prohibit—and effectively shuts down industries that are judged unable to compete. In terms of imports, "openness" in Japan is tantamount to a government decision on how much to lower trade barriers and tariffs in negotiations with foreign firms or governments (rather than removing them, as Americans would understand "opening" markets).

Thanks to a spate of anecdotal evidence, the stories of these barriers to free trade are now legion: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, a private company with close ties to the government, buys fiber optics only from Japanese suppliers; thus, while U.S. companies have 80 percent of the world market in fiber optics, they have less than 3 percent of Japan's. Often, Japanese cultural "uniqueness" is listed as justification for a trade barrier. Foreign pharmaceutical makers are often turned away because their tests are judged inadequate, having been conducted on non-Japanese. Japanese ski manufacturers have been trying to get the government to declare European-made skis—one of the few European import successes in Japan—unsuitable for the market, because Japanese snow is supposedly "wetter" than the European variety.

In addition to identifying the cultural underpinnings of the familiar theory of "Japan, Inc."—the monolith of government and business working together to carry out a national industry policy—Prestowitz and other observers of the Japanese scene have also documented what he calls the more "subtle, non-legalistic nature of Japanese society" that in the absence of specific government policies also keeps imports out and cheap exports flowing to foreign markets. On the import side, the cartel arrangements of the retailing system, maintained through personal relationships and loyalties, serve to keep foreign producers who have gained official access to Japan's markets from the means to distribute their goods. In the U.S. market, for example, Hyundai is able to sell cars in Chrysler, Ford, and GM dealerships; in Japan, any Toyota dealer who even considered carrying Hyundai would be threatened with the loss of his franchise. Clannish Japanese construction firms habitually ignore bids from foreign companies, despite Tokyo's formal 1987 agreement to open that market. In *Yen!*, Burstein, too, goes further than merely flaying traditional trade barriers; his charge is that Japan's more important trade barriers lie in its closed system of corporations, particularly the way its big companies organize in groups, hold each others' stock, and coordinate their business activities. Burstein points out that what Americans would regard as *collusion* is the basis of Japan's industrial structure.

Paying the Price at Home

ANOTHER SIDE to the story of Japan's success looks at the costs of the country's export drive to the Japanese consumer. It would be easy for Westerners to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

understand Japan's conquest of foreign markets as part of a straightforward desire to make money. But Japan's economic success has not translated into more material comforts at home; rather, as a result of years of protection for Japan's producers—farmers, unions, small shops, and big corporations—Japanese consumers must pay exorbitant prices for everything they buy, so foreign buyers can pay less for Japanese products. As Prestowitz puts it: "While Japan is rich, the Japanese are not."

In the absence of imports, the Japanese pay eight times what Americans do for rice; the average home in Japan is one-third the size and costs twice as much as the average American home; in the modernization of the phone system, prices being paid for Japanese-produced fiber-optic cable are three times the world price; and until recently, discount stores were outlawed in favor of mom-and-pop operations and their big mark-ups. Fallows points out that while Japan has the biggest cash surpluses and the largest overseas investments in the world, Japan also has by far the highest consumer prices, the greatest proportion of unpaved roads in the developed world, and the lowest per capita endowment of parks, sporting areas, and other public facilities. Even more baffling to Americans is the self-denying aspect of Japanese life. Fallows observes that less expensive American products for sale in Japan do not sell well because as a rule "Japanese consumers are reluctant to act on price, to be consumers above all."

Fallows believes that this system is the result of an agreement, formalized in the political process, between producers and consumers whereby consumers willingly bear the brunt of protectionism for what they see as the overall good of the country. Others have found an explanation in the disproportionate political clout wielded by Japanese farmers in rural areas vis-à-vis urban consumers that has ensured thirty-five years of one-party rule with little political opposition. Karel van Wolferen, however, writes that Japan is not the "consensus" parliamentary democracy that others have claimed it is, expounding on the old joke that Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party is not liberal, democratic, or a party. Van Wolferen, who has lived in Japan for twenty-five years, argues that Japanese consumers swallow high prices and low living standards because they have little or no choice in who runs Japan, or how. He places less emphasis on Japanese culture and more on a political arrangement ("bureaucratic authoritarianism") put in place more than three centuries ago by a ruling elite.

Essentially, van Wolferen describes an unofficial parallelogram of forces all pushing their own agenda with no one ultimately in charge; decisions are reached through competition and coalition-building among the varied power centers, and enforced through coercion and intimidation. "What is mislabelled 'consensus' in Japan is a state of affairs in which no concerned party thinks it is worthwhile to upset the apple-cart," he writes. By way of detail, van Wolferen describes the scope of old-boy networks by tallying the Tokyo University graduates in ministry and party posts and illustrates former Prime Minister Takeshita's ties to the construction industry by drawing a family tree of relatives in major construction concerns. Where others see inherent cultural qualities, van Wolferen sees compulsion. It is often observed in an admiring fashion, for example, that Japanese companies offer lifetime employment to loyal employees; van Wolferen, however, notes that such loyalty is induced by the refusal of Japanese companies to hire people from other firms. The system has been quite successful in exercising tight social control, containing dissent, and thus retaining power; yet no one controls the system, it is accountable to no one, and it has no control over itself.

The system thrives because, unlike in the Western democracies, there never has been much acceptance of the principle of popular sovereignty in Japan. In fact, van Wolferen maintains that no abstract political or philosophical idea has ever taken hold. This has given rise to a political culture in which there

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are no rules, principles, or morals that always apply. Instead of the rule of law and individual responsibility, both of which are rooted in the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions, Japan's history is animated by "an ideology in which rulers figured as the embodiment of morality." Fallows, writing about this phenomenon in terms of the trade issue, says: "Why is Japan so unconcerned about the double standard of its trading policy? It has to do with the ultimate values of Japanese political life—or what can be called the lack of them. . . . The deeper concept here is the weakness of 'universal principles' in Japan—of ideas that make the Japanese feel that their lives run according to axioms similar to those of human beings' lives around the world."

The Japan-Bashers' Agenda

JAPAN'S CRITICS have not been content simply to describe Japanese society as they see it; most of them draw specific conclusions from their observations for U.S.-Japanese relations. Though one cannot gainsay many of their theoretical insights, here is where Japan-bashing takes a disturbing turn. While the more traditional Japanologists were highly censorious of U.S. business in comparison with an idealized Japan, the Japan-bashers, for all of their sharp demystification of cultural, economic, and political life in Japan, curiously are not only willing to countenance the Japanese world view and its attendant policies, but also implore the United States to imitate them (Fallows is a notable exception). Like the Japan-handlers before them, they are perpetuating their own set of misconceptions, and thus are drawing conclusions for U.S. policy that are almost wholly wrong-headed. Americans are being told to be "just like Japan" all over again. This time, the implications of the advice are more dire, because the Japan-bashers are in fact not only the ultimate apologists for Japan but also America-bashers of the first rank.

The most blatant campaign the Japan-bashers are waging is an assault on free trade—the unimpeded flow of goods and services where each nation sells worldwide what it produces best, and buys the rest. For Prestowitz, the first tack is to demonstrate the "failures" of the free-trade approach in negotiations with the Japanese, taking the reader through disputes over machine tools, motorcycles, semiconductors, telecommunications, aircraft, fiber-optics, petrochemicals, even baseball bats. In the old version of the story, the Japanese worker was indefatigable and the American worker a lout; now, it is Japanese officials who are clever, while American officials are dupes. The problem in each case, Prestowitz thinks, is that because of a "doctrinaire commitment to free trade," the U.S. refused to "take punitive action when attempts to obtain free trade failed."

Entering into such negotiations, the U.S. position has been that if visible trade barriers were removed, leaving a "level playing field," the U.S. would be content with the outcome of fair competition. Prestowitz says this is an inherently flawed framework. In addition to all of those cases where he shows the inability of American negotiators to secure the level playing field, he also analyzes other areas, such as supercomputers, where the Japanese market ostensibly has been opened, formal trade barriers removed, and imports from the U.S. barely increased. If these "failures" can be attributed not to legislative or economic rules but rather to qualities deeply rooted in Japanese culture, it would follow that, in Prestowitz's words, "to negotiate over the procedures of a foreign culture in hopes of obtaining an undefined 'open' market is to court failure and frustration. . . . We cannot negotiate philosophy. . . . U.S. officials will never understand the true inner workings of Japan's group culture, so they shouldn't negotiate on details. . . . "

At bottom, the Japan-bashers make the doubtful judgment that the Japanese simply cannot change. This is the conclusion of van Wolferen's theory of the politically rudderless Japanese system: "The Japanese System and what is left of the international free-trade system are incompatible because the latter

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

requires adherence to rules that the administrators cannot afford to accept without undoing their complex networks of informal relations. . . . Deals can be made within the System, but the introduction of rules that applied to everyone would weaken and eventually destroy it." The message for U.S. policy-makers is obvious: How can one negotiate with a people who have no penultimate decision-maker and who believe in situational ethics?

Faced with a challenge from a centralized, protectionist economy that cannot shift course, the Japan-bashers believe that the only alternative for the U.S., if it is to hold its own in the world economy, is to adopt the Japanese way. The first U.S. goal should be to "correct" the large bilateral trade deficit with Japan (they assume such deficits are meaningful), either by telling the Japanese that the U.S. wants a certain trade balance and leaving it up to them to make it happen; or, more likely, by demanding a certain percentage of particular Japanese markets, based on the performance of certain U.S. exports in other foreign markets. If such negotiations failed, however, Japan would be denied access to certain U.S. markets in retaliation. This, of course, amounts to promoting precisely the system the U.S. for years has been trying to scuttle. Setting trade targets would require an even larger MITI hand in the Japanese economy, for instance by steering investment away from products that compete with certain American exports. In the U.S., the government would have to choose which products it wants to sell to Japan.

In any case, the U.S. would no longer be pursuing a level playing field; the Japanese would no longer be asked to "play fair," excused from having to understand the concept in traditional free-market terms. Having succeeded in getting the U.S. to abandon its goal of negotiating about process in favor of the Japanese penchant for negotiating results, there is reason to believe that the Japanese would be receptive to such initiatives. Fallows reports a conversation with a British friend who tried to negotiate seats for foreign firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange: "Our position was that, in principle, any company that met financial and other standards should be allowed to enter the market. Each time we said that, the Japanese reply was 'How many seats do you want?'" Individual U.S. companies would also prefer guarantees of market share to free competition. In the telecommunications area, for example, where Japan granted U.S. companies access to its mobile telephone market in 1985, Motorola has complained that results in the marketplace, rather than the absence of trade barriers, is the true test of Japan's free trade commitments.

In addition to a call for managed trade, Prestowitz and others are resurrecting calls for a national industrial policy similar to the one the Japanese pursue. "The bad news Prestowitz brings," intoned a *New York Times* reviewer, "is that we must give up the illusion that our system is inherently productive." Once that "illusion" has been surrendered, the door is opened to a host of government-sponsored solutions to the competitiveness quagmire: this would include, on Prestowitz's recommendation, government efforts to identify and support "critical" industries (like supercomputers and aerospace), government-sanctioned business consortia, even a "U.S. Department of International Trade and Industry to oppose Japan's MITI."

In explaining how the United States has reached the sad position of having to abide by an approach that has been antithetical to its free-trade principles for more than two hundred years, the Japan-bashers resemble nothing so much as the America-is-in-decline school that has gained so much notoriety in the last year. There is the apocalyptic sense that not only is "American hegemony" a thing of the past, but that the process of decline is somehow irreversible. To Prestowitz, Wall Street's October 19, 1987 "Black Monday" signalled "the end of the American century," the symbolic climax of the loss of its "position of leadership, of industrial and financial strength, nurtured over the previous century." In competition with Japan, the U.S. is losing its technological edge and must

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

import products it can no longer produce. "The United States," he concludes, "is rapidly succumbing to Japanese economic hegemony." What is more, future U.S. policy should reflect the fact that the U.S. is no longer the world's preeminent economic power. The U.S. can't afford free trade any more. And those who insist on sticking to "outmoded" policies are no longer "dealing with the world the way it is."

More interesting still is the way Prestowitz ties economic decline to military issues, lifting the "imperial overstretch" chapter from the declinist book. According to him, the U.S. government has "time after time bargained away economic goals in exchange for military ones." This point resounded throughout the FSX debate, with critics of the agreement contending that, for the mere sake of our military alliance with Japan, the U.S. was ready to forego its edge in aerospace. "Nowhere have the issues of defense security and economic security come together so clearly as in the case of the FSX," said Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher. Here again, the Japan-bashers are obliging the U.S. to surrender its notion that national security is essentially a matter of military strength, not industrial prowess, and to appropriate the Japanese view, which means showering "strategic" industries with government subsidies, coordination, and protection. "Whereas we treat trade as secondary to national security, for Japan trade is national security," Prestowitz writes.

The corollary to this argument is that Japan has pursued economic strength while ignoring its own defense. FSX opponents, for example, contended that the resources Japan is devoting to co-production, if spent on direct procurement of U.S. planes, would reduce significantly the U.S. burden in defending Japan. The larger issue cuts close to the bone of the U.S.-Japan alliance: Can the U.S. countenance a dependent military ally that is also a fierce economic competitor? The Japan-bashers, attaching more importance to the latter fact than to the alliance, mistrust Japan's loyalty to the U.S.; some seem to question whether Japan is more than nominally an ally. "This is surely the first time in history that a territory in the process of being colonized has actually paid for the right to defend the colonizer," writes Prestowitz. Certainly there is merit to the "burden-sharing" issue, and to the idea that sensitive technologies must be safeguarded, but these points too often are raised as a cover for grievances about Japan's strong economy. The sentiment was captured dramatically by New York real estate developer cum political *enfant terrible* Donald Trump, who took out an advertisement in the *New York Times* proclaiming that he is "sick and tired of being kicked around" by putative allies like Japan. Trump maintained that the nation is now "the world's greatest money machine" because the U.S. "makes it easy" for Japan to keep its defense spending low.

The Political Arena

IN POLITICAL TERMS, these ideas are finding an enthusiastic reception that cuts across traditional party lines. "The idea that the Japanese are taking us to the cleaners has some resonance for members of Congress who think that the issue might play in their districts," Roger Brooks, an Asian policy specialist at the Heritage Foundation, told the *New York Times* this past spring. "The feeling of having our rear ends kicked all the time by the Japanese is prevalent throughout the country." Describing his opposition to the FSX deal, New Mexico's Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman admitted that there "is a lot of political mileage" to be gained from opposing technological alliances with Japan.

In his ill-fated presidential race last year, Representative Gephardt attempted to make the trade issue work for the Democrats by running on a platform that favored retaliatory trade actions against Japan. His brand of "economic nationalism" had a certain resonance with middle-class blue collar workers who have felt the sting of competition from Japan. Though Gephardt dropped out of the race, the Democratic frontrunner, Michael

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dukakis, adopted his message in the closing weeks of the campaign, airing a television ad about the dangers of foreign investment that showed a Rising Sun as a backdrop.

Though Dukakis was soundly defeated, we can expect to hear more from the protectionist Democrats in the future. Karlyn Keene, managing editor of *Public Opinion* magazine, has written: "An economically uncertain Democratic party looks at the prospect of seizing the trade issue, redefining it as the new catchall, economic nationalism, and changing the party's image in the process . . . . Many Democrats appear to believe that a refined message of economic nationalism with a stronger emphasis on trade and protectionist policies will propel them to victory in 1992 by helping them regain the economic advantage." The protectionism-as-patriotism issue is a convenient one for Democrats, as it allows them both the luxury of strong-arming a foreign power while clinging to their general aversion to activist foreign policies as well as neatly avoiding the real challenge of putting America's own troubled fiscal house in order.

In the Bush administration, too, there is interest in what used to be called industrial policy when it was promoted by the Democrats in the early 1980s. Commerce Secretary Mosbacher has endorsed what he called "Japan-style" consortiums. (This means the relaxing of anti-trust laws, no longer barring companies from cooperation beyond the research phase.) Preliminary plans have been set in motion for consortia in everything from a new generation of 4-megabyte memory chips to super-conductivity and high-definition television. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady has publicly ruminated over government measures to correct the alleged short-sightedness of American business: federal assistance to commercial research and development and changes in the tax code to discourage business activities deemed by government authorities as "speculative" and to promote those deemed "productive."

In Congress, Japan-bashers from both parties have enacted a number of ill-considered laws, with the support of American export lobbies that are frustrated by Japan's high growth rates. The 301 provision sends the signal that Washington has given up the effort to get Japan to play by free trade rules. Thus it is unlikely to have the intended effect of "levelling the playing field," as Trade Representative Hills has claimed, and increasing U.S. exports to Japan; in the almost certain event that Japan succeeds in winning a GATT judgment against 301, U.S. exports could become the target not only for Japanese retaliation but for other nations' versions of 301. A trade war with Japan—which in the extreme could trigger a worldwide recession—would be all the more unfortunate because the evidence suggests that the trade gap has actually been closing. From 1986 to 1988, according to the International Trade Commission, total U.S. exports—auto parts, electronic products, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals—to Japan jumped 62 percent to $36 billion a year. Manufactured exports to Japan jumped nearly 65 percent to $19.9 billion over the same period. Purchases of foreign-built cars last year rose 37.1 percent over 1987.

"Trade retaliation seldom leads to good results: It rarely opens foreign markets, and when it does, the gains tend to be small, whether measured in dollar volume, before-and-after market shares or before-and-after percentage of exports," author Jim Powell wrote recently in the *Wall Street Journal*. (Even Gephardt and Hills admit that foreign barriers are responsible for only a fraction of the U.S. trade deficit.) "The most significant market openings—like those in Britain, France, Turkey, Mexico, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan—have had little to do with retaliatory threats. Markets open when a crisis makes it politically possible to overcome entrenched special interests," Powell maintains.

Those proposing protectionist policies overlook the fact that they have succeeded in enacting several barriers to free trade during the years when the trade deficit was soaring. Despite its rhetorical commitment to free

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trade, the Reagan administration imposed more import restrictions than the previous six administrations combined, doubling the share of U.S. imports subject to some form of restraint. More than two-thirds of the goods exported by Japan to the U.S. are subject to some kind of quota, special tariff, or other barrier (including a 100 percent tariff on Japanese lap-top computers and tools). Moreover, the European Community (EC), in its annual report in May on trade, charged the U.S. with erecting forty trade barriers against EC exports. (It cited "buy America" laws, Superfund taxes on oil, import quotas against dairy products, fruit juice, sugar, peanuts, wine, beer, cotton, and machine tools. The EC, of course, appears poised to erect its own set of defensive trade barriers designed to keep out both U.S. and Japanese products.) While the U.S. barriers may be to the short-term benefit of certain exporters, American consumers of foreign products (including businesses) foot the bill, in much the way Japanese consumers are mistreated by their protectionists. The 1986 semiconductor agreement imposed on Japan, designed to protect U.S. industry from Japanese "dumping," contributed to the "quadrupling of semiconductor users and their millions of consumers," Powell writes. (One hardly ever hears that "dumping," another name for discounting, is actually one of the ways foreign countries benefit from Japanese protectionism.) In the case of U.S. quotas on steel imports, which President Bush recently renewed, an estimated $7 billion a year is added to the cost of products containing steel as a result of protection. The industry has argued that it needs time "to become competitive" with foreign producers; the quotas have been in effect for two decades.

Other legislative proposals aimed at the Japanese include one that would require foreign companies to seek U.S. government approval for large acquisitions; Japanese investment in the U.S., however, lags behind British and Canadian. This law would be another aping of the Japanese, who have never shared the U.S. view that foreign investment strengthens the economy; after World War II, Japan enacted strict controls and limits on the inflow of foreign investment and continues to require fuller reporting of foreign investment than anything proposed in the U.S.

Threats have also emanated from Congress that U.S. troops will be withdrawn and military installations shut down if Japan does not increase its defense budget. The common citation is that Japan, the cornerstone of America's military position in the region, devotes only slightly more than 1 percent of its GNP to defense; it is little-noted that because its economy has grown so rapidly, it is now spending more than West Germany, Britain, and France. The country has more men under arms, and a larger air force and navy in the West Pacific than the U.S. In addition, Japan pays about $2.5 billion (or 40 percent) of the costs of maintaining the 55,000 U.S. military personnel there, the most generous host-nation support agreement the U.S. enjoys anywhere in the world. In any event, it would not be in America's interest for Japan to spend anywhere near the 6 percent of GNP the U.S. does; it would increase Tokyo's military budget from $30 to $180 billion a year, with ominous implications for Japan's relations with its neighbors, and with the Soviet Union and China.

More Like Japan?

IN THEIR ANALYSIS, the Japan-bashers are guilty of occasionally making overdrawn arguments and overlooking some inconvenient facts that do not fit their thesis. This is especially so in the case of van Wolferen's description of Japan's all powerful "System," a theory that is proving popular among left-wing Japanese intellectuals. A more balanced approach might add to the story of Japan Inc. that desirable changes are occurring, albeit slowly. Japan is seeing an entrepreneurial wave, for example. There is growing discontent among Japanese consumers over high prices and limited availability of goods. In the areas of most concern to U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

industry, Japan is moving away from the big government-sponsored research and development projects of the past. The Recruit influence-peddling scandal has seen a prime minister resign from office and the chairman of one of Japan's largest companies jailed. The LDP is facing serious political challenges to its rule in an increasingly open political system.

While the Japan-bashers have given us important insights into how Japan works, few of them have been both right about Japan and about the course America ought to take to meet the Japanese challenge. James Fallows, however, comes close. He recounts a conversation with an American friend in Tokyo: "Let's be like Japan. First, we rig politics so that one party is always in power and big-city votes basically don't count. Then we double the cost of everything else but hold incomes the same. Then we close the borders and start celebrating racial purity. Then we reduce the number of jobs for women by 70 or 80 percent. Then we set up a school system that teaches people not to ask questions. After a while we can have a trade surplus too." Fallows' conclusion, hence the title of his book, is that Americans ought to be "more like us"—true to our own values and beliefs—in competing with Japan.

Prestowitz and most other Japan-bashers disagree. But recognizing the superiority of the free trade system in spurring economic growth, Prestowitz is at least intellectually honest about the ramifications of his recommendation to be "more like Japan." The United States will simply have to learn to make material sacrifices in order to maintain its power, just as Japan does. And economic comfort is not the only circumstance Americans will have to give up. "The notion of individualism so sacred to the U.S. is also its fatal flaw," he writes. This does not seem to be a proposition most Americans would accept, nor should they. The risk in Japan-bashing, however, escalates in practice when it becomes a vehicle for demagogic politicians who are not so candid about the implications of their protectionist program. They whip up hysteria in calls to "get tough" with Japan; the public has no clue that the effect of "getting tough" by adopting the Japan-bashers' agenda will be the diminution of American power. If these people win the policy debate, a crucial political and military alliance—and the world economy—may not survive.

Another George on Trade

Mr. Chamberlain talks as though Free Traders were advocating the compulsory purchase of German goods. It is purely a question of individual freedom. If a German article is cheaper and better for the purpose than a British article, why should we not be at liberty to buy it? Is it immoral or wrong? Certainly not. Surely it was intended that the nations of the earth should traffic one with the other. As humanity progresses, as science brings the nations together, are we going to set up barriers, scowl at each other, and treat each other as enemies? No friend of humanity, no friend of progress, no real friend of his country would advocate such a course.

Lloyd George, Address at Deganwy, *Slings and Arrows*
January 14, 1905

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Revisionists

Moscow, Bonn, and the European Balance

Josef Joffe

THERE ARE ONLY three nations that can change the European status quo, and two of them are already doing so with all deliberate, though cautious, speed. The Big Three are the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic of Germany; the duo in search of change are Germany and Russia, and it is no accident that these are also the two players around or against whom the postwar system was constructed.

That the two superpowers could undo the status quo need not be labored. The U.S. and the USSR *built* and *maintained* the contemporary system as by-product of their global rivalry which was centered, above all, on Europe. Whence it follows that either of them can change that order unilaterally—merely by withdrawing from it. Whoever abandoned the contest of containment would transform a European strategic landscape currently defined by balance, bipolarity, and stalemate. In the absence of the United States, the Soviet Union would gain a position of primacy on the Continent. Were the Soviet Union to retract, its empire in Eastern Europe would collapse—and presumably America's *raison d'être* on the Continent as well.

But why the Federal Republic; why not France or Britain? The reason hinges more on geography than on nuclear weapons or (formal) great power status which only the British and French possess. The contemporary order was built in and around Germany, with the two successors of the Third Reich, the Federal Republic (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), assuming critical roles in the system's maintenance. Situated at the fulcrum of the European balance, each Germany became the strategic brace of its alliance. It is in Germany that the two countervailing coalitions meet; it is Germany which hosts the largest peace-time concentration of power the Continent has ever seen. Now assume that West Germany—which, unlike the GDR, is theoretically free to do so—would either disalign or defect from its alliance.

NATO, or what remained of it, would be bottled up behind the Rhine, stripped of depth and its key military asset. The U.S. would be thrown back on a rump alliance centered on Britain, and perhaps on France, too. The bulk of U.S. troops in Europe currently is stationed in West Germany (213,000); where would they, or their remnant, find another home? Whether the Northern Flank (Denmark, Norway) or the Southern Flank (Greece, Turkey) would remain in the alliance as isolated islands is an

Josef Joffe is foreign editor and columnist at the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Munich. His most recent book is *The Troubled Partnership: Europe, the U.S. and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987). © 1989 by Josef Joffe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

open question. Central Europe, in any case, would once more be a distinct geographic entity—beholden to West German, or even all-German, power if the Soviet Union were to decide that German neutrality was enough of a prize and released its East German satrapy onto the road to confederation or reunification. The permutations of this game may be endless, but there is no gainsaying the basic fact: among the middle powers, West Germany is the premier player because of what it has and where it is. By dint of its economic and military potential, West Germany represents the most critical weight in the European balance, and it also occupies the decisive strategic space in it—at the very fulcrum.

Two Revisionists

WHY SHOULD Germany and Russia be in the vanguard of system change? In a basic sense, these two nations always have been the two "revisionist"[1] actors on the postwar stage; the remaining lead players—the United States, Britain, and France—are the status quo powers. Double-containment has been the basic purpose of the latter. Explicitly, their post-Hitler alliance was directed against the Soviet Union, the most recent contender to hegemony in Europe. Implicitly, the coalition was also to envelop the previous claimant, Germany. Nor was the second containment just a matter of memory dating back to two world wars during which Germany had twice made a grab for European hegemony. West Germany was, rhetorically at least, the revisionist power *par excellence*. Its official self-portrayal was that of an incomplete nation; its official "teleology" was reunification with its "counter-state," the GDR. In practice, of course, the Federal Republic was a prisoner of the status quo, with no choice but to obey the realities of power. But precisely because Cold War and bipolarity had brought about Germany's unnatural condition, the Federal Republic carried a built-in imperative: to change the postwar system in the long run.

Neither is the Soviet Union revisionist in the traditional sense. During World War II, it acquired all the territory it coveted; thereafter the new real estate was secured by an imperial sphere stretching all the way into the heart of Europe. But the USSR remained revisionist in a structural sense—that is, fiercely opposed to the order the United States had built in the West. The essential purpose of those institutions, culminating in NATO, was to negate the great advantage embodied in the military potential and geographic position of the Soviet Union. In that respect, the Soviet Union was denied the full fruits of war. With the United States implanted in the European system, Soviet power, though theoretically dominant, was devalued to the point of neutralization. Indeed, from a Soviet point of view, real safety was not among the prizes of war, which had destroyed one enemy (Hitler's Germany) only to bring a more formidable foe (the U.S.) to Russia's doorsteps.

"Structural revisionism," then, was the Soviet postwar destiny. And so, all of Soviet *Westpolitik* thereafter can be subsumed under one overarching imperative: to pre-empt, undo, or at least weaken the architecture of countervailing power sponsored by the United States. The first act in the drama was the Berlin Blockade (1948–49)—a last-call foray to reverse West Germany's amalgamation into the Atlantic coalition. It was followed by Stalin's 1952 note proposing four-power negotiations to end the division of Europe, which was clearly designed to abort West Germany's rearmament within the European Defense Community. After the FRG was firmly anchored in NATO (1955), three decades of Soviet *Westpolitik* obeyed a strategy of the second-best, which was to weaken the military potential of the Alliance.

[1] "Revisionist" in this context is meant to transcend the classical definition pertaining to a power in search of territorial change. Rather, the term is intended to characterize a nation that seeks to transform the overall political-strategic setting in which it must act.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Beginning with the "New Look," the core of American power in Western Europe revolved around the atom. Regarded as the most economical tool of U.S. statecraft, nuclear weapons were to serve two vital purposes: checking the Soviet Union in the theater of greatest importance to both while providing, via "extended deterrence," the glue of America's European alliance. In the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union first lent its blessing to such denuclearization ventures as the Polish Rapacki Plan and then applied massive pressure against the nuclearization of West German defenses[2]—all the way to unleashing the Berlin Crisis from 1958 to 1962.

THE DRAMA was re-enacted in the late 1970s—first against the "neutron bomb," then against Pershing II and cruise missiles, and in each case the prime target was West Germany. The campaign did not subside until 1987, when the Soviet Union purchased the "double-zero solution" (no land-based nuclear missiles in the range of 500 to 5000 kilometers) at the price of scrapping all of its own forces in this category. That the Soviet Union was willing to yield about four warheads of its own for each warhead deployed on the Western side offers a powerful testimony to the importance it attaches to the ancient objective of denuclearizing West European defenses.

Following the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gorbachev's "New Thinking" returned Soviet declaratory policy full circle to the beginning: the complete denuclearization of Europe. "A European peace order," the general secretary proclaimed during his triumphant state visit to the Federal Republic in the summer of 1989, "does not require nuclear containment, but the containment, indeed, the elimination of nuclear weapons. The . . . complete elimination of tactical nuclear devices must not be struck from the agenda."[3] This was continuity *par excellence*—but one which did not bear fruit for almost forty years because a key condition was lacking: a meeting of minds with Europe's other "structural revisionist," the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the meantime, West German policy had also returned to its roots—roots that, unlike those of Soviet anti-nuclear diplomacy, had long been buried under the postwar rubble. For a quarter-century, West German diplomacy had obeyed—indeed, could not but obey—an ahistorical and antigeographical imperative. For the first time since the birth of the modern Reich in 1871, one part of Germany was in, of, and with the West—and for much of that time, diplomacy remained artificially truncated. *Westpolitik* was virtually all there was, while *Ostpolitik* was suppressed in favor of intimate ties to the United States and France. Whatever influence and status the Federal Republic sought had to come from the West while security had to be achieved against the East. Or as Konrad Adenauer, chancellor from 1949 to 1963, put it at the very beginning: There "is no other way of attaining freedom and equality of rights than . . . in concert with the Allies."[4]

This was a remarkable pledge of self-abnegation. But then self-denial was the very condition of self-assertion in a setting where even the *right* to have a foreign policy was detained by the three Western occupation powers. Secondly, by refusing to accept the territorial consequences of World War II as well as the existence of the GDR, the Federal Republic was saddled with a permanent conflict with the East, one that could only be sustained in close alliance with the West. The objective was a classic in the repertoire of client states: to roll West Germany's separate conflict into the general East-West conflict

[2]The *Bundeswehr* then acquired dual-purpose delivery vehicles (artillery, short-range missiles, and strike planes) whose nuclear warheads remained in American custody.

[3]German translation of address delivered at a dinner hosted by Chancellor Kohl in the *Redoute*, Bad Godesberg, June 12, 1989, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 13, 1989, p. 8.

[4]*Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, September 20, 1949, p. 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to identify the threat to one as a threat to all. That made for the greatest historical discontinuity of them all: a junior partnership with the United States where, in exchange for acting as "continental sword," the FRG earned maximum derivative power through subordination. Third, Adenauer did not merely submit to the victors; he also proceeded on a correct reading of the rules of bipolarity.

On the one hand, tight bipolarity suppressed many diplomatic options among clients and patrons alike. On the other, bipolarity left open one theoretical option to the two great powers, until recently comrades-in-arms: condominial arrangements over the lesser nations in between. And hence Adenauer's enduring nightmare of "Big Two-ism." If Bismarck's obsession had been the *cauchemar des coalitions*, Adenauer's horror vision was "Potsdam," the 1945 conference where the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain had jointly decided on the fate of postwar Germany. "Bismarck spoke about his nightmare of coalitions. I have my own nightmare: its name is Potsdam. The danger of a collusive great power policy at Germany's peril has existed since 1945. . . . Germany must not fall between the grindstones. If it does, it will be lost."[5]

TO AVOID THEM, Adenauer chose unconditional alignment with the West on the (correct) premise that alliance fetters bind both sides. Nor was this an unconscious choice. "One false step," he confided to his memoirs, "and we would lose the trust of the Western powers. One false step, and we would be victim of a bargain between East and West."[6] Or as he put it to the American High Commissioner John McCloy: Once Bonn was safely ensconced in the Western alliance, "the demilitarization and neutralization of Germany will no longer be possible."[7]

For these three reasons—self-assertion, a separate conflict with the Soviet Union, and the "nightmare of coalitions"—West Germany's early foreign policy was in profound conflict with both the history and geography of modern Germany. No German entity since the rise of Prussia had ever chosen exclusive ties to, or accepted such thorough dependence on, the West. In the worst of times, Germany and Russia had conspired against the West—from Rapallo in 1922 to the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. At a minimum, Berlin had chosen reinsurance, heeding Bismarck's advice "never to sever the link to St. Petersburg." And when German leaders shunned that counsel, they did so at their country's peril—as in two world wars. In historical terms, then, Adenauer's embrace of the West was abnormal. It was only a matter of time before the Russian connection was restored.

None other than the most pro-Western statesman of the Federal Republic, Konrad Adenauer, laid the foundations for this restoration in 1955—when, hard on the heels of sovereignty regained, he traveled to Moscow to reknit the diplomatic ties and gain the freedom of German POWs trapped in the Gulag. Yet in the midst of the Cold War, he sank the seeds into barren soil. Only fifteen years and many an East-West crisis later was another German chancellor, Willy Brandt, able to heed what geopolitical logic had never ceased to demand: to recognize the realities of power, hence to end West Germany's separate conflict with the East and with it the FRG's excruciating dependence on the West. Conducted in the name of reconciliation, the New Ostpolitik, which finally ratified the territorial verdict of World War II, also contained a core of coldly calculated *Realpolitik*.

To sustain the separate conflict over borders and the GDR, Bonn had to buy the loyalty of its allies. To retain their support, it had to submit to the West and forego options

[5]In a radio interview on June 11, 1953, Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Mitteilungen an die Presse*, no. 561/53, pp. 3–4.

[6]Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, Vol. II (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1965), p. 88.

[7]*Erinnerungen*, Vol. I, p. 457.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the East. Worse, the FRG was stuck with a grating excess demand for security in the face of relentless Soviet hostility—a deficit that could only be "financed" through endless imports of security from the West. For a middle-power that could not possibly counterbalance the Soviet Union on its own while seeking to escape from dependence on the West, that deficit dictated a demand-reduction strategy in the market of security.

The logic—another classic in the repertoire of client states—is simple enough. To reduce demand for security, a nation will try to mute, if not resolve, its own conflict with the common adversary. Even while remaining in the original alliance, such a state will extend side-payments to the adversary, appeasing him in order to soften his predisposition for threats and pressures. As the foe is given what he might seek to gain by force, the propitiator's demand for alliance loyalty dwindles while his scope for maneuver increases. The New Ostpolitik served precisely that purpose by yielding unto the Soviets what they had tried to exact by latent force: the acceptance of postwar borders and the all-but-*de jure* recognition of the GDR, opening up diplomatic access to Eastern Europe.

The bargain with the East, executed between 1969 and 1973, fell far short of a diplomatic revolution, but it amounted to a momentous transformation nonetheless. "At best you can stand on one leg, but you can't walk on it," was the terse diagnosis of the Social Democratic floor leader, Herbert Wehner.[8] The acquisition of a "second leg" would allow not only for mobility in the East but also relieve pressure on the FRG's "Western leg." Elaborating, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt proclaimed: The Eastern treaties "had largely. . . liberated our country from its role as a client." Moreover, "our treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, East Berlin [and] the Four-Power Agreement [on Berlin] have greatly reduced the many reasons. . . for seeking and begging for continuous reassurance." And so, "our margin of maneuver has been extraordinarily enlarged."[9]

Rising Costs

THE QUEST FOR reduced dependence and increased options drives the diplomacy of *any* state—and all the more so West Germany's, which could only regain autonomy by encasing it in the Western coalition. But the drama of *Germania rediviva* ends neither in 1955 (when sovereignty was restored) nor in 1975 (when the cornerstones of the New Ostpolitik were in place). The bargains with the West and the East were but prologues. Still waiting to be tackled was the most formidable task—the transformation of the stage on which the FRG must act.

Some forty years after bipolarity descended on Europe, the basics remain. The strategic presence of Europe's once remote flanking powers has endured. Their military might still extends into the heart of the Continent, cementing the partition of Germany in a divided Europe. The counterpart of an imposed empire in the East is a voluntary *Pax Americana* in the West. Yet even willing submission for the sake of security spells dependence assumed and freedom constrained. Nor has the essential role of the two Germanies changed all that much. Although no longer hostile brothers duelling for the patrimony of the lost *Reich*, they are still the strategic braces of the alliance systems that separate them above all, and the hosts to horrendous force potentials that threaten them above all.

What *has* changed is the ledger of costs and benefits. Though the price was partition and submission, bipolarity conferred enormous benefits on both German states. Instead of dismemberment, there was dual statehood. Instead of a super-Versailles, there was the offer of community with the victors. Instead of indefinite subjection, there was speedy rehabilitation in alliances that extended to

[8]Before the Bundestag, November 6, 1974. *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Series II, Vol. 2 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1976), p. 295.

[9]Before the Bundestag, July 25, 1975. *Bulletin der Bundesregierung*, July 29, 1975.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both Germanies a shelter and a role. To the FRG, the bargain also offered rich economic rewards. In return for markets lost in the East, it gained a far more profitable free-trade system in the West which drove economic growth and "financed" the democratic miracle of the young republic. By 1955, in short, Adenauer had done even better for West Germany than had Talleyrand for vanquished France in 1815.

The profits clearly dwarfed the price—but not forever. The great problem of contemporary West German policy (and *mutatis mutandi* of East Germany, too) is that the profits have vanished into the mist of history while the price has remained. In place is an "unfinished nation" that cannot settle its own fate as long as the alliance system remains in place. Also left are about 750,000 foreign troops in the two Germanies, along with thousands of nuclear weapons over which the Germans have little control and the bulk of which are destined to explode, if at all, on German soil. There are low-level training flights and large-scale maneuvers—societal costs borne mutely no more. Finally there are sundry restraints on German sovereignty that are no longer so obviously balanced by the benefits of community.

The new "bottom line," then, is a long-postponed revisionist impetus analogous to Russia's. Both actors must operate on a stage that was designed to contain their energies—explicitly in the case of the Soviet Union, implicitly in the case of the Federal Republic. And so, "structural revisionism" is the key to understanding the foreign policies of both powers in the 1980s and 1990s. Both must seek to transcend much of what bipolarity has wrought, and for both the problem is how to improve their position in Europe without losing the benefits of the *ancien système*.

The Soviet Union

FIVE YEARS INTO Mikhail Gorbachev's reign, a double-revolution in the grand strategy of the Soviet Union has become evident. First, there is the shift from "guns" to "butter" in order not only to satisfy long-suppressed civilian demands but also to turn the Soviet Union from an "Upper Volta with nuclear weapons"[10] into an at least second-rate economy that will not be hopelessly outclassed by the West. Second, Gorbachev has begun to return the Soviet Union to the community of responsible great powers that revolutionary Russia abandoned in 1917. For this twin-purpose, the axe has been put to the unbearable financial and political costs of empire: from Afghanistan to Angola, from Eastern Europe, where former satrapies now enjoy unprecedented freedom of maneuver, to Western Europe, where the Soviet Union, once the threatening shadow, now offers itself as partner in cooperation and radical disarmament.

Still, great powers have great permanent interests, and these have by no means disappeared from the books; moreover, it is difficult to see how they could in the face of an unyielding strategic geography. The Soviet Union must still counterbalance its only deadly rival, the United States; and in the classic theater of the Cold War, in Europe, it must seek at a minimum to neutralize three threats. One is an "Atlantic Europe" that acts as a forward bastion of American power. The second is a "Devolutionary Europe" that evolves into an autonomous security threat by channeling its economic and demographic resources in a commensurate military potential. The third is a "Revolutionary Europe" in the East that, having shed its bonds and moved into the orbit of West European/West German economic power, would no longer serve as a security glacis for the Soviet Union.

These negative objectives are virtually regime-independent; they bid the Soviet Union, like any other state, to stave off threats to its power and position. Beyond that, it is not foreordained that the new moderation equals a commitment to the status quo. Even while retrenching, great powers do not disparage relative gain. One goal of the new regime is obvious: to harness West-

[10]That term was coined by Helmut Schmidt.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern Europe's financial and technological assets to the herculean task of economic development. The other objectives are more properly political, conducing to the right milieu that would transcend, or at least modify, the bipolar setting in Moscow's favor.

That purpose, of course, dates back to 1945. But the novelty is that Gorbachev has begun to appreciate an ancient piece of sociological wisdom: that enemies create and maintain each other's organizations—and thus the status quo. Instead of pressure and arms, he has offered to Western Europe a vision of cooperation, democratic reform, and wholesale disarmament. He has backed up his words with deeds, and so he has already *changed* the status quo toward something more benign and promising than anything Europe has known since World War II. Yet for all the self-containment of Soviet power, there is still Soviet-Russian reason of state, which cannot be gainsaid either and which bids the Soviet Union to improve a position that has been diminished for so long by American power.

Reason of state informs a strategy that would weaken America's hold in Europe—but not too much, since America-in-Europe is a factor of stability which serves Soviet interests, too. Still, the ancient path toward Europe's denuclearization will not be abandoned because it advances two purposes at once. One is to revalue the Soviet Union's classic advantage—and do so in spite of drastic conventional cuts because even numerical parity at lower levels (Moscow's offer as of 1989) could not blunt the edge delivered by geography and sheer mass. Moreover, with or without theater weapons, the Soviet Union will always remain a great nuclear power, and with nuclear options aplenty. Second, denuclearization will sever the most powerful tie that binds Western Europe to its transatlantic patron.

Indeed, the claim of military security must be muted altogether. Evidently, one hope is that fewer swords will make for more plowshares. But the political effects would be even more impressive. They would prompt Western Europe to relax its guard and to seek safety not in arms and alliance, but in stable politico-economic cooperation. With military requirements down, the ligaments of NATO would be loosened, even though bloc decay is surely a two-way street. Hence, Gorbachev must strike a difficult balance. Alliance decay in the East must not outpace disintegration in the West, implying that control, rather than speed, is the essence of the game. And so, the dialectics of decadence inevitably shift the focus of grand strategy to Western Europe.

To flog Gorbachev's favorite metaphor, the outer walls of the "common European home" must be in place before the Eastern wing collapses. That requires recruiting the West Europeans as tacit allies in stability vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. The prize for the West Europeans, and especially the West Germans, would be the falling barriers of partition, but the price is no less evident: deference toward Soviet imperial sensitivities. If Gorbachev can pull this off, the rewards will be handsome: maximal Soviet influence in all of Europe which will more than compensate for partial loss of control over the Eastern half.

The Federal Republic

IT IS CLEAR that the Federal Republic plays—indeed, cannot help but play—a starring role in this script. The FRG has been *the* forward bastion of American power. It has hosted not only the bulk of American conventional forces in Europe, but also successive generations of nuclear weapons since the mid-1950s.[11] Many threatened the Soviet "sanctuary," and as such, they were the target of lasting Soviet hostility.

[11]Starting with battlefield, airborne, and intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the 1950s, the process continued with the deployment of long-range cruise missiles (Mace) and shorter-range ballistic missiles (Pershing I) in the 1960s, and culminated in the stationing of modern INF (Pershing II and Tomahawk) in the 1980s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the "double-zero solution" of 1987, the land-based threat has been contractually banished, and the historical logic of its policy now bids Moscow to get rid of the rest—and certainly to forestall compensation through extended-range follow-on systems. Since modernization will stand or fall in West Germany, Soviet policy since 1987 has been busy confronting Bonn with the nasty consequences of such a decision.

A "Devolutionary Europe" whereby the European nuclear powers Britain and France would extend their "umbrellas" to the rest, is hardly on the horizon of political reality,[12] and so the task of pre-emption does not enjoy immediate priority. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union will not look kindly on a Western Europe that, having been stripped of U.S. nuclear weapons, will gestate into a nuclear-armed superstate. In this scenario, too, the Federal Republic would be the target of opportunity: as the state that has much to ask from the Soviet Union, and hence much to lose from downward-spiraling relations. For the same reasons, the Federal Republic might also act as financier and as broker for Soviet and East European interests as the European Community moves toward "1992" and beyond.

A "Revolutionary Europe," meaning the collapse of Soviet power east of the Elbe by dint of societal revolt and/or governmental decision (like Hungary's in 1956 to leave the Warsaw Pact), is a nightmare of both West Germany and Soviet Russia. Though Bonn wants change in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev's Russia no longer vetoes it as long as basic loyalties remain untouched, both dread *uncontrolled* change. The Soviet Union has intervened four times to recentralize Eastern Europe: in the GDR in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and—indirectly—in Poland in 1980–81. Will the Soviet Union stand by idly in the face of renewed revolt? That would bespeak Moscow's willingness to self-neutralize its power and to ignore what previously had been a vital security interest—something great powers are not eager to do.

Nor does West Germany contemplate cataclysmic change with great ease. Bonn's nightmare is violence that begets violent recentralization. During the Polish crisis (1980–81) an anonymous adviser to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt put it thus: "If the Russians invade, everything is *kaputt*."[13] That put into a nutshell the driving assumption of West German *Ostpolitik*. Since Moscow is the ultimate arbiter of evolution in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union must be reassured—even to the point where *Ostpolitik* becomes a silent partner in the maintenance of regime stability and Soviet authority.

This is why the Schmidt government was not enthusiastic about Solidarity, why Bonn helped launch a food support campaign to stave off eruptions that might provoke Soviet intervention, and why Schmidt worked hard to hold off Western sanctions. During Gorbachev's emotional reception in Bonn in 1989, he admonished Chancellor Kohl that the pace of reform in Eastern Europe hinged on the proper behavior of the West. And Schmidt's Conservative successor vowed that Bonn would eschew any destabilization.[14] Behind all this was, and is, the premise and paradox of all of West German *Ostpolitik*: "The status quo [in Eastern Europe] must be consolidated so that it may change."[15]

---

[12] I have argued this in greater detail in *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987), ch. 5, "Alliance as Order."

[13] As quoted in "Wir wandeln auf dünnem Eis," *Der Spiegel*, January 2, 1982.

[14] In a confidential conversation between Kohl and Gorbachev, as leaked to, and reported in, the West German press. Cf. "Gorbatschow: Moskau wird sich nicht in die Reformprozesse der Verbündeten einmischen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 14, 1989, p. 1, and "Kohl und Gorbatschow vereinbaren regelmäßige Begegnungen auf hoher politischer Ebene," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 1989, p. 1–2.

[15] Heinz Rapp, a member of the Social Democratic Party's Commission on Basic Values, in *idem*, "Das Kriegsrecht in Polen und die Seele der SPD," *Vorwärts*, February 4, 1982.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But how? For West Germany, the ideal situation would be maximal protection in the West and maximal access-*cum*-evolution in the East, but it cannot have both. The former implies tight alliance ties as well as high armament levels which would recreate precisely the dependence Bonn has partially shed but not unshouldered. Second, West German society, as all the polls indicate with ever more dramatic numbers, is no longer willing to carry yesterday's military burden—be it nuclear weapons stationed on German soil, long terms of military service, the traditional peace-time strength of the *Bundeswehr* of 496,000 men, or the environmental toll of Allied forces in the Federal Republic.[16] Third, recentralization in the West would collide mercilessly with the quest for bloc dissolution in the East.

And hence the underlying logic of West German policy demands that Bonn solve the dilemma by cracking it in favor of a different diplomatic-military milieu. The task is the "subtle subversion" of bipolarity—doing away with its restraints without pushing in the walls—and the logic consists of the following elements. It proceeds from the (correct) premise that bipolarity—the competitive intrusion of the two superpowers into the heart of Europe—has divided Germany and the Continent, whence it follows that the parts can only be fused *pari passu* with the retraction of the U.S. and the USSR. Hence, the ultimate goal is a "European peace order that will overarch and finally overcome the [two] power blocs."[17] That would either allow for reunification or make it unnecessary, because the two Germanies would be free to decide on tolerable terms of reassociation—from open borders to confederacy.

A Lengthened Leash

YET THERE ARE sound reasons for the superpowers' presence in Europe. The Soviet Union has encamped on the Elbe river to secure a politico-pontifical empire that protects its World War II gains, its own borders, and its way of life. The United States is in Europe to contain its rival in the foremost arena of the global contest, because it, too, seeks *le juste milieu* where its values can flourish, and because its allies—unable or unwilling to defend themselves—want it there as counterweight to the Soviet Union. How, then, could "the two power blocs be overcome?" More precisely, how could the West Germans dispense with their transatlantic patron while providing the Soviet Union with an incentive to loosen, if not lift, the heavy grip of its power over Eastern Europe?

It cannot be done by "devolution," by replacing the United States with a nuclear-armed European superstate—for that would merely replicate the Soviet security problem *à l'Europè*. And hence the second tier of the underlying logic which necessitates the relentless reassurance and propitiation of the Soviets and their East European cohorts. There are several stages to this strategy, and they are all contained in the New Ostpolitik launched in 1969. One, the Soviet Union had to be assured of its political and territorial possessions, which were formalized in the

[16] In a poll of the age group between fifteen and twenty-four years, 86 percent opted for the complete denuclearization of West Germany, and 78.5 percent wanted the FRG in the "vanguard of disarmament." A majority of 54.5 percent saw themselves as conscientious objectors, potential objectors, or draft evaders. Figures cited in *Stern* magazine, June 29, 1989, pp. 64, 72.

[17] *Regierungsprogramm* 1987–1990 der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Government Program of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1987–1990) (Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, October 1986), p. 40. Three years later, the term "European peace order" was also used by Helmut Kohl, the Christian-Democratic chancellor, in the Common Declaration signed by Kohl and Gorbachev on the occasion of the latter's state visit. Cf. "Der Wortlaut der gemeinsamen Erklärung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 1989, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Eastern Treaties" from 1970 to 1973. The status quo had to be consecrated so that it may change.

Two, territorial stability in the East has to be buttressed by regime stability on the premise that reassured rulers will also be relaxed rulers. Seeing its glacis secure and unchallenged, Moscow could lengthen the imperial leash. Its cohorts would then enjoy greater autonomy with respect to both domestic liberalization and diplomatic movement. And this would set in motion a "virtuous circle"—with reforms breeding domestic consent, and enhanced legitimacy allowing for ever more reforms, but minus the risk of domestic explosions.

THUS IT FOLLOWS, three, that East-West confrontation is the deadly bane of bipolarity's "subtle subversion." Confrontation and Cold War lead to regime insecurity, allowing Moscow to brandish the external threat as a tool of bloc discipline and forcing the regimes to tighten the leash at home. At a minimum, confrontation will always redound to the hardliners, improving their hands against their reform-minded comrades. Worse, sharpened rivalry between the great, raising the voice of security, strengthens their hold over the small and compresses their margins of maneuver in the process.

This is why, during Cold War II in the early 1980s, the Schmidt government fought tooth and nail to keep the rising tide of superpower strife away from Europe, why he tried to evade economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, why he pleaded with Brezhnev to reverse the SS–20 build-up so that he could avoid counter-deployment with cruise and Pershing II missiles. Cold War redivivus, threatening to refreeze what detente and *Ostpolitik* had so painstakingly unthawed, would inevitably inflict the heaviest penalties on the FRG. And West Germany would suffer twice—both as state and as half-nation because the fortunes of either are so thoroughly tied to a benign East-West climate in Europe. Hence, as Schmidt put it, "we cannot afford gestures of strength [against the Soviet Union]."[18]

Which leads to the third, and the most fundamental, tier of the logic: the sources of influence commanded by a middle-power with the specific handicaps of West Germany. Its outstanding assets are economic potential and geographic position. Yet both have been devalued by the legacies of World War II and by the European order installed thereafter. Accumulating wealth could not be converted into other forms of power. With the "Iron Curtain" in place, West German economic prowess could not buy political influence in the East—a traditional outlet for German energies. Nor could wealth be traded for military strength above and beyond what limited autonomy (and historical memories) allowed. Surely, Bonn has the resources to build a first-class nuclear deterrent; it cannot do so by dint of imposed renunciation and political good sense.

Germany's critical position, which had allowed Bismarck to manage Europe's relations from the center, has been similarly constrained by the postwar order. Integration in the West simultaneously harnessed and neutralized West Germany's assets. Fused to the West and barred from the East, the Federal Republic was welded into place, so to speak. But even after partial emancipation through the New Ostpolitik, even after bipolarity was muted, the system remained destiny. Until this day, West Germany cannot assure military security on its own; until this day, it has no serious options beyond alliance with the West.

The dominant feature of the system is an extraordinary web of military arrangements which constrains none more so than the two Germanies. Originally the greatest profiteers of militarized bipolarity, they are now its greatest victims. Whence it follows that Mars, the father and guarantor of the *ancien régime*, must be dethroned—if ever so slowly. To the extent to which the imperatives of

[18] As quoted in "The perils of being all things to all men," *Economist*, April 20, 1980.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military security are pushed off centerstage, the unique economic, geographic, and diplomatic assets of the FRG will come into their own. Why so?

Imagine, for instance, a post-bipolar system which so constrained Moscow's military power (and geographic advantage)[19] that demand for military security in Western Europe would decline to a fraction of the current level. That might not only obviate the need for counter-aggregation in the West but do much more: provide a setting where West Germany could at least begin to think about life after alliance, the most serious drain on its autonomy.

Imagine, further, a setting where the currency of military power had been drastically devalued, and with it the foremost source of Soviet influence. It follows that the worth of other currencies of power will rise. For a long time, the Soviet Union will remain a third-rate economy with an insatiable demand for financial and technological infusions. Apart from the United States and Japan, it is the Federal Republic that has the requisite wherewithals—and a double-advantage to boot. Unlike Japan, it is neither chained to the American market nor held down by stultifying territorial demands (over the Kurile Islands). Unlike the United States, the FRG is not a deadly rival of the Soviet Union, and its historical reputation for economic excellence is a living legend in the East.

In an economic game no longer overshadowed by vast disparities in usable military strength, the Federal Republic would meet the Soviet Union as an equal, indeed, as a superior player. The chips commanded at this table could be invested in the political game where economic emoluments would buy "positional goods" as well as diplomatic leverage for the Federal Republic. A key positional good is a role whereby Bonn would play the prime *interlocuteur valable* of the Soviet Union, and with hefty side-payoffs in the West. Diplomatic leverage would be used to improve the political milieu across the divide. Having gained Soviet consent, the FRG could widen its legitimate access to Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, good relations with Moscow would strengthen Bonn's hand in its remaining contest with East Germany (over the terms of internal liberalization and state-to-state interaction).

It is visions such as these that must inform the underlying logic of West German policy for both reason of state and reason of nation. *Raison d'etat* bids Bonn to unshoulder the strictures of bipolarity because these detract from the unique sources of West German power, and *raison de nation* bids the FRG to do likewise because it is the division of Europe that has spawned and maintained the partition of Germany. If this analysis is correct, then the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union are, willy-nilly, natural partners in system transformation. Both, each for its own reasons, want to dismantle the structures of bipolarity—but neither too fast nor too thoroughly. Too much change in the East is a threat to Soviet hegemony, but this is all the more reason for Moscow to harness West German "revisionism" within a reliable partnership. Too much in the West, accelerating the decline of the Atlantic alliance, is a threat to West German security, but this, too, is all the more reason for the Federal Republic to propitiate the Soviet Union and to domesticate Soviet power within a milieu no longer dominated by the force of arms.

Implications for Policy

TO BEGIN WITH, there is little the United States can do to stop or reverse the dominant trend in Europe as long as the Soviet Union continues to yield what it

[19]Not that this is the most realistic of bets, but one can think of a minimum strategic deterrent held in check by an analogous arsenal on the U.S. side, the scrapping of all theater nuclear weapons, and a radical drawdown of Soviet conventional forces west of the Urals. All of this would be complemented by intrusive verification, constraints on mobility and offensive weaponry, and a demonstrably defensive deployment and training of remaining forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has withheld for so long. Also, given its own values, the United States has long been committed to the very system transformation set in motion in the mid-1980s. Ideologically, the status quo is not a comfortable notion for American policy, especially in Eastern Europe where stability was bought at the price of justice. In an underlying sense, however, the United States is a status quo power in Europe. Its primacy in the global system is intimately bound up with its role in Europe; were that role reduced, let alone excised from the script, in favor of the Soviet Union, America's position in the world would surely suffer. So there is the familiar dilemma between ideals and interests that precludes simple choices.

Sheer prudence forbids going against the prevailing wind. The vision of a "peace order" or a "common European home" galvanizes all Europeans, especially in the East, who have paid for the miraculous stability of the Continent in the coinage of burdens imposed and options foregone. "Isn't it ironic," asked a Polish diplomat, "that our nation was part of Central Europe before the War, and, having been shifted westward by 180 kilometers, is now considered to be 'East European'?"[20] To go against the trend, assuming that it lasts, buys neither influence nor friends.

Take the case of the Federal Republic, once America's "continental sword," and now an ally that is in and of the West, but not necessarily with the West when Europe's evolution is at stake. The external reasons were analyzed above; they forbid anything that provokes the Soviet Union and/or retightens bipolarity—be it threats to East European regime stability, footdragging on disarmament, or new nuclear wherewithals considered intolerable by Moscow. Yet even more astounding is the domestic transformation that dovetails with the new diplomacy. To put it in a nutshell, the 1980s have witnessed a profound shift of the national security consensus to the left.

Anti-nuclear and pacifist impulses, beyond the ken for decades, have moved into the zone of respectability. There is now *no* party in West Germany that would tie its fate to the modernization of short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and all parties insistently favor more detente and disarmament as well as warm relations with the Soviet Union. Ancient cleavages, separating Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, are past history; Right and Left are virtually one when it comes to nuclear weapons and *Ostpolitik*. Though worlds apart on domestic issues, people like the CDU parliamentary leader Alfred Dregger (a right-nationalist) and the architect of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, Egon Bahr (a left-nationalist), have suddenly joined hands across old divides. Their common shibboleth is: "the shorter the ranges, the deader the Germans," the logic of which militates against SNF and even more against nuclear artillery on German soil.

THIS IS NOT just a tactical, but a *historical* transformation. The Christian Democrats, who rose to, and stayed in, power as trusty guardians of the American connection, who staked their tenure on INF deployment in the election of 1983, are no longer the "American party," at least not predictably so. Historically just as significant is the shift of the centrist Free Democrats (FDP). Strategically placed to make or break coalitions, the FDP has followed its foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher into the avant garde of *Ostpolitik*, where, in the name of a special German responsibility, the FRG's chief diplomat has put forth a kind of "nuclear Monroe doctrine" for Central Europe. "The decision about new nuclear short-range missiles," Genscher postulated, "is about systems that can target the Polish and Czech peoples, which had to suffer endlessly during World War II, [as well as] about systems that can reach into the other part of our

[20] In an informal statement during an all-European conference on comparative military doctrines in Ebenhausen (near Munich) on June 15, 1989, sponsored jointly by the West German and Polish governments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fatherland."[21] By implication, such systems are no longer acceptable. Given the new security consensus, the best American pleas for strategic stability count for little if no significant political force in West Germany is willing to carry them forward as its own.

Thus, forty years after the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949, an astoundingly long phase in postwar history has come to an end. The Federal Republic will no longer act as a willing "aircraft carrier" of American nuclear weapons in Europe—weapons which constitute sinews and ligaments of the Atlantic Alliance. Regardless of party, Bonn will resist the intrusion of new nuclear weapons (the very hallmark of its unique dependence) while working hard to shape a disarmament milieu that makes them unnecessary. That implies the "Germanization" of East-West relations in Europe—the attempt to structure the future of security diplomacy around specifically German needs. It implies cooperation with the Soviet Union while Moscow continues on the path of disarmament. And it may well make for propitiation, rather than renewed armament, if Moscow returned to the nastier ways of yore. An emblematic example was the crisis unleashed by Bonn over short-range nuclear forces (SNF) talks around the time of the NATO summit in the spring of 1989.

In a surprise maneuver on April 20, 1989, Foreign Minister Genscher first forced Chancellor Kohl to accept "imminent negotiations" (which might postpone modernization *sine die*) and then proceeded to confront Washington and London. The Americans had heretofore stuck to "negotiations—not now" while the British had prepared a tougher bargaining position: "negotiations—never." Those were the outward manifestations of a test of wills actually triggered by domestic needs: by a foreign minister in desperate search of an election-winning issue after his (as well as the chancellor's) party had been trounced twice in two regional contests. But the deeper meaning derived from the nature of West German claims. Not only did Bonn assert a veto right (to postpone modernization), which is a standard perquisite of nations in alliance; it also sought to impose its own demands ("imminent negotiations") on all the rest.

To squeeze electoral profit from a duel with two key allies in the early 1980s, when the Russians were piling missile upon missile in Europe, would have been inconceivable. That the West Germans felt safe to attempt to "Germanize" East-West security diplomacy at the threshold of the 1990s, was not so much proof of "neo-nationalism" as it was a powerful testimony to the rapidly changing status quo. Dependents do not seek to inflict their will on patron powers when the threat is high. Conversely, the hold of protectors over clients will inevitably loosen as their demand for security dwindles.

IF THE CRISIS was emblematic, so was its resolution. First, the Bush administration quietly gathered allies among those who were uncomfortable with the German quest for a "Continental combination" against the "Anglo-Saxons." Then, during the President's West German trip in late May, Bush proceeded to pay homage to the Kohl government's pride and domestic weakness by bestowing the title of "partner in leadership" on Bonn. But most important, Washington regained a measure of control over the disarmament dynamic by *joining* it while attaching conditions. And so, at the NATO summit, the U.S. induced everybody to sign on to a "comprehensive concept" that assigned "highest priority" to "conventional force reductions" and envisaged talks about a "partial reductions" of SNF "once the implementation of such a [conventional] agreement is under way." The point of the story: Bonn had scored on the principle of negotiation, and Washington had maintained a *droit de regard* over the timing and sequence.[22]

---

[21] Address to the Bundestag, April 27, 1989, *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages*, April 27, 1989, p. 10325. Following this passage, the record notes: "Applause among the FDP, the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and the Greens."

[22] U.S. Mission to NATO, *Fact Sheet: NATO's Comprehensive Concept* (Brussels, May 30, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That gave satisfaction to West Germany while preserving a measure of American influence. And it highlights a larger point about diplomacy on the threshold of post-bipolarity. One secret of Europe's astounding stability after two murderous world wars has been the *harmonious* domestication of West German energies—through a blend of constraint *and* community. That prescription still embodies the counsel of wisdom, even for Germans who have learned from bitter historical experience that isolation is neither splendid nor serendipitous—and even more: that self-containment is a condition of self-assertion. But American power will no longer convert so easily into influence when authority over allies cannot but dwindle in tandem with the Soviet threat. In such a setting, some devolution is unavoidable, and that will inevitably accrue to West Germany, the strongest player next to the superpowers.

On the other hand, the sources of American influence have not dried up, and neither are they no longer needed. To maintain an American say in the affairs of Europe is not just a narrow American interest; it serves each and all, and in that sense the *ancien régime* by no means has become obsolete. The Germans want the United States in the system because it is their security lender of the last resort. France, Britain, *et al.* want the Americans "in" for the same reason—and as a counterweight to German assets and aspirations. Even the Russians, though intent to dominate the Continent by peaceful means, must have an interest in the American presence. It legitimizes their own in Eastern Europe, and it maintains some control over their foremost confederate-competitor that is the Federal Republic.

That perspective would even remain valid in a Europe moving toward a new "counter-realist" paradigm of interstate politics that some tout as the Continent's new destiny. Accordingly, all of Europe will eventually obey the rules already operating in Western Europe: where competition for advantage persists, but where force is no longer the natural adjunct of policy. Indeed, has not violence been banished already? Where are the volcanoes of aggressive nationalism that have periodically erupted into a European war? And if democracy spreads all the way to the Urals, will this not finally vindicate the Enlightenment's assertion that only despots make war while republics are inherently pacific?

Realism bids us, first, to look not at effects but causes. The sterilization of force in Europe cannot be separated from its existence. Europe's ultra-stability cannot be abstracted from the great reservoirs of military power—especially nuclear—that have contained and devalued each other. Second, the more power recedes, the more it will liberate previously suppressed challenges to the old regime—and nowhere more so than in the imposed empire that is Russia's. Will Moscow accept that verdict and contain itself, as it were? In the face of such an uncertain bet, a paid-up military insurance policy on the part of the West remains a minimal counsel of prudence. Third, even those who aspire to a new paradigm must wish for *controlled* change—lest too much too soon provoke the vengeful return of the old. This is where the basic interests of the two "revisionists" meet with those of the status quo powers—where skillful statecraft can yet rejoin the two halves of Europe without gambling away the precious gift of its stability.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Political Culture in Crisis

The Case for Kohl

Jeffrey Herf

THIS YEAR, several thousand West Berliners celebrated May Day by putting scarves over their faces to conceal their identities and proceeding to riot. The Social Democratic official responsible for the police under the newly-formed city government pursued what he described as a "strategy of de-escalation" in response to the riot. The police were ordered not to intervene so as not to "escalate" the violence. Alas, aggression appeased was aggression unleashed. Hundreds of store windows were broken and stores were looted. About fifty cars were burned. When the police were finally allowed to intervene, the riot was brought under control at a cost of over three hundred injured policemen. Damages were in the millions of marks. There was no immediate cause for the riot: no outrageous example of police brutality, no unpopular foreign war, not even a repressive city government. An SPD-led coalition had just won the city elections. There was only a nihilist, leftist subculture, and a permissive or timid Social Democratic government.

It is commonplace today to speak of over-indulged West German youths who take the virtues of their own parliamentary democracy for granted even while living in the shadows of the national prison that is East Germany. But in the flood of American commentary about West Germany, the conservatives and liberals—those Germans who do speak up for political freedom and liberal democracy—tend to be ignored. The plague-on-both-your-houses school in the Social Democratic and Green parties has captured the attention of admirers and critics alike. In the process, the revival and persistence of a distinctive West German conservatism initiated by Konrad Adenauer has been taken for granted. It is a neglect that needs correction. The political and moral importance of the conservative-liberal coalition of the 1980s will become even more important as the Social Democratic party continues to drift away from any meaningful sort of Atlanticism.

Arnulf Baring's *Unser Neuer Grössenwahn* (Our New Megalomania)[1] is a probing and widely-read analysis of the idea that peace in Central Europe would be possible if West Germany were to distance itself from the United States and adopt a more neutral position between East and West. As Baring shows, it is not "the Germans" or "West Germans," but a familiar cast of Social Democrats (Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr, Oskar Lafontaine), leading journalists (such as the

Jeffrey Herf is a research associate at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. This article draws on material from his forthcoming book, *No Middle Ground: West Germany and the Euromissiles*, to be published by The Free Press.

[1] Arnulf Baring, *Unser Neuer Grössenwahn* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publisher of *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein), and intellectuals (such as Günter Grass), along with the radical Left in the Greens, who have adopted, articulated, and helped to diffuse this view. The most important consequence of this diffusion is that today there is only one combination of political parties—the one currently in power—that is able to meet the Gorbachev peace offensive while retaining West Germany's Western anchor.

A REVIEW OF the essentials of West Germany's democratic political culture places developments since the 1960s in focus. The crucial factor that made a democracy possible in postwar West Germany was the presence of "militant democrats" of both the Right and the Left. Konrad Adenauer was key to the Right. It was his and his followers' task to keep German conservatism democratic, to have it serve as a bulwark against a revival of Nazism, and to base opposition to Soviet expansion and the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe on principles of humanism rather than a National Socialist program of racism and anti-Semitism.

The "militant democrats" of the Left were led by Kurt Schumacher, who in 1945 emerged after twelve years in Dachau to speak for *das andere Deutschland*, "the other Germany," which opposed Hitler. Schumacher, no less than Adenauer, was indispensable in the formation of West German democracy. It was Schumacher and his Social Democratic colleagues who formed a barrier against Soviet and Communist efforts to form a united front on the Left in 1945 and 1946. As a result, Moscow was frustrated in its efforts to isolate the Left from the mainstream of German politics, a defeat that constituted one of the critical turning points in the founding of the Bonn republic. Though he opposed the formation of NATO and West German rearmament, Schumacher spoke unambiguously about Soviet dictatorship, oppression, and colonialism.

Of these two traditions only one, Christian Democracy, was new. It remains the only really new political tradition in West Germany. Konrad Adenauer, the party's patriarch who in the late 1950s ran on the election slogan of "no experiments," was the author of a decisive revolution in political culture that created a *West* German conservatism. The Adenauer tradition broke from *German* conservatism and its anti-Western, anti-democratic, illiberal, and anti-capitalist core. For the first time in German history, conservatism was reconciled to parliamentary democracy, a mixed economy, and a Western alliance. There is, especially in the United States, a persistent failure to appreciate the novelty and significance of the transformation of German conservatism into West German conservatism.

Even more neglected than Adenauer's role in transforming German conservatism has been the impact on West German political culture of his most important heir, Helmut Kohl. Adenauer created a tradition; Kohl preserved and re-energized it. From the early 1970s, Kohl understood the foreign policy debate about detente to be a debate about whether or not the "new" tradition of the Adenauer era would be displaced by the concept of a West Germany no longer firmly anchored, either morally or strategically, in the West.[2] Kohl urged his Christian Democratic party to state clearly the moral foundations of its political commitments at a time when West German conservatism seemed exhausted from twenty years of governing and empty of any political vision. Specifically, he reached out to intellectuals who were bitter about the Social Democratic government's failure to protect academic freedom in the universities from the attacks of the radical Left. Kohl and his Christian Democratic colleagues continued to speak a language of freedom versus totalitarianism and democracy versus dictatorship, at a time when Egon Bahr viewed such language as a return to "Cold War ideology."

[2]See Helmut Kohl, *Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus* (Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell, 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The character of West German conservatism in the 1970s is poorly understood in the United States, perhaps because many of those who report on West Germany dislike it or because the West Germans who typically speak for "the Germans" in American analyses often come from left of center. Whatever the cause, the fundamentally Western and classically liberal character of West German conservatism of the 1970s was often lost from view. In the face of the Left's attack, intellectuals such as the historian Thomas Nipperdey, the sociologist Helmut Schelsky, the philosopher Hermann Lübbe, and the political theorist Wilhelm Hennis rallied in support of individual liberty, political pluralism, and existing West German political and economic institutions. In parliament, Kohl, Franz-Josef Strauss, and the brilliant and perceptive speaker for the Christian Democracts, Alois Mertes, constantly warned about the dangers of detente and the neutralism implicit in the speeches and programs of the Social Democrats.

THE CENTRAL tenet of the conservative critique of Social Democracy in the 1970s was that the SPD was abandoning the role set out for it by Schumacher: that of a bulwark against Soviet policy in Europe. The conservatives—and some Social Democrats around Helmut Schmidt—argued that the SPD was failing to connect the principle of peace in Western Europe and freedom in Eastern Europe. This was most evident in student politics, where in hundreds of university elections from the late 1960s to the early 1980s the Social Democratic youth organization entered into coalitions with communist, Marxist-Leninist, and new left groups rather than coalesce with young conservatives. This mentality was also in evidence in the Social Democratic attacks on President Carter's human rights campaign as a threat to detente. And it was conspicuously so in Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr's refusal to take seriously the Soviet military build-up.

To understand the Left in postwar West Germany one must begin with the fact that, from Kurt Schumacher on, social democracy and its more radical friends to the left have intellectual roots which go back to the nineteenth century. If there has been a "restoration" in postwar West Germany of past German political traditions, what has been restored is not Nazism but the still intact legacy of socialism and social democracy found in the writings of Marx, Engels, August Bebel, Karl Kautsky, Edward Bernstein, and Rosa Luxemburg. In the 1960s, this German restoration also embraced the legacy of the more romantic, subjectivist Marxism of Karl Korsch, Hungarian Georg Lukacs, and the Frankfurt School critical theorists—Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Franz Neumann, and Herbert Marcuse. The 1970s saw a further "restoration" in West German political culture with the revival of themes of German romanticism of the nineteenth century in the new environmental and anti-nuclear movements crystallizing in the Greens. Having roots in this older tradition contributed to their tenacity in the early 1980s, by which time similar romantic impulses in the United States had lost their political impact. It also made for a more nationalistic Left.

But the most important change in the West German Left in the period spanning the 1960s to the 1980s was the change in political language. The authors of that change were principally Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr. They criticized the ideology of the Cold War, and replaced it with a kind of West German Wilsonianism, captured in phrases such as "security partnership" and "common security." In place of Schumacher's "militant democracy," Brandt and Bahr offered faith in agreements and hope that good deeds could replace power politics.[3] In doing so they began the dismantling of the language of social democratic anti-communism.

[3]On this development see Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezähmten Deutschen* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Brandt, Bahr, and the intellectuals and journalists who share their vision have denied being neutralists and insisted on their support for the Atlantic Alliance. But West German neutralism in the 1970s and 1980s was not primarily a policy for transforming West Germany into a variant of Switzerland or Austria, nor did it seek a spectacular leap out of the Western alliance in exchange for reunification of the two Germanies. Rather, it was first and foremost an issue of political culture, and the erosion of the moral and political boundaries distinguishing West German democracy from the communist regimes of the postwar era. It was one thing to recognize that the nuclear stand-off required negotiations, but quite another to describe Brezhnev's Soviet Union as West Germany's security partner. True, there was a bipolar rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. But the terms "both superpowers," "both blocs," or even "East-West relations" became euphemisms which obscured the tensions between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Preventing nuclear war was essential. But the language emerging from the 1970s was neutralist in its exclusive focus on this or that weapon or "the arms race" in general. It had an odd, apolitical quality. Reading Bahr, or Brandt, one gets no sense of a Soviet Union with a will of its own.

IN ADDITION, the West German Left has purged whatever politically offensive elements remained in Bahr's modest policy toward the East of *Wandel durch Annäherung* or "change through rapprochement." At one time, Communists in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had reason to fear contact with Germany's Social Democrats, fighting as they were with them for the right to be the legitimate representative of the socialist tradition. Brandt and Bahr's neutralism lay in eliminating that fear. Rather than condition detente on fulfillment of human rights and political liberalization in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the West German Social Democrats accepted rapprochement without change, in the interest of peace. It was a trend that was foreshadowed in Brandt's argument that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 only made detente all the more essential. The effective separation of the issue of peace in Europe from that of political freedom in Eastern Europe in the Brandt-Bahr political vocabulary was what represented its essential neutralism.

Helmut Schmidt was the leading heir of the tradition of militant democracy initiated by Schumacher. Just as important as the bridges Kohl constructed to centrist and neoconservative intellectuals were the political decisions Schmidt took—and did not take—in 1974 when he became chancellor. Terms such as "successor generation" and "postmaterialism" lent an air of inevitability to the rise in power of the intellectual and political Left within the Social Democratic party. But political events often have political causes, a truism evident in Schmidt's decision not to find a replacement for Willy Brandt as chairman of the SPD in 1974. Schmidt left the affairs of his party to Brandt and his associates. As a result, Brandt was in a powerful position to consolidate a leftist opposition to the "right-wing," "technocratic" Schmidt government—in peace research institutes, party journals, newspapers, and the like. While Schmidt concentrated on governing, Brandt captured the party's heart.

Schmidt erred by not having his allies in the SPD wage a full-scale intellectual and political debate on behalf of his policies. Had Schmidt in 1974 appointed a chairman sympathetic to his foreign policy views, and had he waged a full-scale defense within the SPD over his foreign and defense policies, the rise of the Left within the party would have been slowed, perhaps even prevented. Whether Schmidt's intervention would have reinvigorated a vigorous anti-communist Left willing to speak bluntly about Soviet armament in the 1970s is uncertain. But Schmidt's considerable energies and intelligence were focused elsewhere. It is hard not to conclude that this missed opportunity in 1974 cost Schmidt dearly when his own party turned against him in the dispute over INF deployments.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A neutralist wants to believe that he or she stands midway between contending powers. But in the great war of words over the euromissiles of the early 1980s, the Social Democrats were not equally critical of the American and Soviet negotiating positions in the INF talks: they were more hostile to that of the ally than that of the adversary. They supported key elements of the Soviet position, calling for the inclusion of British and French missiles in the talks and a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe. In the election of March 1983 and in the Bundestag vote of November 1983, the Social Democrats rejected NATO's proposed deployments of the Pershing IIs. In the early 1980s, the West German Social Democrats served as a lever for, not a bulwark against, Soviet policy in West Germany. Rather than challenge, for example, Soviet propaganda about American plans to wage limited nuclear war in Europe, the SPD and the Left in the press gave voice to the same fears. It was a key theme in the re-emergence of a more nationalistic Left, one which claimed to be speaking for the nation against its "victimization" by the United States.

IT IS IMPORTANT to remember that this changing perception of the Soviet Union took place long before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. It occurred in the Brezhnev era: an era marked by Soviet economic stagnation, a massive military buildup, assertion of the Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe, and armed intervention in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It was a period in which the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and threatened to invade Poland. Just at the moment when the Soviet Union appeared most threatening, a part of the West German establishment concluded that the threat was a thing of the past.

The transformation of the political culture of the West German Left in the wake of detente and the emergence of the New Left led to a redefinition of the terms "Right" and "Left." In West Germany, "right-wing" intellectuals earned the label by defending such values as political pluralism, autonomous universities, the Western alliance, parliamentary (as opposed to plebiscitarian) democracy, and human rights in Eastern Europe. This Tocquevillian strain in West German conservatism has yet to be recognized in the United States, or recorded in American scholarship. The result of the transformation of the West German Left was that alliance decisions rested primarily with parties of the Right and Center, which became the defenders of the terrain of militant democracy after the Social Democrats had abandoned it.

The roots of the German conservatives' victory in November 1983 lay partly in the rapprochement of conservative politicians and intellectuals alienated by the policies of the Brandt government. In the early 1970s in West Germany, sophisticated intellectuals did not talk about freedom versus totalitarianism but about the "fascism" of the past and the primacy of peace in the present. Helmut Kohl's accomplishment was to revitalize the political vocabulary of the Adenauer tradition, a vocabulary keyed to ideas of liberty, political freedom, the mixed economy, NATO, and realism about Soviet power.

WHEN HE WAS elected party chairman in 1973, Kohl called for a *Wende* or "turn" in West German politics away from the "ideological absolutism" of the socialism of the Brandt years and toward a policy of the Center.[4] In both domestic and foreign policies, he called for a renewed emphasis on the basic values of free, democratic societies. In Kohl's view these basic values were threatened in 1973 by the logic of peaceful coexistence, by the weakened leadership of the United States, and by changes in the Atlantic Alliance:

[4] "Rede von Dr. Helmut Kohl nach der Wahl zum Bundesvorsitzenden der CDU am 12 Juni 1973 in Bonn," in Helmut Kohl, *Zwischen Ideologie und Pragmatismus* (Bonn: Aktuell, 1973), pp. 105–114.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> But above all the inner coherence of the Atlantic community is threatened by the dwindling of the power of a previously commonly shared value order (*Wertordnung*) which has been its foundation. The dismantling of the military danger by the policy of the Communist camp has brought the Cold War to an end. It has not, however, set this threat aside. This policy has only changed its character. Ideological aggression has emerged alongside military aggression. Today the conflict is conducted less with weapons than with words, concepts and ideologies. . . . The community of values and ideas must again emerge alongside the community of weapons. It is decisive that the idea of a militant democracy (*streitbaren Demokratie*) remain the content of the Atlantic community and of the movement for European unity. . . . [5]

At a time when Brandt, and even Schmidt, became reluctant to speak of freedom and totalitarianism, Kohl and the foreign policy team of the Christian Democratic Union—notably Alois Mertes on foreign policy and Manfred Wörner on defense—continued the tradition of militant democracy.

KOHL, THOUGH anything but a spellbinding orator, spoke the most important words a West German chancellor could utter in the midst of the war of words: "There is no middle ground between democracy and dictatorship. We stand on the side of freedom."[6] Kohl said that the West Germans were not "wanderers between two worlds" but stood clearly on the side of the United States and the Western alliance. Faced with the Social Democratic lever, Kohl—and, yes, Hans-Dietrich Genscher—became the bulwark. The anti-Western, anti-democratic Right of the Weimar Republic bore a heavy responsibility for destroying the first democratic experiment in German history. But the decidedly Western, democratic conservatives and liberals of the Bonn republic deserve the major credit for having defended West German democracy against the Soviet strategy of divide and conquer.

Recent events have evolved along paths evident in the crises of the early 1980s. The *Republikaner*—an extremist, right-wing party which has received between 5 and 7 percent of the popular vote—is anathema to the conservatives. Heiner Geissler, the CDU's general secretary, speaks of the "so-called" *Republikaner*, and the CDU leadership has unanimously rejected any coalition with them. The Christian Democratic leadership continues to protect the Federal Republic from neo-Nazi revivals.

In contrast, the popular front of the Social Democrats and Greens is now a reality in West Berlin and Frankfurt. In the spring elections of 1989, the SPD in West Berlin broke its campaign promise not to enter a coalition with the leftist *Alternative* party. Faced with the option of forming a "coalition of democrats" with West Berlin's Christian Democrats or aligning with the extreme Left, the Social Democrats took the latter option. The mentality of the popular front lives. There is no reason to assume that if faced with the same dilemma in the 1990 national elections the SPD would behave any differently. As in 1969, the formula for a victory by the Left would be a weakening of the democratic Right by a right-wing splinter party, accompanied by an alliance of the SPD with the far Left.

IN FOREIGN POLICY, the SPD continues to push for Gorbachev's arms control proposals. Hans-Dietrich Genscher has pressed for taking greater steps towards Gorbachev's proposals, but never at the expense of the Western alliance. In the crises of 1979 to 1983, Genscher adopted a very hard line in the face of intense Soviet pressure in favor of the zero-zero option. In the Bundestag he raised concerns about the SPD's neutralism. In September 1982 he broke up the coalition with the Social Democrats and decided to form a coalition with the conservatives, partly to ensure implementation of the NATO decision of 1979. Genscher warned

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111.

[6] Helmut Kohl, *Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages*, November 21, 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West Germans about leaving the Western alliance and the dangers of creating a power vacuum in Central Europe by opting for neutrality.

Kohl has been far from perfect as a defender of the Adenauer tradition. His insistence that President Reagan visit Bitburg was not only politically damaging and morally obtuse, it also indicated a confusion about what the Adenauer tradition has been about. Adenauer sought an alliance with the United States on the basis of a westernized Germany, not on an American reconciliation to an old and rightly discredited Germany. But Kohl's error, however serious, was not sinister, as his subsequent speeches on the Nazi past indicate.[7]

Nevertheless, the *Historikerstreit*—the recent dispute about West German historians and the Nazi past—has again raised questions about the character of West German conservatism.[8] The controversy was initiated by Jürgen Habermas, a West German sociologist and philosopher well known for his writings on epistemology and political theory. Habermas, who himself has not contributed anything substantial to the scholarship on National Socialism, argued that an essay by the West German political theorist and historian Ernst Nolte and a speech by historian Andreas Hillgruber were indicative of an emerging apologetic trend in West German conservatism about Germany's Nazi past. Nolte maintained that the Gulag prefigured Auschwitz and prepared the way for it, and that Jewish opposition to the Nazis had contributed to the Nazi attack on the Jews. He offered no convincing evidence for either of these claims.

ANDREAS HILLGRUBER meditated ambiguously on the "tragedy" that the Wehrmacht's fight to defend Germany against the Red Army had made possible the continuation of the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews.[9] It was an odd thesis but a serious one for anyone trying to understand how, as Thomas Mann put it, the Germans placed their virtues in the service of evil. Coming from the pen of the greatest West German historian of the impact of racism and anti-Semitism on power politics in Hitler's war, it was, at worst, an unsettling provocation; at best, it was an honest retrospective on how duty, mindless obedience, and love of country were debased in the service of absolute evil.

But Habermas lumped Nolte together with Hillgruber, as well as the historian Michael Stürmer, and the journalist-historian Joachim Fest, as a neoconservative group intent on forgetting, repressing, distorting, and relativizing the Nazi past. With the exception of its application to Nolte, whose arguments cannot withstand critical scrutiny, the notion of a forgetful and apologetic West German conservatism is false. One of the sadder aspects of the *Historikerstreit* is that it diverted attention from the greatest work of West German scholarship dealing with the relationship between Hitler's racism and his wartime strategy, Hillgruber's own *Hitlers Strategie*.

Also lost in the *Historikerstreit* were the central contributions made by other liberal and conservative West German historians, including Karl Dietrich Bracher and Klaus Hildebrand, to the understanding of the origins of the Holocaust. Bracher, a true liberal in the classical sense, analyzed Nazism as a totalitarian regime and then urged West German scholars to defend liberal democracy against totalitarianism in other places—the

[7] See my article, "Phillip Jenninger and the Danger of Speaking Clearly," *Partisan Review* (Spring 1989).

[8] The major documents of the dispute are collected in *Historikerstreit* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1987). Two well-informed American commentaries are Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); and Jerry Z. Muller, "The West German Historians Dispute," *Commentary* (May 1989).

[9] Andreas Hillgruber, *Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europaischen Judentums* (Berlin: Corso bei Siedler, 1986).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union, the Third World, and Eastern Europe. He warned that detente was displacing the juxtaposition of freedom and tyranny in Europe in the 1970s, and cautioned Germans against a Left which rejected West Germany's Western moorings.[10]

The attack on West German conservatives who speak clearly about the Nazi past reached absurd lengths in the fall of 1988 when Phillip Jenninger, then-president of the Bundestag and member of the CDU, was forced to resign after delivering a superb speech about the Nazi era to the Bundestag on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of *Kristallnacht*. Jenninger's speech was one of the most truthful statements about Nazism and the Holocaust ever delivered in the Bundestag. The irony of the flap over Jenninger's speech is that it is the German Right and Center which have made the most impressive contributions to understanding the ideological origins of the Holocaust. In contrast, the German Left has had little or nothing of significance to say. This is so, in spite of much huffing and puffing by the Left about "coming to terms with the past."

IN THE MOST important affairs of state, Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher have in large measure successfully borne the brunt of Soviet anger and enticement in the 1980s. In doing so they completed a reversal in the rhythms of European politics that Helmut Schmidt initiated in his London speech of 1977. It is in the national interest of the United States not to take the contributions of these allies for granted. The euromissile dispute could well have gone the other way, with the consequences that today Europe would be less stable, less peaceful, and less free.

For Americans, it is important to make distinctions. It is very different for Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher to take up Gorbachev's proposals than it was for Brandt to make similar gestures towards Brezhnev. A Social Democratic-Green government in Bonn would be an effective conduit for Soviet proposals and incompatible with an effective alliance. Policy-makers would do well to disabuse themselves of the notion that leadership in Washington can win over the West German Left. The emergence of a neutralist sentiment on the Left is not a passing fad; it taps deep into German traditions. It cannot be willed out of existence by clever policies pursued in Washington. The German Left is lost for the foreseeable future.

In place of "militant democrats" facing undemocratic extremes, the West German political scene today consists of a popular front of the Left, a militantly democratic Center and Right, and the revival of the old, anti-democratic Right. Effective *Abgrenzung* or "demarcation" between the democratic Left and a radical Left that cannot make up its mind about the core values of liberal democracy and the Western alliance is a thing of the past. The historic split of socialists and communists in twentieth-century German history is either over or, at best, much diminished. It spanned the period from Rosa Luxemburg's murder in 1919 to the euromissile battle of the early 1980s.

By contrast, the split between the democratic Right and the undemocratic, xenophobic, and anti-Western Right remains a chasm, at least for Helmut Kohl and Heiner Geissler. An effective Western alliance in West Germany now rests exclusively on the fortunes of liberalism and moderate conservatism. The strategy of "de-escalation" pursued by the West Berlin government on May Day 1989 rests on illusions likely to accompany any future Social Democratic-Green government's handling of foreign affairs. In such a situation, it is wise to grasp, as the Bush administration appears to have done in the spring of 1989, the value of paying attention to the fortunes of one's friends.

---

[10]See Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship* (New York: Praeger, 1970); and *The Age of Ideologies* (New York: St. Martin, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Good Word for Imperialism

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

MY GRANDFATHER was an imperialist. He ran away from home at the age of fourteen to seek adventure in the British Empire. Having made his way to India in the 1890s he joined a regiment of cavalry and won his spurs in chivalric duels with the tribesmen of the Northwest Frontier. Events took him to Africa where he ruled alone a remote corner of the newly conquered territories of Rhodesia, guided only by his Bible, his conscience, and a smattering of English law. When a colleague in the neighboring district was impaled alive with an assegai during a bout of native unrest, my grandfather was given leave to recover his spirits. It was then that he met my grandmother, on a ship in the Indian Ocean. She walked up to the proud and melancholy Victorian as he sat reading on deck, and asked: "What do you do, Sir?"

"Madam, I am an empire builder," he replied. "I civilize the wastelands of humanity and add another jewel to the imperial crown." At first she found this hilariously pompous, but it grew on her. They got married and together established one of the first sugar plantations in Zululand. My grandfather lived for another half-century during a prodigiously long and colorful career that ran across four continents. He survived to see Nehru in India, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Nasser in Egypt, to see Britain wriggling out of her last commitments, to see his own vocation vilified. He died a deeply wounded man in 1959, an anachronism in an era when imperialism had become a dirty word.

My family is steeped in the British Empire. As a child I learned enough about the colonial character to know that the Leninist theory of imperialism was mechanical nonsense. It was thus with delight that I read Lewis Feuer's book, *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind*,* which argues that imperialism often has more to do with the export of "surplus energy" by an exuberant and dynamic culture than the extraction of "surplus value" from a backward economy. Marx himself was ambivalent about the economic benefits of conquest and wondered whether the British government of India "does not threaten to cost quite as much as it can ever be expected to come to." But Lenin later found a niche for imperialism in the class system. According to Marxist theory the gap between workers and capitalists would widen, causing class consciousness and eventual revolution. But it did not happen. The working class enjoyed a surge in living standards during the decades before the First World War and industrial nations began to establish the welfare state. So Lenin concluded that the exploitation had simply shifted abroad, that "surplus value" plun-

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is the Washington correspondent for the *Spectator* of London.

*Buffalo: Prometheus, 1986. 265 pp., $22.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dered from the colonies was being used to bribe the workers at home. Imperialism, then, was the later stage of capitalism.

Empires, however, have recurred throughout history, at every level of economic development, regardless of creed or ideology. Strong people dominate weak people. It is a human condition. "Imperialism is, as it were, inherent in the vital urge. It is at the bottom of the soul of individuals as well as the soul of peoples," said Henri Bergson. The effects can be uplifting or utterly disastrous, depending on the imperial ethic, but some form of suzerainty by one country over others seems inevitable. Imperialism as such is a morally neutral term, and Feuer makes a distinction between "progressive" and "regressive" strains.

Genocidal empires like the Mongols and Nazis are easy to place. So too is the Soviet Union which has gained control over cultures more advanced than its own and has brought nothing of value to the ancient states of Central Europe—except, possibly, by preventing them from fighting each other. The Spanish Empire shifts about on the regressive side of the continuum, and it seems to be Dr. Feuer's *bête noire*. One of his criteria is whether the conquered population of an empire grew or fell, and by this standard La Conquista was a calamity. Mayan Indian regions in the Cuchumatan mountains of Guatemala, for instance, had lost 90 percent of their population by the mid-eighteenth century. But the same indictment could be made against English colonialism in America where tribes of Indians were wiped out, mostly by European diseases.

The conquest of Mexico was ferocious, without doubt, but there was a spiritual grandeur to the early Spanish rule that has been eclipsed by a *leyenda negra* of plunder and extermination. Hérnan Córtes was a passionately moral man in his twisted medieval way. After the fall of Tenochtitian he sent to Madrid for "twelve good men and true" to match the impeccable character and nobility of the Aztec priesthood. Charles V dispatched "Los Doce," all Franciscans. They walked barefoot from Veracruz with nothing but their robes and begging bowls, and when they reached Mexico the Gran Conquistador crawled forward five hundred paces on his knees to meet them and kiss the hems of their filthy rags.

Among those first ascetic priests was a cousin of the Emperor, a brother of the King of Denmark, and a half-brother of the King of Scotland. These were not younger sons of destitute hidalgos from Estremadura. Nor were they narrow-minded. They were faulted if anything for leaning too far to accommodate Aztec custom, and one Franciscan was investigated for allowing child sacrifice in his church. Almost invariably they took the Indian side against the government, much as liberation theologians do today, and it is owing to their public relations skill that we still have such a black picture of the conquest. The nutty, radical Fray Bartolome de las Casas made up or embellished many of the atrocities he described in his letters to the Emperor. Some of the correspondence fell into the hands of the British navy and was used as spectacular propaganda during the wars against the Spanish.

The imperial conception of the Spanish, writes Feuer, was "confined to feudal categories; they could only extract tribute and reproduce feudal plantations and their counterpart, a feudal mining system." In common with other regressive strains Spanish imperialism was undertaken and directed by the state, rather than by traders in an open system of pluralistic competition. It was not even state capitalism. Instead of investing in new schemes and inventions, the gold and silver of the New World was shipped home to be spent on the beautification of Spain, her churches, and her women. The inevitable result was inflation, and finally bankruptcy as the mines of Potosi and Taxco were depleted.

Progressive empires are those that foster human creativity, enrich the civilization of the metropolis, and bring peace, prosperity, and the rule of law to subject peoples. The paragon was Rome, which practiced a "participatory imperialism" open to almost any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

race that accepted the conventions of Roman civilization. "A Spaniard, a Gaul, or a Greek might, under the Roman Empire, if he possessed the talent, rise to the highest grades of the military or civil service, or even become emperor." It was the foremost deficiency of the British Empire that a Hindu from Hyderabad could never rise beyond local rank and serve as prime minister at 10 Downing Street, with a Malay as chancellor of the exchequer and a Zulu as first lord of the admiralty. The British Empire could never be universally inclusive because it was a crown federation of diverse and autonomous cultures, where a handful of graduates from Balliol College, Oxford looked after roads, sewers, and public security, while the indigenous peoples ran their own affairs much as they had always done. Although force ultimately held the empire together it was not a military regime. In the 1850s only 45,000 British troops, supported by 250,000 Indian troops but no auxiliary secret police, kept order among 200 million people in what is now India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Burma. There was no choice but to rely on native institutions in a system of indirect rule.

The Macedonian, Dutch, and French Empires are naturally counted as progressive but Dr. Feuer also praises Arab imperialism in the seventh century, which may raise a few eyebrows. The Muslim conquest has usually been treated unsympathetically by Western historians because it dislodged Christian powers—Byzantium in the Middle East and the Visigothic kingdom in Spain—but for the Jews it was a liberation, opening a tolerant era of commerce and science.

IT IS THIS Jewish angle that gives character and theme to Feuer's book, for he uses the Jewish experience under imperialism—"mostly a happy one"—as a case study over two thousand years. It is a unique standard of judgment because the Jewish Diaspora has lived through every strain of Aryan and Semitic imperialism, for better or worse, and it is calculated to throw the left intelligentsia off balance. One needs to be a little cautious here, however. It is possible that the lives of Balts, Ukrainians, and even the Russians themselves would greatly improve if the Soviet Union disintegrated and the universalist ideology of communism gave way to the nationalism of the Estonian Popular Front, of the Popular Movement for the Restructuring of the Ukraine, and of *Pamyat* among the Russians themselves; but Soviet Jews would not share the liberation. They might well feel that their interests were better protected by the Bolshevik umbrella.

Jews have prospered as craftsmen, traders, and officials in each of the great commercial empires from the Greeks onwards. But they reached their fullest bloom under the Union Jack, as Benjamin Disraeli rose to be prime minister of the largest and most populous empire the world had ever seen, his romantic empire "of liberty, of truth, and of justice." I doubt that any Jew has exercised more power before or since, Henry Kissinger not excluded. The British dominions were so open to talent that many of the pioneers were foreign Jews. From Hamburg came Alfred Beit, who made (and gave away) a fortune mining gold in the Witwatersrand and who joined Cecil Rhodes in a partnership that extended British rule deep into the African hinterland. From Prussian Silesia came Eduard Schnitzer, the scientist who governed the Anglo-Egyptian province of Equatoria for seven years in total isolation after the Mahdi took Khartoum. And from Iraq came David Sassoon, hereditary leader of the ancient Jewish community of Baghdad until he was expelled in 1829. He settled in Bombay where he signed his oath of loyalty to the British crown in Hebrew. "The turbaned, bearded, gowned Sassoon, creator of the first mechanical textile factories in India, was followed by a line of energetic sons and grandsons in novel industries from Bombay to Shanghai. Was its end foreshadowed in the elegant, sensitive great-grandson, Siegfried Sassoon. . . the lyricist and chronicler of a society grasped by the mood of decline?"

It is strange how the British imperial will

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

collapsed so abruptly after the First World War. Doubtless, there were economic reasons. India's textile and steel industries were undercutting Britain's exports to the subcontinent; and bigger, more expensive garrisons were needed to keep order as mass education created a movement for Indian independence. But economics alone cannot explain the cultural malaise, the defeatism of the opinion elite. A wave of anti-imperialist literature—beginning at the turn of the century with J.A. Hobson's seminal work *Imperialism*, cross-fertilizing with the theories of continental Marxists, and reaching full bloom, so to speak, with the Bloomsbury Group in the 1920s—so subverted the establishment that by 1930 it was considered gauche to praise the empire in educated circles. "It is a wonder that the white man is not more thoroughly detested than he is," wrote Cyril Connolly, in the spirit of the times. "In our dealings with every single country, greed, masked by hypocrisy, led the unscrupulous coercion of the native inhabitants. . . . Cruelty, greed and arrogance characterized what can be summed up in one word, exploitation."

The leading critics of empire in Britain accepted that there was a psychological component to imperialism. They acquired a taste for what we would now call "psychobabble" and used terms like "the Prospero complex" to portray imperialists as deeply warped characters, misfits, and failures who went abroad to escape their shame and to enjoy the thrill of power and sexual domination over dark peoples. There is no evidence of such a pattern of behavior. On the contrary, most of the imperial pioneers were robust and forthright. Feuer argues ruthlessly that the same could not be said for the critics themselves. It is hazardous to pick a few miserable wretches and build a theory upon their depravities, but it is striking how many of the anti-imperialists had complexes very like those they projected onto their foes. We know from the diaries of Sir Roger Casement that he extended his trips in South America in order to sodomize Pucamayo Indian boys. He was also a virulent racist. "Brazil and the Brazilians are vile," he wrote; "I can't bear them—mud-colored swine." It was not an ideal of fraternity that drove him to denounce the empire, but his hatred of the establishment. Eventually he was executed for treason.

As for J.A. Hobson, he was so anti-Semitic he accused the Jews of unleashing the Great War for their own profit. He advocated some remarkable policies of "rational stirpiculture," whereby the civilized states, working together in an "international political organization," would combine to prevent "the spread of degenerate or unprogressive races" and gradually bring about their "elimination." The current generation of anti-imperialists has shed Hobson's notions of master race and has gone to the other extreme, often preferring backward cultures to their own and denying the moral legitimacy of the West. A pharisaical mind lies behind this attitude, for such people seem to care little if dark races oppress and murder each other provided that the West is not involved, or Western ideology invoked. Theirs is a very narrow, legalistic sense of responsibility; a passionless compassion, driven by a phobia of guilt. Completely lacking is the moral duty to enter the fray and do what you can, at the risk of muddying yourself, in order to bring about a happier outcome.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH lost its way utterly in this fog of guilt during the 1960s and 1970s, to the point where it overturned the doctrine of sin. It is hard to see what is left of Christianity once sin becomes collective, its source found in the unjust system of exploitation allegedly imposed by capitalist hegemony, rather than in the heart of every human being. It was inevitable that liberation theology would throw up men like Donald McKenna, an Irish priest with IRA connections who joined the guerrillas in Guatemala and was last heard of living with a Dutch nurse in Nicaragua; or Ernesto Cardenal, the Sandinista Minister of Culture, who says that Christ forbade the sword but not the gun. The heresy was promoted by Pope Paul VI him-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Look of the Thing

Colonialism was a highly visual phenomenon. It abounded in flags, exotic uniforms, splendid ceremonies, Durbars, sunset-guns, trade exhibitions at Olympia and the Grand Palais, postage stamps and, above all, coloured maps. It was, in essence, a cartographic entity, to be perceived most powerfully from the pages of an atlas. Seen from maps, colonialism appeared to have changed the world. Seen on the ground, it appeared a more meretricious phenomenon, which could and did change little. It came easily; it went easily.

Paul Johnson, *Modern Times*

self, with his calls for the pooling of the world's wealth in his *Octogesima Adveniens* in 1971. In Latin America it was distilled further by Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, the secretary general of the Bishops Conference, who declared that "the United States and Canada are rich because the peoples of Latin America are poor."

This absurd statement was not so far from the opinion of academics, journalists, and World Bankers who together made up the school of development economics that has dominated thinking about Africa, Asia, and Latin America for a quarter of a century. They distinguish between pristine, "undeveloped" economies and "underdeveloped" economies which, while they may have pockets of relatively advanced industry, are nevertheless locked into a structural dependence on metropolitan capitalism that prevents them from reaching economic take-off. These economies cannot break out of the trap because the "terms of trade" (a favorite expression) are forever turning against them, so that they have to export more and more coffee to buy the same tractor from the West. To break free they must cut their ties to the system as much as possible, turn inward, and embark on a state directed strategy of import substitution. Free enterprise is fine for some, the argument runs, but not for backward countries leapfrogging stages of development.

It is an emotional construct, not a theory. Sure in their hearts that the poor countries are somehow being exploited, these economists have latched onto the "terms of trade" theory to support the claim. But there is no evidence that the price of coffee, for instance, has kept on going down. Only by juggling the data and picking a base year when the price of coffee was aberrantly high can such an argument be sustained. When the surge of oil prices in the 1970s showed that the "terms of trade" can move dramatically the other way, it was of course an exception. When whole countries—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.—achieved spectacular export-led growth, then they too were exceptions.

Looking back over thirty years, the only terms of trade that changed were *within* poor nations, between the cities and the countryside, as coercive regimes forced farmers to sell their produce to state monopolies at prices that lagged further and further behind inflation. Eventually, crop prices fell below the cost of production, the agricultural sector went into a tailspin, and only foreign aid kept the economy afloat. It happened all over Africa. The Sandinistas and some other Latin American governments have chosen the same path to poverty, in the case of the Sandinistas perhaps as part of a deliberate plan to eliminate the yeomen peasants and force them to join collectives where they could be controlled. Instead they fled to the cities or joined the contras. The results of statist development economics are by now well known and yet the theory continues to exert its poisonous influence.

"Development economics" was not conceived by the new nations of the Third World. It had a long gestation during the last decadent years of European imperialism. In fact, it was the British administration that first introduced the apparatus of monopoly in West Africa when it created the cocoa marketing boards in the late 1930s. Ghana's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

farmers, who were almost all black freeholders, were forced to sell their cocoa to the state. That was more or less tolerable until the boards became politicized, as they were bound to be. When Kwame Nkrumah took power in Ghana he began turning the screw until eventually farmers were only being paid as little as one third of the world price of cocoa. Drawing on what amounted to a confiscatory tax, the cocoa board became a bloated patronage machine for the ruling party. Ghana collapsed.

Professor Feuer overlooks the culpability of the colonists. He does an injustice to Africans when he describes the genocide that took place in several countries after independence as a relapse into indigenous savagery. Many tribes got along with each other fairly well before the colonial era, and some had quite effective political systems. A million Nuer, for instance, ran their affairs in the southern Sudan without any government whatsoever, relying instead on a web of mutual obligations that has come to be known as "ordered anarchy." Imperialism upset the balance and put a premium on power. Inevitably, tribes that had been thrown together into multiracial countries were soon locked in bitter struggles. "Despotism and kleptocracy do not inhere in the nature of African cultures or in the African character," writes P.T. Bauer, who has made West Africa one of his specialties. "It was the British policy in the closing years of colonialism that contributed greatly to the creation of a new political climate in which despotism was likely to emerge and corruption bound to flourish."

EVEN THE BEST empires have had some unhappy consequences, of course. But that must not cloud one's judgment. There will always be dominant powers in the world, and the Soviet Union is ready to fill the vacuum if the United States, crippled by a self-lacerative ideology, shrinks from the responsibility. Feuer asks us to try a *Gedankenexperiment:* What would the world have looked like if Stalin had had a nuclear monopoly at the end of the war? Can there be any doubt that he would have created a totalitarian, global regime, and snuffed out the liberal way of life, perhaps forever? It was America, however, that had the bomb, so Stalin had to content himself with half of Europe. Even in these last turbulent years of Soviet collapse his successor retains the military power to take most of the other half, and it could happen with devastating speed if America

Burmese Daze

The country the world knows as Burma is in future to be called Myanma. Its government insists that this is its proper name. The colonial British, it seems, got the pronunciation wrong; very wrong, evidently, even allowing for the heat, the flies, and the notorious British impatience for devilishly difficult foreign languages.

No doubt a country is entitled to call itself what it will. All the same, bookshops will now find themselves with instantly obsolete maps and guides. The geography of South-East Asia, which recently appeared to acquire an entirely new country called Cambodia (or was it Kampuchea?), will become even vaguer. Myanma? Spanish, isn't it?

There is, too, a streak of obstinacy in most people that rebels against name changes. The boat people arriving in Hongkong talk of Saigon, rather than the cumbersome Ho Chi Minh City. . . .

Burma will be around for a while; so will Rangoon, although its new official name is Yangon. No one is going to update "Where the old flotilla lay . . . from the Rangoon to Mandalay." But the xenophobic military government of, er, Myanma wouldn't approve of Kipling.

The *Economist*
June 3, 1989

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allows her theater nuclear deterrent to be undermined by confused diplomacy.

Feuer calls on the United States to forge a vigorous new imperialism and set out to dominate the world, without apology. This is the explicit purpose of his book. The term "imperialism" has to be detoxified and infused once again with the idealism of the nineteenth century so that Americans can shed their paralyzing guilt. His vision is not territorial conquest, but rather an hegemony of values: muscular American leadership within a concert of nations. As a melting pot of immigrants drawn from every race, America is uniquely adapted to a global participatory imperialism. The rhetoric of the United Nations belies the fact that America enjoys a certain trust among nations. Even intellectuals taking the fashionably anti-American line have been ambivalent about the country, acknowledging that there is an inscrutable altruism in the American character. Bertrand Russell gave voice to the inner thoughts of many on the left when he commented in 1922 that "America showed after the war, a complete absence of that hunger for territory which distinguished all other victors. These are very great moral assets, and they make me, in common with most European radicals, feel that if any one power is to be supreme in the world it is fortunate for the world that America should be that one."

The exhortation to empire is a deliciously taunting and provocative reply to Paul Kennedy's thesis of imperial overstretch. I doubt that Dr. Feuer will get his way. But in twenty or thirty years time, when a tidal wave of immigrants has renewed the American stock, and when the United States has become, indisputably, the only superpower, I hazard that his vision of a *Pax Americana* will be much closer to the mark than the handwringing defeatism of the prophets of decline.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The American Foreign Service Association

is pleased to invite colleagues interested in the foreign affairs community to become Associate Members.

As a member, you will receive the *Foreign Service Journal,*
the award-winning magazine for professionals in foreign affairs.
You will also have membership privileges at
the Foreign Service Club—just one block from the State Department.
The Club serves lunch daily, and has facilities for
catered events and conferences.
We'd also be delighted to add your name to our mailing list for
AFSA's bi-monthly lunchtime seminar series on professional issues.

If you care about foreign affairs, you'll want to be a part of the association dedicated to advancing the professionalism of America's representatives overseas.

Please include me as an AFSA Associate Member.
I enclose my $45 check for one year's membership.

NAME:

ADDRESS:

Return to: AFSA Membership Department, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20037

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Way We Were

Irving Kristol

THE MOST COMMON error that historians fall into is to assume they understand the past better than it understood itself. It is so common an error precisely because it is, in one special respect, partly true—we can, by virtue of retrospection, understand the consequences of past behavior, and most especially the unintended consequences, in a way that actors in the past obviously could not. (Mind you, even such an understanding is elusive and controversial, since the consequences themselves are not self-proclaiming, as new actors, coping with new circumstances, enter the scene.) But historical research proper is (or ought to be) constrained by a principle of modesty. It establishes the motives for behavior by listening respectfully to what the protagonists themselves say, both in public and private. One often hears it asserted that the scrupulous historian can inform us how things happen but not why they happen. This seems to me to be the very reverse of the truth. Any explanation of how things happen is at the mercy of a near-infinite number of details, about which many of our sources are simply silent. To appreciate why they happen, you simply have to assume that people took their own ideas and convictions seriously, were predisposed to see the world through the prism of these ideas and convictions, and were further inclined to act on them to the degree it was possible to do so.

Yet any such assumption, in our own time, is off-handedly dismissed by the various forms of determinism that are regnant in our intellectual and academic circles—economic determinism, sociological determinism, psychoanalytical determinism. All take it for granted that the historian understands people of the past better than they understood themselves, since they were but "vehicles" of "ideologies" whereby "underlying forces" worked their effects. What is pretentiously called the "sociology of knowledge," wherein people's ideas are explained away as "superstructural," is a sham. The professors who subscribe to it do not, of course, ever apply it to themselves.

Against this background of pretentious but intellectually impoverished contemporary history-writing, it is a pleasure to welcome Peter Coleman's *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe*.* It is a special pleasure to me, since I—as co-founder and co-editor of *Encounter*, which was sponsored by the Congress—come out well. (Almost too well: Stephen Spender played a more constructive editorial role than Mr. Coleman suggests.) But putting that aside, what I like about the book is its methodolog-

Irving Kristol is publisher of *The National Interest* and a distinguished fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

*New York: Free Press, 1989. 313 pp., $22.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ical modesty. Mr. Coleman has interviewed the participants who have survived, has consulted the available published and unpublished sources (including private correspondence in the Congress's files), and has composed a rather laconic, factual, and sympathetic account. It is sympathetic because the author himself was an active member of the Australian branch of the Congress, though only in the 1960s when the Congress was already on its way to eventual dissolution. Such explicit sympathy—always controlled by the oral and written sources—is quite different from "bias." For one thing, it is explicit. For another, it confronts uncomfortable evidence candidly. Above all, it allows Mr. Coleman to understand the Congress's main actors, in the two decades of its history, just as they understood themselves.

One of these days, no doubt, we shall get a history of the Congress from its opponents' point of view—we have already had some preliminary accounts. What we are unlikely to get is a candid, sympathetic history of all those star-studded pro-communist or anti-anti-communist organizations the Congress was founded to confront and combat. One would like very much to see such a history, but since it could only be written if the files of the Soviet foreign office, of various communist parties, and of the organizations themselves are opened for inspection, we would be well-advised not to hold our breath. It is interesting to note that we haven't even had any memoirs from those who were active in these organizations. For the fact is that most of them really were created, and financed, and manipulated, as part of a secret Soviet conspiracy, whereas the conspiratorial element in the Congress's history was of a subsidiary order—for most of us, an inconsequential order.

This conspiratorial element, as is now well known, involves the financing of the Congress by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since the CIA does not make its records available to historical researchers, Mr. Coleman had to piece together this part of the story from a few interviews with former CIA officials and agents, who were not always as forthcoming as one would like. Still, we now know the essentials. It is in some ways a rather bizarre story.

Like everyone else associated with the Congress, I heard gossip and rumors about "State Department" or "CIA" financing. I did not find them credible. Why on earth should John Foster Dulles's State Department support an international organization of intellectuals practically all of whom regarded themselves as liberals or social democrats, and whose publications, as Mr. Coleman demonstrates, reflected this political bent? As for the CIA, then a new organization about which one knew little—well, what kind of intelligence-gathering could such an organization of talkative and argumentative intellectuals be good for? I preferred to take at face value the official report that the money came from American foundations—which it did, though as it turned out they were, for the most part, distributors of CIA funds.[1]

[1]An amusing personal aside: When, in 1965, seven years after I had severed my connection with the Congress, Tom Braden, formerly of the CIA and then a publicity-hungry columnist for the *Saturday Evening Post*, made public the story of CIA-financing, he wrote it in such a way as to suggest that I might have been a CIA agent in this operation. I was outraged and moved to sue for libel. I was dissuaded by McGeorge Bundy—then head of the Ford Foundation but who, as national security adviser to John F. Kennedy, knew all there was to know—who patiently explained that I would only be publicizing the libel. This dissuasion was also buttressed by my lawyer, Morris Abram, who pointed out that an American jury was more likely to think of a CIA association as glamorous rather than libelous. (Those were the days!) Abram, however, in the course of his inquiries in Washington, discovered that the CIA had actually considered approaching me to become an agent—but had decided I was a "security risk" because of my youthful association with a Trotskyist sect!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

What I did not appreciate was the fact—as Mr. Coleman now relates—that within the CIA at this time there emerged a group of liberals recently recruited, notably Tom Braden and Cord Meyer, Jr., who believed that the only effective response to world-wide communist propaganda among intellectuals would have to come from intellectuals on the non-communist Left (or NCL'ers, as they came to be called within the agency), since there were precious few intellectuals who were not on the Left. They were right, of course. When the Congress was originally founded—by happenstance, this coincided with the outbreak of the Korean War—it was a kind of broad popular front of all anti-communist intellectuals and writers. But those "cold warriors" who were moving away from an identification with the non-communist Left (e.g., James Burnham, Max Eastman, Arthur Koestler) soon removed themselves from the Congress as well. Whether this caused any tension within the CIA is unclear. In the event, however, those who supported the NCL version of the kind of "cold war" that had to be conducted on the intellectual front evidently won out. They were helped, no doubt, by the fact that the magazines the Congress sponsored—*Encounter* in London, edited by Spender and myself; *Preuves* in Paris, edited by François Bondy; *Tempo Presente* in Rome, edited by Ignazio Silone and Nicola Chiaramonte—were deemed to be both successful and influential. Indeed, there is reason to think that, in the longer run, this success may have had a counterproductive aspect. The CIA became so proud of its sponsorship that it never energetically sought out private funds as a replacement, something that ought not to have been too difficult.

Strangely enough, as Mr. Coleman documents at some length, the major internal stress within the Congress involved its relations with the American Committee for Cultural Freedom, based in New York. (Since I had briefly been executive director of this organization before moving to New York, I tried to play the role of mediator, though with little or no success.) In New York, the Committee experienced two secessions—from the Right, led by James Burnham, who disliked the "pink" coloration of the Congress, and from the Left, led by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who thought the Committee was insufficiently militant against Senator McCarthy. What remained was a nucleus of indisputably "liberal cold warriors"—Diana and Lionel Trilling, Arnold Beichman, and others—who felt the Congress and its journals should have as their priority a blunt confrontation with and refutation of the rabid anti-Americanism then rampant in Europe and Asia.

This point of view was deemed "provincial" by the executive committee of the Congress, where Raymond Aron was the guiding light (though Sidney Hook and Irving Brown, European representative of the American Federation of Labor, both on the committee, were on the whole sympathetic to New York). I agree that it was provincial. But it was also understandable. Since there has been so little by way of historical research into the incredibly violent—in retrospect, incomprehensible—spasm of anti-Americanism and pro-Sovietism that gathered into its fold the overwhelming majority of the world's intellectuals, writers, and artists, it is hard to convey to people today the climate within which the Congress had to operate. We were definitely an embattled minority. (In a country like France, you couldn't even get a minor role acting in a movie unless you subscribed to anti-American, pro-Soviet views.) Jean Paul Sartre was the model European intellectual during those years, while a Raymond Aron was ignored. Those who attended the Soviet-sponsored and Soviet-controlled International Peace Conference at the Waldorf Astoria in 1949 (the event that was to move anti-communist intellectuals into organized activity) included Albert Einstein, Charlie Chaplin, Leonard Bernstein, Clifford Odets, Aaron Copland, Lillian Hellman, et al. Why? This was the barbaric regime of Stalinist Russia that these intellectuals were viewing with favor, while the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States, after helping to liberate Europe from Nazism, had launched its very generous Marshall Plan—yet was regarded with a mixture of contempt and hatred. Whatever the explanation for this pathological moment in Western intellectual history, it was no surprise that many New York intellectuals—themselves an embattled minority at the time within the United States—should have been outraged, and in a combative mood.

The Congress, however, decided that while factual and analytical anti-communism was appropriate to its mission, a strident pro-Americanism would merely serve to isolate and neutralize it to some extent. This reflected the Congress's personal attachment to the ideology and political constraints of the right wing, then the dominant wing, of the British Labour party. In part, too, it was a strategic decision—a Hugh Gaitskell, a Denis Healey, a C.A.R. Crosland could speak to the world, and at least a portion of the world would listen. These people—"our" people—were careful not to be seen as too pro-American. Looking back, I really don't see that the Congress had any alternative but to go along with them. (Though I myself was inching toward "neo-conservatism" by the mid-1950s, it would never have occurred to me to say a kind word for capitalism.) The American Committee, embittered, in the end severed relations with the Congress, which was a relief to all concerned.

I mention this episode, otherwise of no great significance, to emphasize the ideological homogeneity, based on an "NCL" perspective, that tended to prevail in the Congress's headquarters in Paris and in its various offshoots throughout the world. This helps explain why the editors of the various journals could all testify, in good conscience, that there was no impingement on their editorial freedom. In the case of *Encounter*, the major source of tension between London and Paris was the degree to which the journal had to be "British" to gain readership and respect, as against being an English-language magazine that happened to be published in London. *The Liberal Conspiracy* reprints some sharp exchanges between Michael Josselson, executive director of the Congress (and the CIA man on the spot, as it turned out), and me on this matter. Re-reading them after all these years was a peculiar experience—rather like hearing echoes from a lost world.

Speaking of Mike Josselson, I am pleased that Mr. Coleman goes out of his way to give him the appreciation that was his due. Mike, though not the easiest person in the world to get along with, was a brilliant autodidact, fluent (and widely read) in four languages, and a committed public servant. His work at the Congress gradually undermined his health, yet he never let up. When the CIA flap occurred, he promptly identified himself and took full responsibility, after which he retired to Geneva where he wrote a scholarly biography of Barclay de Tolly, the Russian general who was responsible for Napoleon's defeat—but never got the credit. He died in isolation, ignored by the country and the government he had served so well. He deserves Mr. Coleman's memorial, at the very least.

As I noted, Mr. Coleman's book, as a work of history, is on the austere side. That is to its credit. Too many historians have become converted to the notion that *Time* magazine style is the way to recapture reality. Mr. Coleman has written a lucid, coherently organized, and as accurate an account as one could wish of this intriguing, if probably marginal, episode in the intellectual history of our times.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chutzpah by Any Other Name

Benjamin Frankel

SECURITY OFFICERS at the Israeli embassy in Washington have grown used to all sorts of misfits coming to the embassy asking for consideration. Among them are wild-eyed men, claiming to be descendants of the lost tribes, wanting free trips to Israel, and weather-beaten veterans with crew cuts and tattoos wishing to join the Israeli Defense Forces. Officers at the embassy listen patiently to their pleas, then politely but firmly turn them away.

There was thus nothing unusual about the short, overweight, bespectacled man in his early thirties who drove his green 1980 Mustang through the embassy's electronic gates on the morning of November 21, 1985, accompanied by his bewildered wife and a cat named Dusty. The intense, nervous man claimed to be a naval intelligence officer who had been engaged in spying for Israel. Now he was in trouble, and following his "handler's" instructions, he was reporting to the embassy. In any event, as an American Jew, he had the right to become an Israeli citizen under Israel's Law of Return, and he was at the embassy to exercise that right. The story sounded incredible, but there was nothing unusual about that, either. The security officer heard all kinds of incredible stories during his tenure at the embassy.

Benjamin Frankel is a research associate at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.

The bored diplomat listened to the couple's pleas, and then, as he had done on many occasions in the past, asked them to leave the embassy's grounds. The Israeli official did not notice the dozens of unmarked U.S. government cars surrounding the embassy compound, or the men standing next to them with binoculars trained. And since he turned and entered the building before the green Mustang left the embassy's driveway, he probably did not see the car being stopped and its driver led away in handcuffs.

The arrest of Jonathan Pollard brought to an end the short but spectacular career of what members of the Israeli intelligence community still regard as one of Israel's most important and successful spies. The Pollard affair has raised disturbing questions: What obligations do allies have to each other and to each other's security? If one partner in a special political relationship believes the other to be in possession of information vital to its interests, and that ally refuses to share that information, how far is it legitimate to go in an effort to obtain it? Is there a difference between recruiting and planting a spy in a friendly country and availing oneself of a "walk-in" informer? Does it make a difference whether the informer is motivated by ideology or greed? Is it meaningful to distinguish—as Israeli officials have tirelessly tried to do since Pollard was exposed—between spying *in* the United States and spying *against* the United States?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wolf Blitzer's *Territory of Lies** is not meant to answer these questions (although the author does provide a short epilogue where he addresses some of them). Rather, the book chronicles this bizarre and disturbing episode from beginning to end, in the process demonstrating how good intentions get corrupted; how zeal blinds; how greed enslaves; how arrogance breeds recklessness.

The outline of the story is straightforward. Pollard grew up in South Bend, Indiana, where his father was a noted scientist at Notre Dame. The centrality of Judaism in his upbringing was accentuated by repeated incidents of anti-Semitism in the public school he attended, incidents numerous and severe enough for his parents to move him to a different school. Early on he had developed a fascination with—and a sense of utter devotion to—the State of Israel. Pollard, writes Blitzer, was like a small number of Diaspora Jews, for whom "religion wasn't necessarily Judaism, but Israel." Indeed, since his early teens Pollard had been tormented by his desire to migrate to Israel.

To his fascination with Israel there was added a rich fantasy world. He was attracted to the military and to espionage. Fellow students who attended Stanford with Pollard remember him confiding in them at different times that he was a colonel in the Israeli army. One student remembers Pollard describing himself, during discussions in political science classes, as part of an Israeli officers' group favoring a good relationship with Egypt. Many of the students who knew him were convinced by him that the Mossad was paying his tuition. He spent an inordinate amount of time playing "Diplomacy" and "Panzer Blitz."

After college Pollard attended Notre Dame law school for a short while, then did graduate work in African politics at Indiana University and Fletcher. While at Fletcher, Pollard, on his own initiative, began to report to the CIA on the activities of Third World students at the school, especially Arabs. Becoming impatient with academic life, he applied for a job with the agency, but in what was one of the major disappointments of his life, he was turned down because of drug use during his days in college. He then applied for a job with another governmental intelligence agency, and in September 1979 was hired as an intelligence research specialist by the Field Operational Intelligence Office of the U.S. Navy in Suitland, Maryland. His work included mostly analysis of surface navies of non-communist countries. By 1981 he was frustrated with his job, disillusioned by the Reagan administration's decision to sell AWACS reconnaissance aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and resentful of what he perceived as anti-Semitism within the Navy. He applied for a job as a defense analyst at AIPAC, the official pro-Israeli lobbying organization in Washington. AIPAC's officials remember him as "very strange"—an adjective invariably applied to Pollard by people encountering him over the years—and believed AIPAC was being set up as part of a 'sting' operation. Pollard was turned down.

His enthusiasm for Israel and its cause, though, did not diminish. He was growing increasingly bitter over what he believed to be anti-Israeli attitudes at the top echelons of the Defense Department, especially in the wake of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. He decided the time had come to take a more decisive action on behalf of Israel.

In fact, the defense and intelligence cooperation between the United States and Israel had become very close by then, and was growing increasingly so. Following the December 1981 agreement on strategic cooperation, and the subsequent formation of joint military working groups, Israel and the U.S. came to share many of their military secrets. Under James Angleton and William Casey, the cooperation between the intelligence establishments of the two sides was especially good. Israel would provide the United States with Soviet weaponry captured from the Arabs, as well as information gathered

**Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989). 336 pp., $22.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through its considerable human resources in the Arab countries and within terrorist organizations. The United States would provide Israel with information it had gathered through its vast National Technical Means network, comprising satellite photography and other electronic and signal reconnaissance.

But the two sides did not share everything with each other. For example, the U.S. generally refused to provide Israel with military information on Arab countries friendly to the United States, such as Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. The United States also abstained from information that might prompt Israel to take steps which would complicate the American position in the region vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (this was the case with information concerning Syrian chemical warfare capabilities). Intelligence services in both countries generally abstained from providing the other side with information whose dissemination might jeopardize valuable information sources.

AGAINST THIS background of qualified cooperation, and with the perfectly innocent help of one of his father's friends, Pollard contrived a meeting with Colonel Aviem Sella. Sella, an Israeli Air Force pilot and national hero (he had commanded the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in May 1981), was in New York completing his advanced studies in computer science. The meeting took place in the coffee shop of the Washington Hilton on May 29, 1984. Pollard was blunt. "I know I can help you," he told the stunned Sella. "You have no idea how much vital information the United States is denying Israel." Pollard was in a position to know. He was just about to be transferred to a newly created Anti-Terrorist Alert Center (TAC) of the Naval Investigative Service's Threat Analysis Division, where he became a watch officer. Since much of the global terrorist threat originates from various Middle Eastern quarters, the new position allowed Pollard access to information more relevant to Israeli interests than he had previously enjoyed. And what he saw bothered him a great deal.

He learned that Israel was being denied information about massive shipments of sophisticated Soviet armaments to Arab countries. The United States, as mentioned, was also reluctant to share with Israel information about Arab countries' chemical warfare capabilities, or about the armies of pro-Western Arab countries. Pollard also saw intelligence cables detailing planned Arab terrorist attacks against Israel and was upset to realize that some of that information was not being shared. Pollard came to believe that this was because anti-Israeli factions within the administration, led by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, believed that only a weakened Israel would be ready to negotiate with the Arabs. One way to weaken the Israeli hand was to deny it accurate information about Arab military strength and terrorist activities.

Pollard could also see the information the United States was gathering on Israel through its National Technical Means. By providing very detailed photographs of Israeli military facilities taken by American satellites, and decoded Israeli communications intercepted by American reconnaissance systems, Pollard enabled the Israelis to improve their camouflage, concealment, and encoding techniques, making it more difficult for America—and the Russians—to gather information on Israeli military installations and activities. If the United States was not going to share with Israel information Pollard believed essential to Israel's security interests, then Pollard would see to it that Israel received the information anyway.

The rest is history. All told, Pollard and American intelligence authorities agree that the thousands of top secret documents Pollard had delivered to Israel would fill a small room.

Was Israel right to employ Pollard? The answer is a resounding and emphatic no. It is true that as a general rule everybody spies on everybody else. But there is spying and then there is spying. Countries employ large staffs

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of analysts even in embassies in friendly countries for the purpose of analyzing data gathered from open sources. Moreover, the cameras and listening devices on an American spy satellite do not shut themselves off when traveling in the sky of a friendly country. Antennas mounted on American planes and ships are not tuned so as not to acquire radio signals emanating from the territory of an ally.

But there is an unwritten rule among allies against initiating sustained, intrusive spying on each other. This applies to technical means as well as to human sources. An American satellite may not turn off its cameras when flying over Britain, but it is difficult to conceive of the CIA bugging the British defense ministry. Similarly, countries may avail themselves, on a one-time basis, of a "walk-in" informer in a friendly country (as the U.S. did, when an Israeli military person, objecting to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, provided information to American officials in Tel Aviv). They are not likely, however, to engage such an informer on a long-term basis. And allies do not plant "moles" in each other's government.

In the case of Pollard, Israel blithely and brazenly violated these unwritten rules. This flagrant violation is especially shocking when viewed against the depth and scope of the American commitment to Israel's security and welfare. Israel's very existence, after all, is dependent on American economic and military aid, and America's goodwill towards Israel is one of the core elements of Israel's national security. The central task of Israel's foreign policy should thus be to secure and enhance the Israeli-American relationship. It is not a question merely of gratitude—although gratitude is the proper Israeli attitude towards the United States—but of realpolitik. It is difficult to imagine what intelligence information Israel could steal from the United States—on top of the voluminous information already provided it—that would be worth jeopardizing its relationship with the superpower.

Even if the information Pollard had provided allowed Israel some short-term tactical gains, such information became obsolete very rapidly. U.S. justified irritation with an ungrateful and impudent ally is not likely to diminish as quickly.

The Israeli government had insisted that the affair was a "rogue" operation, launched by a small unit within the intelligence community without the knowledge or approval at the political level. This may have been the case initially. Sources high in the government, however, including Defense Minister Rabin, admitted to seeing some of the documents provided by Pollard, and they must have known that these documents did not come through regular channels. They did nothing to stop the operation.

It is also not clear what the Israelis mean by "unauthorized." Colonel Sella is a model soldier. It is inconceivable that he would have contacted Pollard, and provided him with intelligence-gathering instructions, without the knowledge and approval of his superiors at the time—Air Force commander General Amos Lapidot and IDF Chief of Staff General Moshe Levy. It should also be noted that the two principal Israeli culprits were not exactly treated as renegades or punished once their "rogue" operation was discovered. On the contrary: In a vexing display of insensitivity, the Israeli government *promoted* both of them! It appointed Rafi Eitan, the high intelligence official who personally handled Pollard and monitored his activities, head of Israel Chemicals, the largest government-owned economic concern in Israel, while naming Colonel Sella commander of the prestigious Tel Nof air base. After Sella was forced to relinquish the post because of American pressure, he was named head of the Israel Defense Forces staff college. Further, despite Israel's promises its cooperation with the American investigative team, headed by Judge Abraham Sofaer, was not only less than full, but at times positively misleading.

Another aspect that had been insouciantly ignored by the Israelis in their decision to employ Pollard was the likely effect on the American Jewish community. To employ an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Jew in a sensitive position as an Israeli spy is to play into the hands of those who speak of Jewish "dual loyalty." Supporters of Israel in American politics have been successful in fashioning a generally pro-Israel consensus in U.S. foreign policy, a consensus adhered to by successive administrations because their patriotism and their dedication to the interests of the United States were above reproach. This has also been the source of their success in engendering pro-Israeli attitudes among the majority of Americans. These supporters of Israel could honestly make a persuasive case that there was a high degree of convergence between American and Israeli interests. What the employment of Pollard by Israel showed was that there were some Jews—at least one Jew—for whom loyalty to Israel was placed above loyalty to the United States and its interests. Of course, one cannot and should not generalize from one exceptional incident to question the motives of other American supporters of Israel. But it certainly makes the task of supporting Israel just that much more difficult.

WHAT DID NOT help the situation was the fact that circumstantial evidence suggested that Pollard—unbeknownst to him—had a collaborator, possibly a "mole," placed in a high position in the American government. Pollard did not pick up TOP SECRET documents at random for the Israelis to photo-copy. He was very methodically "tasked" by his Israeli handlers to pick up very specific documents, identified to him by their title and code number. He would order these documents from the various intelligence libraries to which his clearance gave him access, then deliver them to his Israeli handlers for copying. How could the Israelis provide him with the exact titles and code numbers of these highly classified documents? Who provided them with that information? After Pollard, it has become more difficult for American Jews with relatives in Israel to obtain or maintain top security clearance.

What is especially amazing—and disturbing—about Israel's behavior in the Pollard affair is not that the Israeli intelligence operatives, after weighing the odds, gambled and lost. It is that there is no evidence to suggest that at any point during the affair were Pollard's handlers bothered by thoughts about the consequences of their actions if the operation was discovered. They nonchalantly assumed that if Pollard were caught, the U.S.-Israeli "special relationship" would see to it that nothing serious would happen—to Pollard, to them, to U.S.-Israeli relations—and that the whole affair would be hushed up. Pollard himself believed that the fact that Israel was not a Criteria Country (that is, one the government formally designates as hostile to the United States) somehow made his spying less illegal. In a display of incredible complacency, Pollard's handlers did not even bother to develop an escape plan for him! The Israeli temerity was expressed above all in taking the United States, and its commitment to Israel, for granted.

But a relationship between countries cannot and should not be taken for granted. American support for Israel is not an act of nature; it is not a given. Rather, it is a result of a perception on the part of American policy-makers and the American public that there is a community of value and interest between the two countries. This special relationship, like any other relationship, should be nurtured and nourished continuously. Without attention and care, the perception of common interests may change and the trust the two countries have developed may erode.

Why did Israel do it? Blitzer's answer seems right:

> One inescapable conclusion of the Pollard affair is that Israel's famous chutzpa can be a source of weakness as well as strength. It has enabled Israel to survive in a very dangerous part of the world. Yet it has also engendered a widely held attitude among Israeli officials that Israel can get away with the most outrageous things.

Israel has proven its daring and unorthodoxy in countless military and intelligence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

operations. Its penchant for the unconventional has indeed served it well. But daring should be tempered if it is not to deteriorate into sheer recklessness. Unorthodoxy should be qualified if it is not to turn into unprincipled opportunism. In the Pollard affair, Israeli predilections have bred arrogance, overconfidence, and disregard of its obligations to a vital ally. In Greek they call it hubris. In Hebrew, chutzpa.

WHAT IN THE NAME OF LENIN IS GOING ON IN GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA?

GLASNOST—Subscribe Now!

For the only on-the-scene, independent answer to that question, read the bimonthly, English-language edition of GLASNOST. With each issue containing the most important articles from the three previous numbers of the Russian edition, our journal looks at everything from "The Goals and Limits of the Gorbachev Reforms" to "The End of 'The Good Life' for Galina Brezhneva." Other subjects include "The Ecological War on the Peoples of the Caucasus," "The Destruction of the Last Court Archives from the 1930s-1950s," "The 15th Moscow Film Festival," "Public and Political Clubs in the U.S.S.R.," "Inventors and Perestroika" and, of course, the most current appeals and open letters to Soviet leaders. Glasnost, then, may not contain the latest in "Gorbymania"; but it will try to tell you all about Gorbachev's most recent mania.

$48 for a one-year subscription
Only $36 for each additional year!

For institutional subscribers or those who order in bulk, special rates apply:

☐ Check box for 50% discount if ordering 10 or more one-year subscriptions.

☐ Check box for 25% discount if ordering 2 to 9 one-year subscriptions.

All checks payable to The Center for Democracy in the U.S.S.R. Send orders to:
GLASNOST
c/o Center for Democracy
358 West 30th Street, Suite 1-A
New York, N.Y. 10001

MY NAME _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Send *Glasnost* as my gift to:

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democracy and the Vitality of Evil

Craig Snyder

DEMOCRACY IS the issue of the moment. Before they were slaughtered, students, workers, and other Chinese citizens held the main square in Beijing and, with the portrait of Mao overhead, fashioned a replica of the Statue of Liberty, quoted Patrick Henry, and chanted about every manner of "bourgeois" right. In the meantime, the Poles have held nearly legitimate elections while South Americans prepare to consign their last military dictator (Pinochet) to mere memory.

No fluke, all of this, says Gregory Fossedal: Democracy is the issue of the age. For Fossedal, in fact, democracy is alpha and omega. The "democratic revolution" is his description of present reality, the "democratic imperative" (a world role for the United States irreducibly aimed at the cultivation of democracy around the globe) is his prescription and, though he rejects the characterization, the "democratic century" is his prediction of what is to come after the year 2000.

Guided perhaps by the rule of political argument crafted by John Stuart Mill in *On Liberty*—press one "very simple principle"—Fossedal has a single theme. Well, two themes, but he clearly intends them as inseparable. First, democracy is a good thing, the right thing, for everyone, everywhere. Second, democracy is *our* thing. In Fossedal's world, then, the tensions between American interests and American values, the nature of which has been debated long and hard by many, vanish. For America, morality is power.

From these provocative sparks—to which I wish to assent and say thanks—Fossedal goes on to propose a construct of "ideopolitik" counterpoised against conventional views of "geo" and "real" politics. His notion is that the balance of power ultimately cannot but be governed by the power of ideas.

So far, so good. But, unfortunately, while Fossedal has written a book dealing with the most important issues, it is a seriously flawed book. *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution** is marred by omissions, lapses of argument, and the disproportionate attention it gives to second-order issues. Indeed, the book fails to make an argument on anything like the scale demanded by the subject. Instead, Fossedal leaves even a sympathetic reader wishing that, rather than spinning out catalogues of peripheral facts, the author would just make a point.

Craig Snyder is an attorney and former program director of the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia. He is the editor of *The Strategic Defense Debate: Can "Star Wars" Make Us Safe?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986).

*New York: A *New Republic* Book, Basic Books, 1989. 293 pp., $19.95.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unable to sustain an argument from a premise to some sort of conclusion, Fossedal, even in his lengthy factual accounts, never really tells his readers what he thinks about the large questions he raises. Could the U.S. have altered the outcome in Hungary in 1956? Could we have prevented the communization of Cuba, the rise of Khomeini, or the consolidation of the Ortegas? Certainly affirmative answers to these questions are implicit in Fossedal's treatment of them. But one is never told why and how.

At worst, Fossedal should have explored each of his overabundance of case studies more deeply, following them where they need to go. At best, he would have lopped off half these excursions into and demonstrations of "research" and given us more comprehensive "rhetoric," in the sense that term used to be understood. Regrettably, he did neither.

Fossedal believes that a far too pessimistic picture of the world is widely shared among American policy-makers, in both liberal and conservative circles, a picture in which potential leaders abroad who love freedom are a rarity and America's options in dealing with this or that nation are frequently limited to non-intervention or support of one extreme or another. There are/were, he maintains, significant numbers of genuine democrats in the Philippines, in South Korea, in Nicaragua, even in South Africa. Yes, even in Iran. Fossedal implies that with different American policies, these and other countries that are not free today could have been, and that those that are free could have been so sooner. On the whole, he is right. But the issues concerning the transformation of democratic potential into democratic reality that Fossedal fails to confront are as profound as the insight itself.

First, in the real world of post-Vietnam America (his optimistic reading of the polls about attitudes toward U.S. involvement overseas notwithstanding) the argument for interventionism—of any kind, much less of the elaborate protracted sort envisioned in Fossedal's call for a global mission—must be made and won, not assumed, for it is opposed broadly and passionately. What right do we have to meddle and impose, to export "our system"? There are answers, of course, and I have no doubt Fossedal could make the argument that turns this question on its head. But he doesn't.

And what of the various challenges of the "realists": if ever it once could, America today can no longer afford so sweeping a role; and, as John Quincy Adams long ago suggested, our proper role must be that of a friend to freedom everywhere, but defender only of our own. Fossedal's cases are meant to show how much we can accomplish on the cheap. Not that this is key, since in any event one can deduce that he rejects the arguments about America's diminished capacity. But his reasoning is elliptical, merely suggestive.

Furthermore, what if there are places without viable democratic centers? In the long run—perhaps—we can create "third forces"; but politics happens in the short run too. And what of the effects of the appearance of inconsistency on any U.S. policy dedicated to the "rights of man"? The book alludes to this issue—by ridiculing the pursuit of consistency and those who urge it—but fails to address it squarely. While Fossedal is right, the demand for moral consistency in judging American policy is a fact that cannot be treated cavalierly. The needed response is not parody but persuasion.

An example: Fossedal argues that the U.S. should arm, or at a minimum should consider arming the ANC in its struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. But, aware of the ANC's Marxist connections, he says that part of the purpose for U.S. support would be to smoke out the group's true intentions for a post-apartheid state. There he stops. But what should be our policy if, after this smoking out, it becomes apparent that there is no third force of consequence in South Africa?

Fossedal's failure to deal explicitly with the remaining vitality of evil, specifically in the form of a lust for power, leads to other omissions. If Fossedal and others are correct in believing that the century-long "war of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideas" between democracy and communism is over and we have won, then free peoples may face a new sort of danger from would-be tyrants. Deprived of the once potent wellspring of power and legitimacy associated with Marxist ideology, are these candidate-dictators likely simply to surrender? Exposed as illegitimate, is not the next generation of tyrants faced with a stark choice between the most brutal use of power or its loss? In *The Democratic Imperative* there is not a hint of this, not a passing reference to the clear fact that the flipside of the unique political promise of our age is the danger posed by the stripping away of the ideological justification for power.

What will it mean, to take the most important case, if the Soviet empire, swept by the winds of freedom, faces imminent collapse, both abroad and at home? Surely the reaction of the Chinese government to the recent uprisings there suggests that "people power" on its own faces brutal opposition by even weak autocrats. The point is simple. Not only does the top-down transformation of a truly totalitarian state have no precedent, finally, it has no meaning. "Reform communism" is alchemy. A "blueprint" for U.S. foreign policy, which Fossedal's book claims to be, that does not consider how to manage change towards democracy in the East—and to survive the consequences of all that we cannot control—is a blueprint for a structure with no foundation.

What else has escaped Fossedal's attention? The Islamic world comes to mind; a sizable chunk of humanity that seems impervious and oblivious to the otherwise quite real democratic trend. Muslim political and religious radicalism is a threat—to Israel of course, but also, in an era of terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to all free peoples.

All of this leads to Fossedal's discussion of the means for promoting democracy. He opens the section with a quote from the *Journal of Peace Research* "on the meaning of nonviolence." He examines the available policy tools: words (human rights policy as such), radio and other levers of public diplomacy, economic sanctions, arms assistance to guerrillas, and international macroeconomic policy ("stable money and free trade").

There is much here that is interesting and useful, even if it is too "richly detailed" for its own good. But again, the problems are of omission and proportion. It is not clear, for example, where Fossedal stands on the use of force, on the *raison d'être* of American military power in the new era of international leadership he promotes. Perhaps he believes—as more and more do—that the direct application of force for political ends by a great power is an anachronism at the close of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, Fossedal implies that the U.S. should have used some sort of direct force against the Sandinistas. He is also clearly enthusiastic about the Grenada operation, and acknowledges that the provisioning of arms to various freedom fighters does carry with it the possibility of direct involvement. So where does Fossedal stand on the hard issue: What do we do in support of democracy when the costless stuff does not work? As force remains the basic currency of international transaction, when and how should this country be prepared to use it towards the end which he and I agree is central to America's place in the scheme of things?

FINALLY, we come to what I think is *The Democratic Imperative*'s greatest shortcoming. What exactly is this thing—democracy—we are exhorted to export? Fossedal gives us the most reflexive of answers: "a political system run by leaders chosen in periodic elections open to general participation and free debate."

Fossedal is certainly correct to attack the reverse racism of the too common liberal/left view which sees political liberty as a luxury which only the rich can afford and which is, at best, irrelevant to the world's mass of poor. Anyway, this argument can no longer be sustained, as it could still be with some plausibility as late as the 1960s. More clearly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than at any previous time in history it stands exposed as a case for tyranny in the name of economic development. We obviously now understand that oppression and poverty have only been defeated, and can only be defeated, together. We have also seen from Panama to China how much liberty itself inspires ordinary men and women everywhere. But that said, Fossedal should understand that there is a sense and a time frame in which, across much of the face of the globe, bread matters more to more people than voting rights. The point he should have made, fully consistent with the moral reasoning he does offer, is that a policy aimed at the export of American political structures *alone* will likely fail—and should.

In all of Latin America and throughout Africa, elections as such have not changed the misery of the majority. Elections have merely rearranged the constellation of elite forces that own these countries through their intertwined state bureaucracies and "private" economies. It is, as Hernando de Soto argues in *The Other Path*, mercantilism, not capitalism, that has been the actual Third World alternative to socialism. This is why even quite respectable GNP growth rates coexist with burgeoning populations of the superpoor. And it is why Fossedal's macroeconomic policy scheme for free trade and a restoration of exchange rate stability, whatever its Chicago-school merits, might do little more than make the rich of the Third World richer.

America's task is more daunting than Fossedal suggests. The gravamen of our efforts to see a better world in the new century must involve all three of the components of our social system (what Michael Novak calls "democratic capitalism" but which the old "Superman" TV show called simply "the American way"): political, economic, and social. This must mean a policy aimed at breaking the grip of the mercantilist oligarchies and their corrupt states. Until we find a way to do this, to reach the slums from Manila to Rio to Lagos to Dacca, not only will the dream of a Democratic Century fail to obtain, but the threat of anti-democratic revolution, if not in the name of Marx then of someone or something else, will persist.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Why Everyone Hates the State Department

And What To Do About It

Elliott Abrams

George Washington warned two centuries ago of "foreign entanglements"; ever since, Americans have been wary of close involvement in other people's affairs. In this century, Americans died in great numbers in two struggles over the mastery of Europe, and, even further away, in Korea and Vietnam. Experiences with Iran and Libya have reinforced the perception that the world is filled with madmen and fanatics, towards whom the best attitude is disentanglement backed by bombers. The U.S. is, after all, not Belgium or the Netherlands; and constant concern with, and worse yet, involvement in the affairs of others can seem not an accepted fact of national life, but rather a choice fraught with peril.

In these circumstances, the Department of State is a dead duck: Americans will always distrust the institution whose very role is, precisely, foreign entanglements. Thus, most of the criticism of the State Department—being rooted in fear, not facts—is generally immune from factual refutation.

Begin with the 'social' critique: the Foreign Service is comprised of a haughty elite—WASPs from Eastern Establishment families with old money, educated at the Ivy League schools, utterly out of touch with America. The old joke had it that the true formula for success in the Foreign Service was to have a reversible name (Vanderbilt Whitney or some such thing), preferably followed by roman numerals. These names, and this social group, are certainly better represented in the Foreign Service than among major league baseball players, yet the old Foreign Service is disappearing. No one can spend time in the Department of State without realizing quickly that it is largely inhabited by real Americans, from places like Iowa and Colorado. The old Ivy League and East Coast domination is simply gone.

Then there are the 'substantive' criticisms: that State is simply incompetent, or that it seeks a negotiated, diplomatic solution to all problems, avoiding confrontation at all costs. Here it is worthwhile to recall that the Foreign Service is but one of three career national security bureaucracies in Washington, the others being the CIA and the uniformed military. Is it really possible to argue that in recent years the State Department has demonstrated less competence than these other bureaucracies? Is it really possible to argue that State gets more criticism than the military or the CIA because it deserves more? Thinking of the CIA's performance in Iran, or its alarmist misjudgments about Mexico, or of the Pentagon's innumerable errors in Grenada, it is hard to argue that State has been notable for bad work.

Bad work there has been. The political

Elliott Abrams, a lawyer in Washington, DC, was an assistant secretary of state from 1981 to 1989.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sections of some embassies are well-led and turn out terrific analyses, while others seem never to look beyond elite circles in the capital. Some look ahead, while others seem baffled as to what might be coming next. Some court the powerful, seemingly ignorant that they too shall pass and that when they do go power will pass to groups the embassy ought to have been cultivating all along. The point is not that the Department turns out uniformly fine work (it does not), but that the standard is at least as high as that across the Potomac at the CIA or Department of Defense, and that it is indeed pretty good. In recent years, for example, embassy analyses of developments in countries such as Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and El Salvador (all missions led by career diplomats) have been superb; and while my own recent experience is limited to the Latin region, it seems likely that U.S. diplomats in other regions are no less skilled.

All three bureaucracies have their dunces, although most of them are winnowed out by promotion boards over the years; all three have their geniuses, although the nature of bureaucracy itself all too often forces out idiosyncratic officers, even when the idiosyncracy is brilliance. Man for man, our diplomats are arguably smarter than our spies or our soldiers, and they certainly write and speak more coherently.

Yet more extraordinary is the notion that State is pusillanimous, while the CIA and Pentagon types are aggressive in defending American interests. In recent years, after all, it was the State Department that (rightly or wrongly) pushed a U.S. military role in Lebanon and a hard line against General Noriega in Panama. The Pentagon, on the other hand, not only opposed these initiatives but was reluctant even to take on the militarily trivial task of restoring democracy to Grenada. It was the Defense Department, not State, whose rules about U.S. involvement overseas excluded any provocation less dramatic than Pearl Harbor. It was the State Department which had prime responsibility for U.S. efforts against the communist regime in Nicaragua. Still, it is State about which people mutter "cookie pushers" and similar epithets.

Needless to say, these comments about the character of State and Defense are generalizations: there are plenty of aggressive generals and cautious diplomats. Nor would we necessarily want it otherwise, for aggressive generals can be a dangerous commodity, and diplomats who doubt the efficacy of diplomacy would be unlikely to achieve much employing it. The point is, the Pentagon's reputation has not declined much despite its conduct, and State's has not improved much despite its own.

A similar phenomenon can be seen through the prism of drugs, a scourge Americans want to fight. On the front line sit Foreign Service officers, risking their lives each day in places like Colombia and Peru. The U.S. ambassador in such countries today is constantly in great peril, as are his wife and children; other embassy staff members may be at even greater risk, for they receive less protection. Some posts are so hazardous that no spouses or children are permitted to live in the country.

Yet in Congress, the institutions which reap popularity from the drug issue are the law enforcement agencies like the Drug Enforcement Agency and Customs, not State. The law enforcement types waltz into congressional hearings to denounce various foreign countries and their leaders and demand greater toughness. It is left to State to note that we have a broad range of issues to discuss with, for example, Mexico; that punitive measures might undercut current efforts; that the Mexicans are caught between the South American traffickers and their market (namely, the U.S.), etc. The Department is always accused of being "soft" on drugs, despite its actual management (again, at great personal risk to many Foreign Service officers) of the anti-drug programs. There is really no solution to this: State does in fact have the job of managing our intercourse with the countries in question, and it goes beyond the single issue of drugs. The problem is that too few on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Capitol Hill or in the press want to hear about it; they want to hear tough talk from law enforcement officers about smashing the drug pushers.

If these criticisms of State are largely invalid, one is more telling: that it lacks expertise about key countries. There is a virtual lack of Mexico experts, for example, despite the enormous importance of Mexico to the U.S.; and the real expertise about many other important countries is slim. The Foreign Service encourages mobility among its officers, and most have served in more than one region. No doubt they are the broader for it, but it means they lack the number of years concentrating on Germany or the USSR that they need in order to acquire true depth. What is remarkable about this thinness in country expertise is how little remarked upon it is. The critics appear to be less interested in analysis of serious problems than in easier and more enjoyable attacks on the institution.

AND THIS IS precisely the point. The criticisms of State are not founded in real assessments of its performance. The basic problem is not elitism, not incompetence, not avoidance of conflict, or any of the other customary lines of State-bashing. Basically, Americans dislike the State Department because they dislike its *mission*. It is not that the Department performs its mission poorly; it is the very nature of that mission itself. They do not like the constant reminders of interdependence, of inescapable involvement, of entanglement; they do not like the reminders that problems are complex, that other countries' interests must be understood, that we will not always have our way. And this is why State is a dead duck.

Which raises a question: Is there a new way of defining State's goals, its tasks, that would appeal more to American people, to American ideals or concern about national security? More briefly, could State do anything *popular*?

Yes. Americans are for freedom, and not only value it as an ideal but understand that the spread of freedom throughout the world is the best guarantee of our own security. The State Department, then, should fight for freedom.

This strange proposal is not without grounding in the Reagan administration, where instruments like the National Endowment for Democracy were created as part of a broad program of support for the development of democratic institutions. This was not the human rights activism of the Carter years, which focused on individual cases of abuse and avoided systematic change. Rather, the idea was that democratic systems are the best custodians of human rights and the best guarantors of friendly and peaceful relations among nations. As the Reagan years went on, the President and Secretary of State Shultz focused their rhetoric and activity more and more consciously on the unifying theme of the spread of democracy as the keystone of their foreign policy.

There was much suspicion of this policy. Some of it was political, and came from Democrats who simply denied that we were backing democracy. They claimed that we were actually pursuing a policy of anti-communism. Reagan's support for democracy in such places as Chile, Paraguay, or Turkey gives the lie to that criticism; and in any event it was not really criticism of the policy but rather an allegation of unfaithfulness to it. As this year's events in China have shown, an administration is more likely to be attacked from the Left and Right alike for inadequate support for democratic developments than for excessive action in support of freedom.

The other criticism came from "pragmatists" who derided the policy as work fit for missionaries, not for diplomats. But the missionary strain in American foreign relations is deep and ineradicable; if we lack a *mission civilatrice*, perhaps we have an inescapable *mission democratice*. Moreover, the view that nations have interests rather than friends, the notion that values and ideology (here, democracy) have no place in international politics, is

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

simply alien to American life. A foreign policy that promotes and defends the values Americans hold dear is much more likely to command domestic support than any other, and an agency that undertakes the responsibility for that policy will gain popularity thereby.

Nor is it a task that Foreign Service officers shrink from or perform badly: In times and places as different as Beijing in the spring of this year; Santiago, Chile, during the preparations for the 1988 plebiscite there; South Africa and Prague for many years now; and Managua in 1987 and 1988, embassy staff members in all cases demonstrated professionalism and personal commitment in the cause of democracy, following but also enriching U.S. policy. In each case, they won America a great many friends abroad by associating us very concretely with local aspirations for democracy. But they won the State Department rather less support here at home. The problem has been a lack of understanding by Americans of just what it is the Department and its people are *doing* in a number of countries overseas.

Seen from this perspective, the Department has already begun to change its mission. The "human rights" work introduced in the Carter administration was rightly suspect, biased as it was toward leftist regimes and reserving its criticism for the Right; and the 'casework' activity, while of real moral value, did not always appeal to Foreign Service officers. But today the idea of an active commitment to democracy has really sunk in, and indifference to the local form of government—for example, undertaking an Alliance for Progress or a Panama Canal Treaty without reference to the brutality of the local regime—is unthinkable. And the complex analyses and activities which are required as part of a policy of promoting systemic change towards democracy constitute fascinating and intellectually challenging work.

No doubt, it is in a sense missionary work, and it is impossible to imagine Japanese or French diplomats doing anything quite like this. American embassies have never been as commercially oriented as those countries' missions, no doubt to the detriment of our export industries. But here again we come to fundamentals: for Americans, foreign policy is about values as well as interests. The State Department has been seen as indifferent to both. The answer is not better "performance" by State, which at best would address the "interests" issue; the Department can respond to the deep suspicion it still evokes in this country only by showing that it is dedicated to the task of defending and promoting our values.

One of the old insults about State is that "it needs an America desk," meaning it should stop worrying so much about foreigners. The Department should pick up the cue: it should take as a central task propagating America's values around the world—not just cheering but leading the democratic revolution. For that would be a mission of the State Department, finally, that Americans could understand and cheer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rifle on the Wall

Semyon Reznik

WHILE GLASNOST and perestroika have riveted Western attention on the remarkable new tenor of Soviet policies and actions, an important change in U.S. government policy toward Soviet Jews has almost escaped notice. Today, the Immigration and Naturalization Service no longer classifies Soviet Jewry as a persecuted group. Moreover, it withholds refugee status from every fourth Jew leaving the Soviet Union. These changes in our immigration policy come not at a time when Soviet anti-Semitism is declining; they have been imposed at a moment when there is clear evidence it is acquiring a new virulence.

Superficially, this may not seem to be the case. Both glasnost and perestroika have in some ways undoubtedly helped Soviet Jewry. A Jewish Cultural Center has been opened in Moscow. Hebrew teachers are no longer arrested. KGB persecution of groups that study Jewish culture and history has stopped. Emigration applications are processed with greater dispatch and many more Jews are permitted to emigrate.

But there is another, darker side to Gorbachev's Soviet Union. An anti-Semitic organization—*Pamyat* (Memory)—whose membership includes Communist party members, scholars, and high ranking army officers, and which is supported by the KGB, is increasing its activity. *Pamyat* regularly holds meetings at which speakers as a matter of course blame Jews for a broad range of transgressions including the terror of the Civil War, the destruction of Russian Orthodox churches and other religious and cultural landmarks, the brutal collectivization campaign, Stalin's purges, the destruction of the economy, environmental pollution, and even the "alcohol addiction of the Russian people." *Pamyat*'s propaganda thus repeats, with old and modern examples, the thrust of Nazi propaganda which depicted a nefarious Judeo-Masonic conspiracy aimed at Russia. Even such recent catastrophes as Chernobyl and the Armenian earthquake have been attributed to a Jewish conspiracy.

Pamyat's most active branches are located in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, and Novosibirsk; but others can be found throughout the Russian republic. Many intellectuals who do not officially identify themselves with *Pamyat* in fact support it both publicly and privately. Indeed, similar sentiments manifest themselves even in some dissident circles. For example, Igor Shafarevich, an outstanding Soviet mathematician, scholar, and active dissident since the 1960s, asserts in his recent book *Russofobia* that Jews have always been the Russian people's enemy. In Leningrad, the media and authorities support this anti-Semitic organization. During the summer of 1988, *Pamyat*'s weekly meetings in Rumyantsev Square were not covered in the local press, and the police protected these meetings

Semyon Reznik is a Russian emigre writer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

while ignoring appeals by frightened citizens. Only after *Moscow News* published letters of indignation were the meetings stopped. Only then did the Leningrad press manage to give the incidents half-hearted, belated coverage.

Pamyat's leaders travel extensively throughout the country trying to organize new groups in Georgia, Latvia, and other Soviet republics. They have targeted the Ukraine and White Russia, since both share an anti-Semitic tradition. Extremist youth groups, such as *Lubery* and the "Afghans"—an organization of Afghanistan war veterans with branches in cities throughout the country—are controlled by *Pamyat*. In many cities youths form fascist organizations and while links between *Pamyat* and these groups have not been discovered their ideas and values are certainly similar. Even the environmental movement has been influenced. The popular mass movement for a clean Lake Baikal, a lake which is horribly polluted, is headed by Valentin Rasputin. A leading Soviet author and an influential political figure who was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies from the Writer's Union, Rasputin was recently awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor and is an ardent *Pamyat* supporter. Hitherto the movement has busied itself more with defending the lake from the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy than with preserving it from pollution.

Many other Soviet authors have played a significant role in propagating anti-Semitism. Victor Astaf'ev, a well-known writer, has published works offensive to Georgians and other minorities, but he reserves his most venomous screeds for Jews. Writing to the prominent Soviet historian Nathan Eidelman, Astaf'ev insisted that Jews are the enemies of the Russian national renaissance and proposed firing them from all jobs related to Russian culture. He maintained that "Every national renaissance must have its opposition and enemies. In returning to life, we will reach the point where we can sing our own songs and dance our own dances; the experts on Pushkin's and Lermontov's poetry are also going to be Russians, and. . . we ourselves will publish the Russian classics. The encyclopedias and all other editorial media, theaters, and movie studios we will put into our own hands; and we ourselves will comment upon Dostoyevsky's Diaries." When he suggested that Zionists, rather than Communists, were to blame for the murder of Czar Nicholas II and his family, *Pamyat* speakers industriously repeated the charge claiming that "the execution of the czar's family was committed as a Jewish ritual sacrifice" (*Sovetskaya Kultura*, February 25, 1989).

When the Astaf'ev-Eidelman correspondence was made public it attracted so much attention that Gorbachev must have become familiar with it. And yet in numerous speeches Gorbachev explicitly praised Astaf'ev for his concern for the country's destiny. In so doing, he implicitly encourages anti-Semitic groups. It is significant that only two years ago there were no signs that national idols like Rasputin or Astaf'ev belonged to the anti-Semitic movement. Now, they are its enthusiastic and energetic proponents. Vasily Belov, another celebrated author, whose anti-Semitic works have been published since the 1970s, was included with Gorbachev and other Politburo members in the privileged "list of one hundred" representatives of the Party in the elections for the Congress of People's Deputies.

IN ORDER TO estimate just how deeply anti-Semitism has become ingrained in Soviet society, one need only note that over the last two decades at least nine million copies of fifty books that denounce the "Zionist conspiracy against Russia" have been sold and their themes echoed in hundreds of reviews—all of them laudatory. According to these publications, every Soviet Jew is at minimum a suspect in this conspiracy. No literature refuting this conspiracy theory is available.

The most aggressively anti-Semitic articles, essays, reviews, poems, and novels have appeared in three prominent monthly magazines: *Nash Sovremennik*, *Molodaya Gvardia*, and *Moskva*. Glasnost has allowed these pub-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lications to expand and their circulation has doubled, reaching 1.5 million. Last November, *Nash Sovremennik* published an article by Vladimir Begun, an author of well-known books and articles about the alleged Judeo-Masonic conspiracy threatening Russia. In it he explains that any Jewish activity—cultural, religious, educational, or philanthropic—really serves as a cover for Zionist plots. When articles subsequently appeared in the Soviet press demonstrating that Begun borrowed ideas and in some places even lifted his text from Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, the Party Committee of the White Russian Academy of Sciences—for which Begun works—denied the accusations and extended its full support to Begun.

Indeed, in White Russia as a whole, anti-Semitism is pervasive. White Russian Party and government authorities, as well as academic groups, opposed an attempt by intellectuals to found a Marc Chagall Museum in Vitebsk—Chagall's hometown—asserting that the spirit of his paintings had no connection with his homeland and insisting that Chagall was a Zionist and a traitor. An editor of the *White Russian Encyclopedia* who defended Chagall was fired.

It is not surprising that during the glasnost years the vandalizing of Jewish cemeteries has dramatically increased in Moscow, Minsk, and Tbilisi. In Minsk, Jews have been beaten in the streets and one Jewish family was murdered. And yet, although fanning the flames of ethnic enmity is officially illegal in the USSR, not one of the measures required by law has been brought to bear against either *Pamyat* or its supporters.

In their speeches and written statements, *Pamyat*'s leaders widely quote Gorbachev in order to demonstrate their loyalty to him and to support their offensive statements against "Zionism" with his authority. Gorbachev has not condemned *Pamyat*. Many Soviet intellectuals have expressed their concern at this "protective non-intervention on the part of the leadership," as Yuri Nagibin, a well-known author of moderate views, cautiously put it. But Gorbachev has not responded to them. Alexsandr Yakovlev, a member of the Politburo and the recognized "architect of perestroika," is the only high-ranking Soviet politician to criticize *Pamyat* for its anti-Semitic activity. But he was then repeatedly attacked as the head of the "dark anti-patriotic forces of Zionism within the party leadership."

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the authorities have deliberately laid the ideological groundwork for again making Jews the convenient scapegoat should the USSR face a crisis. In explaining the secret of his art, Chekov laid it down that if a rifle hangs on the wall in the first act of a play, it must be fired in the last one. During the first act of glasnost the rifle of anti-Semitism has been a conspicuous part of the stage set.

In his final speech prepared for the Congress of People's Deputies, Andrei Sakharov characterized the situation in the country as follows: "Given the impending economic catastrophe and the tragic eruption of conflicts among [Soviet] nationalities, powerful and dangerous processes are taking place. One of the manifestations of them is the general crisis of trust between the people and the leadership. . . . The growing tension may shatter our society—with the most tragic of consequences."[1]

That this is a realistic appraisal is evident from the bloody clashes between ethnic groups already occurring in various parts of the country, including the Armenian pogroms in Azerbaijan, the armed suppression of peaceful demonstrators in Georgia, the massacre of the Turkish Meskhetians in Uzbekistan, and other, smaller, conflicts. These clashes provide fertile ground for exploiting anti-Semitism. To give one example, rumors of a Jewish pogrom in Kishinev, the Moldavian capital, and of mass demonstrations under the slogan "Push Russians behind the Dnestr river, throw Jews into it"—

[1] Gorbachev turned off the microphone in the middle of Sakharov's speech and did not let him complete it. The speech was later published in its entirety in the West.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fortunately not confirmed—have been deliberately spread throughout the country to compromise the Moldavian democratic movement and increase ethnic tensions in general.

Yet the more the West concentrates on laudable developments in the Soviet Union, the more determined it seems to overlook its dangerous ones. Businessmen are now lobbying for a reconsideration of the American policy of linking trade agreements with human rights conditions. A waiver of the Stevenson and Jackson-Vanik amendments, which link financial credits and most-favored nation status with emigration rights, is called for.

As a flexible politician, Gorbachev maneuvers and is likely to yield to those forces that exert the greatest pressure, especially if they possess other things that he needs. The West in general and the United States in particular should understand this. More, not less, pressure is likely to be effective in persuading the USSR to meet its human rights obligations, including those to Soviet Jews. If American pressure can exceed that of Soviet reactionary circles, the authorities will take effective measures against *Pamyat* and its supporters, and Soviet Jews and other minorities will no longer fear that the rifle on the wall may be fired. This would be a victory both for perestroika and for the West.

The Other View

Without question, we are witnessing a dramatic change in Soviet policy. Emigration levels are now the highest in a decade, exceeding 43,000 in the first four months of this year, including 14,000 Jews. . . . in the spirit of glasnost, the Soviets have recently committed themselves to principles of free emigration. In January, they signed the Vienna Concluding Documents, which requires participating countries to respect the right of everyone to leave any country, including his or her own. . . . We must ask whether the Soviet reforms have gone far enough to justify a Presidential Waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. In my view, they are not there yet, but they are getting close. It is essential that the United States acknowledge the truly remarkable changes brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev. If we fail to do so, it only makes it more difficult for Mr. Gorbachev to promote further change within the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that I have joined with several of my colleagues in Congress in introducing a resolution urging President Bush to waive Jackson-Vanik for one year, provided certain conditions are met.

Sam Gejdenson (D-CT) in the *New York Times*
July 10, 1989

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More Responses to Fukuyama

Timothy Fuller

AT LEAST since Saint Paul, Westerners have repeatedly sensed the approaching end of history. In his remarkable essay, Francis Fukuyama revives these eschatological urgings. As with previous eschatons, this one is likely to be delayed. We cannot know the end of history since each succeeding moment of history potentially alters our picture of the overall shape of past experience. The "end of history" is really the ordeal of having to rethink old assumptions on which we have been depending, not a decisive insight into what the future must be. In this sense, we undergo the end of history continually. That momentarily it appears not as an ordeal but as a triumph stems from the hope that, at long last, Western vigilance might relax into long hoped-for tranquility, that we might be exemplary for history while insulated from the movements of the world historical spirit, a desire which has lain at the heart of Western and especially American political life throughout its history.

Plausibly, the "end of history" means that we have exhausted the adequacy of certain ways of talking about and analyzing political life that seemed only yesterday accurately to characterize our circumstances. But to equate the "end of history" with the triumph of the idea of "liberal democracy" is to imagine that the dialectic which spawned the categorical distinctions between "East" and "West" or "slave" and "free" can be resolved undialectically, that is by the victory of one prong of the opposition as if it were not ineluctably tied to the other. This is dialectic without tears. It shrinks from the abysmal thought that history dissolves all permanencies. This is the radical thought at the heart of the modern perspective in which history has only immanent meaning. If we defined ourselves previously in opposing an unsought but unavoidable dialectical partner, we cannot retain that identity unaltered; it must itself alter, if only in discovering hitherto unnoticed and unresolved perplexities when we are forced to look back, trying to recollect the identity we hoped to preserve against our opponents. In Hegelian irony lurks the threat that success must breed a new necessity to undo the unforeseen consequences flowing from an evanescent experience of release.

The attractiveness (and thus the apparent cogency) of Fukuyama's argument relies on giving light emphasis to his qualification that what has triumphed is principally the *idea* of liberal democracy. This allows the analysis to seem inevitably compatible with every likely state of near-term developments except rejection of the *idea*. But Hegel himself insisted that significant ideas are never so impotent as to remain merely ideas. Ideas have consequences; a compelling idea will seek actuality in the world. The transition from mere idea to historical actuality imposes the revolutionary upheaval in which we move from one era

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the next, transforming everything. The widespread adoption of a rhetorical commitment cannot sustain satisfaction perpetually. In short, Fukuyama projects triumph from within the liberal democratic camp as if that triumph, if such it is, will take its actuality in forms that are compatible, even congenial, with our own.

Fukuyama employs a wily argument that moves back and forth between a voluntarist and a determinist pole: First, he argues that history evolves according to our ideas (or *is* our ideas) about what the world means—a radically voluntarist view; but he then insists that the USSR must liberalize or get "stuck in history," refuting them with an idealist, Hegelian version of a familiar Marxist argument: history unfolds in a necessary pattern, and a coherent (historically relevant) life depends on conforming to that pattern—a distinctly determinist insistence on liberalism's success. This is inattentive to the disjointed plurality of histories of nations, regions, and peoples, which is the material context of the abstract idea "liberal democracy" in which people must adapt the idea, organizing themselves for themselves. Fukuyama treats a momentarily dominant ideational consensus as a first principle to which we appeal both as a justification for choosing liberal democracy and as proof of the necessity of submitting to liberal democracy. This "end of history" relies on everyone believing the end of history has come, on knowing what "liberal democracy" means, and on events not contradicting the belief unmanageably. This neither proves anything, nor is much on which to hang hopes of global unity. And, whether the claim is believed or not, nothing specific can be deduced from it to guide the day-to-day decisions of statecraft.

Behind Fukuyama's argument lies a debate between Alexander Kojève and Leo Strauss in the late 1940s on tyranny, occasioned by Xenophon's long-neglected dialogue, "Hiero or The Tyrant."[1] Kojève insisted, following Machiavelli and Hegel in opposition to Strauss, that tyranny can be justified as an instrument for radical social improvement. What is wicked now can be redeemed later by its ultimate result. Simply to condemn tyranny is to shrink from the reality that tyranny can be the harbinger of historical progress; history, with all its brutality, is yet immanently coherent and progressively unfolding. Strauss refused to acknowledge tyranny as progressive and rejected the idea of historical progress as such. For him, the end is not in history but in a vision of what is right—as right at one moment in history as at another—and the character of which is unalterable by historical necessity. Modern thought, bewitched by the idea of progress, relativizes the idea of good or right, seeking humanly defined earthly fulfillment. This induces failure to see the good that is present while baptizing numerous current evils in the hopes that a good will materialize later. The rationalization of tyranny perpetrates a wicked inversion.

The difference between Strauss and Kojève is one between two concepts of "reason of state." Both know history imposes unavoidable necessities, but oppose each other on the lesson this teaches. Fukuyama instances Strauss's fear in declaring himself already bored with our astonishingly good fortune, looking for something (religion? nationalism? economic disaster?) to reactivate history. Finally to complete the Tower of Babel will be a greater curse than living with its original destruction; to build it excites a need to dismantle it. We cannot, then, equate the good as such with the triumph of "liberal democracy." Temporal, immanent definitions of the eternal render it, witness Fukuyama, "boring." The point is neither that liberal democracy is undesirable nor that it is not superior to the alternatives; the point is that the "idea" of liberal democracy, insofar as it can be translated into actuality, cannot end the longing for satisfaction at the core of

[1]For Xenophon's dialogue and the exchange between Strauss and Kojève see Leo Strauss, *On Tyranny*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Agora Paperbacks Edition, 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

human consciousness. No earthly order can fulfill that longing.

Given the infinite diversity human ingenuity can devise under the umbrella of "liberal democracy," identifying a historic transformation with our views will reassure us only briefly. If we insist on thinking in historicist terms, must we also accept the demise of liberal democracy or its radical redefinition under less hospitable historical circumstances? Will a new ideational consensus get us "stuck in history"? Are those who live by history prepared to die by history?

Only forty years ago Strauss and Kojève debated tyranny under the cloud that communism (the "universal, homogenous state") might triumph as now liberal democracy is expected to triumph. For Strauss, triumph lay in the spiritual courage to defend what is right regardless of supposed ends of history. Liberalism's universality had to be found in its rightness.

The mystery of historical existence both impels a quest for knowledge we do not have and tempts us to think we have it. Is current global sentiment the successful climax for historic liberalism? Converts must now adopt its puzzles and tensions. Can this not disorient them? Will they feel no need to "improve" what they struggled to acquire? Can the struggle for meaning not resurface as old ideological constraints recede into deep uncertainties?

Timothy Fuller is a professor of political science at Colorado College and author of The Voice of Liberal Learning: Michael Oakeshott on Education *(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).*

David Satter

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA'S lucid and thought-provoking essay seems to me to have two weaknesses. First, it fails to appreciate the depth of totalitarianism's challenge to the Western world. Fukuyama argues that the liberal reforms in the Soviet Union have driven the "final nail in the coffin" of the Marxist-Leninist alternative to liberal democracy. This assumes that the essence of Marxism-Leninism lies in specific political arrangements rather than in its overall spiritual pretensions; but what is distinctive about totalitarian regimes is their claim to be the source of morality and arbiter of truth. As long as this claim is maintained (as it still is by both the Soviet Union and China), it is unrealistic to speak of the death of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Despite the economic and political reforms in communist states, the world is still divided into those societies which recognize a supramundane point of reference for their acts and those which, in effect, define *themselves* as supramundane. The difference is reflected in different sets of moral standards and, because a worldly absolute needs constant demonstrations of legitimacy, two different conceptions of reality. Under these conditions, communist leaders may acknowledge the practical superiority of liberal institutions. But in the absence of any acknowledgment of liberal democracy's moral superiority, this only indicates a willingness to exploit the benefits of liberalism to reinforce what they assume is a morally superior communist metaphysical framework.

Second, underestimating the fundamental difference between communist societies and free societies, Fukuyama also underestimates the extent to which the modern world is still vulnerable to the devastating impact of destructive political ideas.

Totalitarian ideologies, no less than liberal ideas, exist as a potential prior to their realization. And if liberal ideals of freedom and equality are attractive by virtue of their demonstrable ability to improve the condition of man, totalitarian ideologies are attractive because they claim to offer a way out of the spiritual crisis of modernity.

Ever since the invention of the telescope, man has searched for the moral certainty that was lost when science challenged the metaphysical base of revealed religion. The bizarre cultism of totalitarian regimes, their ritual and collective incantations, all betray

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the vacuum of faith that they seek to fill and which called them forth to begin with. It is premature to speak of the final victory of liberalism as long as that vacuum continues to exist.

Fukuyama's tendency to underestimate the unseen force of totalitarian ideologies leads him into difficulties when he tries to apply his historical generalizations to specific situations —particularly the one now existing in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the "homeland" of Marxism-Leninism and its rejection there very likely would mark its irreversible decline. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union is prepared to fight in order to save its ideological structure, Marxism-Leninism is not quite the spent force many observers believe it to be.

For Fukuyama it is clear that the Soviet Union is forsaking its ideology and moving in the direction of liberal democracy. He argues that Mikhail Gorbachev and his lieutenants now understand the importance of markets, of an independent judiciary, and of property rights; that the problem is no longer a "conceptual one"; and that all that remains is for institutions to be brought into harmony with the new state of consciousness reflected in the professed goals of the Soviet leaders.

This, unfortunately, is to take the talk of reform in the Soviet Union too literally. The Soviet leaders use familiar words like "legality," "property," and "markets," but what they mean is "socialist legality," "socialist property," and "socialist markets." These concepts are understood in light of the Soviet ideology which limits their applications and probably dooms in advance the Soviet reform program's chance of success.

Of the reforms, the political ones—glasnost, the liberalization of information, and the new electoral system—have gone farthest, but they have been carried out completely under the Party's control. Glasnost, in fact, is calculated to mobilize the masses against recalcitrant elements in the Party bureaucracy; and the newest electoral system is organized to guarantee a reliable Party majority even as it provides for an unprecedented degree of free speech.

More serious have been the ideological limitations affecting the plans for economic and judicial reform. A plan for giving autonomy to enterprises, for example, had the potential for rationalizing economic decision-making; but the profits and losses of the supposedly autonomous units are being calculated in fixed prices which renders the results economically meaningless. The new system might work if there were free prices, but free prices contradict the idea that, under socialism, commodity relations cannot apply to labor or the means of production.

Agricultural reform is desperately needed, but the Soviet authorities allow farmers only to rent land. For reform to work, farmers must be able to own land, with the right to sell it, and they must have access to a free market in agricultural supplies. But this would contradict the basic principle of the Soviet version of socialism, which is the abolition of private property.

The ideological impediments to reform are most serious in the area of judicial reform. The creation of a society based on law requires that the law be put above the Party; but this contradicts the notion that the Party has the right to exclusive rule as the sole interpreter of the ideology. It would, in effect, reestablish the historic relationship between God and man in the heart of communist society, because the spiritual equality of man before God is the model of the equality of all men before the law.

Fukuyama is right that the "general principles" underlying many of the reforms in the Soviet Union come from a source alien to Marxism-Leninism. But they are still being applied within the existing ideological framework. Liberal reforms within this framework can only serve a mechanical function; they cannot affect the ultimate values of the regime.

There is a widespread impression that no one believes in Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet Union any more, but the question revolves around what one means by "belief." Soviet citizens may not know the doctrine well or take it literally. They may even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

express cynicism about it. But, after generations of indoctrination, for the majority of the population it is still the prism through which they perceive reality.

It is the influence of Marxism-Leninism, with its emphasis on socialism as the highest good, which accounts for Soviet citizens' lack of a sense of transcendent values and their consequent reliance on force; their tendency to view themselves not as individuals but as participants in a movement; and their vague faith that the absence of freedom which characterizes their lives is the necessary price for the creation of a better future. Without a change in the communist world's values, many of its citizens are ill-equipped to work successfully in a competitive environment or to develop democratic institutions, even if there existed a genuine commitment to create such institutions for them.

Fukuyama has written an important essay. Despite its merits, however, it is illustrative of a worrisome tendency to assume that the West has won the battle of ideas—a battle which, in fact, it never fought. Such premature celebration distracts attention from the fact that now, as the crisis of communism deepens, there is a pressing need to strengthen contact with the populations of communist countries and to foster those transcendent values which give Western society its moral structure.

As the Soviet leaders are learning, attempting to carry out liberal reforms within a totalitarian structure can be destabilizing. It is impossible to succeed in such a mission without first making a fundamental break with the prevailing ideology. Without such a break, the situation is likely to worsen to the point where the regime faces a choice between either accepting spreading civil disorders or returning to repression. The most important factor leading the regime to make the necessary break with the ideology could be a growing moral consciousness on the part of a politically organized population.

There is an important role here for the United States. For our own sake and for that of the people of the Soviet bloc, we should seek to encourage those independent forces which are inspired by a recognition of universal values. But this requires a firm resistance to self-delusion. We cannot foster the development of universal values in the Soviet bloc if we operate on the assumption that the war of ideas has already been won.

David Satter was Moscow correspondent for the Financial Times *of London (1976–82) and is currently a freelance journalist in Washington.*

David Stove

IS THE WORLD about to surrender for good to liberalism and the free market? Will there soon be no more Colonel Qaddafis, only Colonel Sanders everywhere and forever?

No. My short proof is that, if it were so then Woodrow Wilson (even if his timing was a little wrong) would have been right; but this is impossible, *ergo*, etc.

The long proof, in a nutshell, is that the mixture which Fukuyama expects to freeze history forever—a combination of Enlightenment values with the free market— is actually one of the most explosive mixtures known to man. Fukuyama thinks that nothing will ever happen again *because* a mixture like that of petrol, air, and lighted matches is widespread, and spreading wider. Well, Woodrow Wilson thought the same; but it is an odd world view, to say the very least.

According to Marxist mythology, the eighteenth century-Enlightenment was an ideological expression of bourgeois economic interests. The truth is almost exactly the opposite. The more thoroughgoing Enlightenment thinkers were *enemies* of the institution of private property. This was so even before the industrial revolution—see Rousseau, Godwin, etc. After that revolution, hostility to private property became universal and emphatic among the Enlightened. Marx was perfectly right to regard himself as the legitimate heir of the Enlightenment. By about 1900, a member of the Rationalist Association in Britain, or his counterpart

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anywhere in Western Europe, could almost as easily have been a Tibetan monk as a free-marketeer. The Enlightenment package—of secularism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism—seemed to everyone to point in only one economic direction: socialism.

Not only did it seem to—it did, and it still does. The reason is simple. The fundamental moral value of the Enlightenment is *equality*. But what inequality is more cruel or more glaring than that which is inescapable from the free market: the inequality between those who can afford to buy and those who cannot?

Fukuyama's immobilizing mixture has in fact been tried once before. It seems extraordinary that he should need to be reminded of this, but the trial that was made of it was actually what *produced* twentieth-century socialism. Between about 1780 and 1900, the mixture of Enlightenment values and the free market was given its chance in real life. What the result was everyone knows: a virtually universal and unconquerable conviction of the moral and historical necessity of socialism. Among those so convinced was an unusually resolute heir of the Enlightenment named V.I. Lenin. He turned his own country into a gigantic graveyard, and successfully exported his policies to many other grateful countries—feats unknown and unimaginable before this enlightened century of ours. But it is unnecessary to replay this old film any further: this is where we came in.

"We are all socialists now," said the future King Edward VII in 1895. It was true. It still is. It is idle, even if true, to keep telling us that the citizens of Russia and China are now disillusioned with socialism: *we* are not, and that is what matters more. Of course we have *talked* a lot in the last few years about dismantling the welfare state, and no government can now be elected which does not vow to do a great deal of that dismantling. But this is all pure talk. The welfare state still grows every year at about the same staggering rate as it has done since 1900. Does not *this* process have the genuine feel of irresistibility about it, the irresistibility which Fukuyama's hypothetical opposite process so conspicuously lacks?

But one need not debate only future probabilities with Fukuyama: one can appeal as well to past and present actualities, some of them in his own backyard at that. Take the American Indians for example. The federal government has been trying for centuries to interest them in what is, essentially, Fukuyama's mixture: with how much success it can hardly be necessary to state. Again, American intellectuals have been unable, for twenty years, to interest even their own children in this supposedly irresistible mixture. What price the world, then, and all future time?

Or take recent relations among nations. Fukuyama says that "the legitimacy of any kind of territorial aggrandizement has been thoroughly discredited." A more astounding statement than this is not easily conceived. Fukuyama might with advantage inform himself what proportion of Australian (not to mention American) land, agriculture, and industry has passed to Japanese owners in the last ten years. Is this *some* "kind of territorial aggrandizement," or is it not? If it is, then Fukuyama's statement is ludicrously false.

If it is not, then neither was the Japanese presence in Manchuria in 1925. At this rate, it would appear, there never was any territorial aggrandizement even in the past, and everything is not only *going* to be all right, *it always was*! Well, that is what Hegel actually said, of course, and what Fukuyama (p. 5, footnote 4) is not ashamed to quote without the faintest hint of dissent.

But then, people who take Hegel's pretensions seriously can believe anything. Schopenhauer, whose idealist philosophy was mad enough in all conscience, called Hegel a "charlatan" and a "humbug". He was, though it is not easy to convey by how much even those words are too good for him.

David Stove was until recently a professor of philosophy at the University of Sydney. His books include Popper and After *(New York: Pergamon, 1982) and* The Rationality of Indirection *(New York: Oxford, 1986).*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Frederick L. Will

TO UNDERSTAND how in the long course of world history we have arrived at an endpoint, we are helped, according to Fukuyama, by some teachings of Hegel. Contrary to the deterministic materialism propounded by those polar opposites, Marx and the *Wall Street Journal*, Hegel reminds us that ideas or ideologies—comprising art, religion, culture, economic arrangements, and even philosophy—are of great determining importance in history. Seeing this we can begin to understand also what Hegel saw almost two hundred years ago, namely, that the French Revolution was the expression of ideas whose time had come. The ideas were those of freedom and equality, of a liberal state responsible to the people and a liberal economic system in which political equality is matched by increased equality in the sharing of common material goods. Now, writes Fukuyama, we seem to be witnessing the fruition of those ideas in "an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism." More striking, this victory may signify "the end of history as such: that is the endpoint of man's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."

Alexandre Kojève, whose interpretation of Hegel Fukuyama follows closely, identified the end of history with "the American way of life" as it was being realized at the end of World War II. How closely do the main lines of development in American democratic ideology in the last half-century exemplify the kind of freedom that Hegel thought represented God's will in the world? There are some very significant discrepancies. One is deluded by the identity of the word "freedom" if one supposes that the "will of the people," expressed more and more forcefully in an expanded suffrage and multiplied plebiscites, represents what Hegel conceived under the term "political freedom". Rather, Hegel spoke scathingly of such exemplifications of the popular will, saying that when the term "people" is taken to designate some segment of the citizens of a state, it designates a body that *does not know what it wills* (original italics), since "to know what one wills. . . is the fruit of knowledge and insight" and this is just not a matter of popularity (*eben nicht die Sache des Volkes*).

Just as whatever authority, or suspicion, associated with the name of Hegel cannot be attached to populist versions of democratic practice, so, too, it cannot be attached to those versions of democratic ideology that conceive the relations between individuals and their political institutions in the Jeffersonian way. In these versions, individuals are taken to be the receptacles of inalienable rights that are independent of the institutions, and the institutions to be primarily mechanisms for the defense and cultivation of these rights. Democratic ideology of this kind, ascendant to the point of dominance in America in the past half-century, is a kind which Hegel, in his own way, no less than Burke in his, opposed. In Hegel's view, such a conception of the individual and his rights, and of the relation of these rights to the state, is fundamentally flawed: illusory philosophically and practically mischievous. Abstracted from the rich nexus of customs and institutions that have formed him and in which he lives, the individual is such an unreal entity that it would be quite impossible to determine what rights to ascribe to him. Not that this would prevent such ascriptions. It is natural that when the function of the state is conceived to be that of securing the native rights of its citizens, those seeking action on the part of the state should seek to ground their claims upon such rights. And further, it is natural that the tendency to find rights to fit needs should result in a growth industry of discovering such rights, one that more and more translates competing claims concerning prudent state action into zealous demands for the fulfillment of native and hence imprescriptible entitlements. In such a situation, with partisan groups all marching under the banners of such rights, there are the seeds of the kind of "faction" with which Madison,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Madisonians to this day, have been concerned. Such may be unavoidable features of the liberal democracy that recent American history now exemplifies, the necessary thorns accompanying this political rose. Still, the rights ideology in which these tendencies flourish remains a signal feature of American political theory and practice for which the political philosophy of Hegel offers negligible inspiration or support.

Frederick L. Will is a professor of philosophy, emeritus, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Between Paradigms

Owen Harries

SUDDENLY, AFTER several decades of unusual clarity and certainty, there is great confusion concerning international politics and American foreign policy. The substantial consensus about the verities of the old paradigm—bipolarity, ideological competition, containment, deterrence, and all that—has shattered, and there is no agreement about what is to take their place.

The President speaks of "beyond containment" and others of "the end of the Cold War," but many remain skeptical. Terms like "multipolarity," "interdependence," and "the declining efficacy of force" are thrown around, but are sketchily and variously explained. There is disagreement about the meaning of perestroika and glasnost, their chances of success, and their significance in terms of Soviet foreign policy. Some proclaim a global "democratic revolution" and the triumph of the market economy, others fear a world of protectionist trade blocs.

The same uncertainty exists concerning America's future role in the world. Are decline and retrenchment inevitable, or has the United States just won a spectacular and conclusive ideological victory? Do the times call for boldness or caution? Should we react to the astonishing developments in the communist world by standing aloof or becoming heavily involved? Where are our principal allies—particularly West Germany and Japan—going, and what should we, can we, do to influence their choices?

The problem is not one of silence but of confusion and cacophony, not an absence of answers but a profusion of conflicting ones. In the circumstances it may be useful to attempt a sort of provisional taxonomy—not in order to make final judgments but, more modestly, as a preliminary sorting-out exercise. Here then is my list of six prominent positions that contend for support in the current debate, with a few comments about the strengths and weaknesses of each.

The Old Faithfuls

THIS GROUP differs from all the others in that it maintains that nothing has changed fundamentally. Its message is that the Cold War model that has served us for the last forty years is still valid and should not be traded in.

The Soviet Union may be in deep trouble economically, but it is still our principal adversary and still very dangerous. There has been much more talk than actual reform, and nothing has happened that is not reversible. Moscow's foreign policy goals remain unchanged and it continues to have enormous military power at its disposal. It would therefore be very foolish to change our policies. Adherents of this position are skeptical about Gorbachev. Some believe that he is engaged in an elaborate deceptive operation to confuse

Owen Harries is co-editor of *The National Interest*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and divide the West; others, that in any case Gorbachev's intentions and prospects are not the real issue: the nature of the regime, its force posture and capacity, and its interests are. As events in China recently demonstrated, totalitarianism lives.

Opponents of this point of view tend to dismiss those who hold it as rabid ideologues, people so habituated and committed to the Cold War that they cannot bear to acknowledge its end. As was said of the English conservative prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, their spiritual home is the last ditch. But while this description no doubt fits some accurately, it does not apply to all; and in any case it establishes nothing about the truth or falsity of the position. As the late, lamented Sidney Hook once put it, "Before impugning a person's motives, answer his arguments."

There are some serious arguments to be answered. In particular, Soviet military spending and production have not slackened during the Gorbachev years, despite the economic crisis and the existing superiority in conventional arms. Soviet forces in huge numbers remain in place in Europe, and large subsidies continue to flow to Nicaragua, Cuba, and Vietnam. And Gorbachev is undoubtedly playing on the hopes and illusions of the West, particularly the Germans. Whatever else, drawing attention to these facts provides a salutary corrective to facile optimism, and a necessary reminder that the Soviet Union remains a militarily formidable adversary.

That having been said, however, the Old Faithfuls are open to the criticism that they underestimate seriously the significance of the changes that have taken place. The Soviets have retreated on the ideological front to the point where a serious ideological contest no longer exists, and the mobilizing capacity of Marxism-Leninism has almost certainly been damaged irreparably. A Cold War deprived of this ideological dimension, one that is no longer a struggle for possession of the future, cannot remain the phenomenon we have known by that name. If it is not ending, it is certainly changing very significantly.

Again, the assumption that the Soviet leaders are prepared to destabilize their own power base—by unsettling political reforms, heretical pronouncements on doctrine, unprecedented glasnost, etc.—merely in order to deceive the West is thoroughly unconvincing. For any regime, but particularly for one that gives such systematic attention to the seizing and holding of power, the need to protect that base must far outweigh the achieving of any foreign policy objective. If actions are now being taken that threaten it, they must be explained not in terms of sophisticated maneuver, but as a reaction to a perceived crisis—and a more flexible reaction than was thought possible by a totalitarian regime as recently as five years ago.

Is it not intellectually perverse to cling without reservation to a position that cannot offer any adequate explanation of what has happened in the Soviet Union over the last four years?

The Prudentialists

THIS GROUP is strongly represented in the Bush administration, with Brent Scowcroft perhaps being its purest exponent. Unlike the Old Faithfuls, its members do not deny that very important changes are happening in the Soviet Union, ones that may well transform the regime and its international conduct. But they maintain that we do not yet know enough about these changes and where they will lead to make radical changes in our own policy: what is permanent and what is reversible; how much is thought out and how much improvised; what the balance of forces is within the Party; how controllable are the processes that have been initiated; how developments within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will translate into foreign policy.

The proper response therefore is a cautious "Wait and See," or at most a deliberate step-by-step policy with a careful testing of the ground at each stage. We should not make irreversible concessions (like granting Soviet membership in the World Bank and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GATT) in return for things that are easily reversible. We should applaud perestroika but not pay for it; trust, but verify (i.e., don't trust). Underlying this approach in some cases is not only a sense of prudence but a belief that, with its adversary in trouble, the United States is in the box-seat and can afford to let matters develop without prodding them very vigorously. Why hurry to change a policy that has contributed to such a successful state of affairs? Why strive to make deals when passivity seems to lead only to better offers from Moscow?

Two criticisms are commonly leveled against this position. First, it cedes the initiative entirely to the Soviets, and whatever Gorbachev's problems at home he has shown himself to be a virtuoso performer on the international scene, one capable of producing seemingly endless initiatives and appealing effectively to Western public opinion over the heads of governments. If the United States does not compete vigorously and imaginatively, the disintegration of the Western alliance may well keep pace with the dismantling of the Soviet empire.

Second, and tactical considerations apart, the Prudentialists run the risk of failing to rise to an occasion that may mark a genuine turning point in world history. Through lack of vision and boldness, it is argued, a great opportunity to create a more stable and harmonious international order may be lost. In the absence of a forthcoming Western response, the current Soviet leaders will be discredited and replaced with harder men. We cannot afford to respond to perestroika and glasnost as mere spectators; our behavior will be a crucial variable in determining the outcome of these experiments.

To all this the Prudentialists reply that the extent to which we can influence events in the Soviet Union is grossly exaggerated, and that in any case we do not know enough to be sure about what effects our actions would have. Or, alternatively, they maintain that the most effective way of ensuring the continuation of reform in the Soviet Union is to avoid doing anything that relieves the Soviet leaders of the necessity to face hard choices in the allocation of scarce resources: more guns or more consumer goods. To let them off that hook for the sake of good will would be a disastrous error, serving neither the interests of the United States nor those of the peoples of the Soviet bloc.

In support of their position, the Prudentialists can cite the most famous piece of diplomatic advice ever offered: Talleyrand's *"N'ayez pas de zèle."*

The Grand Designers

IF THE PREVIOUS category represents *Realpolitik* at its most nervous, this one includes those realists with a taste for boldness and strategic vision. Henry Kissinger and Irving Kristol come to mind.

The time is ripe, this group argues, to explore the possibilities of a new European grand settlement, one that will end the division of the continent and the massive confrontation of military power at its center. The belief that a deal can be made does not rest on any soft-headedness about Gorbachev and what is happening in the Soviet Union, but on the changed realities of the continent and the need of both sides to adjust to them. The Soviet Union needs Western help to deal with its desperate economic problems, and at least a temporary relief from the burden of an activist and expensive foreign policy. Its grip on Eastern Europe is weakening, and the costs—political as well as material—of trying to halt (let alone reverse) that process are close to prohibitive. Rather than hanging on and being involved in the mess usually associated with the retreat from empire, it is in the Soviet interest to come to terms with the inevitable—if it can be assured that its strategic adversary will not seek to exploit the situation.

For its part, the United States must recognize several things. First, if perestroika and glasnost continue and the Eastern bloc disintegrates, NATO will not long survive. Second, 1992 is probably going to mean the end of America's leadership of Western Europe in any case, and if the U.S. does not move soon the Europeans—and the Germans

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in particular—are likely to make their own deal with Moscow. Third, it is better for the liberation and democratization of Eastern Europe to happen in an orderly way, with Soviet compliance, than through a series of convulsions. And last, if the cost of the Cold War has become impossibly expensive for Moscow, it has also become uncomfortably so for Washington, and domestic support for the existing commitment to Europe is going to be difficult to sustain. Why, then, not try to negotiate a settlement with Gorbachev while the circumstances are opportune, one that will result in a substantial if not total military withdrawal of the superpowers from Central Europe and the removal of barriers between East and West?

All this is persuasive, but there are problems. It is hard, for example, to think of a grand settlement acceptable to the Russians that would not leave the United States at a strategic disadvantage in Europe. We would have to pull back much further than they, and the political difficulty of reversing an American withdrawal if need arose would be formidable. And there is the special problem of West Germany. If the Germans are already shaky, will not a significant weakening of the American presence in Europe increase the likelihood that they will bolt the Western alliance and yield to the temptation of playing an independent role?

The Classicists

THIS GROUP, which has an eloquent spokesman in Charles Krauthammer, thinks that the key to the new era is that international politics will resemble the "classical" power political system of the nineteenth century more than at any time since 1914. It will be multipolar rather than bipolar, with four or five major and relatively interdependent actors. It will be less static, disciplined, and positional than the two-bloc system to which we have grown accustomed, more complex and volatile. As the possible permutations will be many, adroitness in maneuver will be at a premium. As well, in the absence of a powerful totalitarian actor the system will be less ideologically charged than at any time since 1917, which will also make for more flexibility and a more mundane pursuit of secular interests.

The sophisticated representatives of this position do not maintain that the end of the Cold War will necessarily make for a relaxed and comfortable existence. On the contrary, the system will be less stable and predictable, and more difficult to manage. The United States—whose experience as an active great power is almost entirely restricted to the comparatively simple "We-They" politics of the Cold War, and which has a traditional distaste for power politics as immoral—will come to the new game ill-prepared. Even if communism dies and the Soviet Union disintegrates, Russia will remain a powerful actor and may be especially dangerous in turmoil and decline.

One questionable feature of the Classicist position is that it makes little allowance for the impact of nuclear weapons. The possibility of a resort to war by the principal actors served as the *ultima ratio* of nineteenth-century power politics. Can the game convincingly be played by similar rules under the shadow of the mushroom cloud (and in the absence of transcendent ideological conflict)? If the answer is no, what will replace military force as the final arbiter? If, on the other hand, it is yes, then it may be premature to write off bipolarity altogether. For the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to outgun other states decisively for a long time to come. In that case, instead of thinking in terms of a bipolar system being displaced by a multipolar one, it may make more sense to think of the one being grafted onto the other. This would make for even greater complexity and uncertainty about roles and appropriate modes of behavior.

The Triumphalists

FOR THIS GROUP, what is happening in the communist countries (and in much of the rest of the world) represents, above all else, the victory of de-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mocracy in its great fight against totalitarianism. It is a group well represented among Scoop Jackson Democrats, past and present, and younger neoconservatives. For a rousing version of the position see Gregory Fossedal's book *The Democratic Imperative: Exporting the American Revolution*, reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

The argument is that the appropriate course for America, now that it has won the ideological conflict, is to declare victory and proceed to press home its consequences. The democratic revolution, it is maintained, is already well under way in both the communist and third worlds; if the United States remains true to its destiny and avoids the mistake of snatching compromise from the jaws of victory, we shall enter an era in which the principles of the Founding Fathers and Adam Smith prevail without serious challenge, and the next century will be the Democratic Century.

Now it may well be true that the prestige and attraction of the democratic idea and the market economy are currently higher than they have ever been. There is also force in the argument that for an American foreign policy to gain the necessary popular support it must represent values that lift it above considerations of narrow self-interest and power.

But those who hold this position give inadequate attention to two things. First, a viable democratic system is an extremely difficult thing to install and sustain; only a few countries have so far managed it. Even when the idea is attractive, translating that idea into reality requires special and complex conditions, ones which do not exist and cannot easily be created in most countries. It may be possible to install a Corazon Aquino with "people power," but as long as a corrupt semi-feudal political culture remains in being, the result will not be democracy. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism may be dying in the Soviet Union, but there is little in Russian history or Soviet society to sustain the belief that what will replace it will be in any real sense democratic.

Second, the United States has many important interests to protect and advance in the world and it cannot consistently subordinate all the others—its security, the maintenance of international order, economic prosperity, to name but three—to the propagation of democracy. Any commitment it has to the latter will have to find its place in a complicated and shifting hierarchy of interests. Furthermore, if there is not to be rapid disillusionment it will have to be undertaken at the understanding that what the United States can do to promote lasting democratic regimes (a) is quite limited, and (b) will require an intrusive policy of systematic meddling in the internal affairs of other countries.

The Euphoric Welcomers

THE MESSAGE of this last group, an important one, is that the whole nature of international relations is being transformed in desirable ways. Everything is changed, changed utterly—and they like what they see.

As with the other positions listed, there are simple and sophisticated versions, but the essential conclusion is the same: The events and trends of the last few years signal not only the end of the Cold War but the end of war as such (at least on a serious scale), the end of power politics, the end of ideological conflict, and, according to Francis Fukuyama, the end of history (properly understood) itself. The world is destined to become a gentler, more harmonious place—with the efficacy of force declining, competitiveness among states losing its vicious edge, barriers between peoples lowering, democracy and the market economy spreading, and prosperity rising.

For most who hold this view, the crucial fact is the growth of "interdependence." As they see things, the interests and activities of the industrialized states of the world are becoming so intertwined and mutually dependent, there is such a fine and intricate mesh of relationships, that we have either reached or are fast reaching the point where sheer self-interest demands cooperation, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rules out war as counterproductive. This interdependence applies not only to economic interests in the narrow and conventional sense, but to environmental, ecological, demographic, and other concerns. The decline of ideological conflict both reflects and reinforces the process, as does the growing global commitment to the market economy.

This is not a new line of thought. It goes back at least to Sir Norman Angell, whose influential book *The Great Illusion* (1910) sought to demonstrate the futility and irrationality, if not the impossibility, of war in a modern, capitalist world. War, he claimed, no longer paid; and that, essentially, is what the interdependence school says today.

The thesis is half-right and half-wrong; but unfortunately it is the wrong half that is the more important. Even in 1910, Angell was correct in saying that war was no longer an economically paying proposition for those who resorted to it. But four years after his book appeared the great powers engaged in the most bloody war in history. They did so because, in extremis, the passions generated by nationalism, religion, and ideology; the political and strategic calculations necessary in an anarchic state system; the ambitions, vanities, and rivalries of leaders—all these outweighed considerations of economic gain and loss.

Perhaps things have changed between 1914—or 1939—and now. Perhaps the existence of nuclear weapons makes a decisive difference. But perhaps not. Until the matter is put to the test by an acute crisis—one in which the participants will have to decide whether to abide by the cost-benefit calculus of interdependence and accept a political defeat, or to fight—we do not have much evidence to go on. And even after such a crisis we would not know whether the same decision would be made the next time around. In other words, there is no objective way of determining what would be enough interdependence to ensure the end of war. All the current claims amount to is that if the world's leaders shared the priorities of the interdependentists, then peace would be assured.

Many of those who preach the gospel of interdependence tacitly concede this, perhaps without realizing that they are doing so. For in other contexts they join the ranks of those who are alarmist about the dangers of the "arms race" and worry about the global economy degenerating into a confrontation among protectionist trading blocs. Such concerns indicate a less than perfect faith in the power of interdependence to ensure a state of international harmony.

It may be, as Fukuyama argues, that with the triumph of liberal democracy something like a "common marketization" of international politics will happen, with all passion spent and economic calculation in the ascendant. In that case, the foreign policy of the United States, like that of all other countries, will become more like domestic policy, with bread-and-butter issues predominating. But many remain skeptical that the spirit animating traditional power politics will be so easily exorcised. Nationalism is alive and well in the Soviet empire. Religion is a more powerful and intolerant force in Southwest Asia than it has been for centuries. Some, like Josef Joffe, argue that even in Western Europe traditional rivalries and "the perverse, age-old logic of international politics" have only been held in check by the American presence, and that it is dangerous to assume that they will not reassert themselves once that presence ends.

All in all the Euphoric Welcomers take a lot for granted. Consider this: The most interdependent social organization entered into by human beings is the family. It is also the most dangerous, in that most murders are family affairs. Why should it be otherwise among states?

The Component of Conjecture

I ACKNOWLEDGE that this attempt at distinguishing the main positions in the current debate is not very tidy. The six positions outlined are not all mutually exclusive, and they mix up analysis, prediction,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and prescription very freely and in unequal amounts. But that—at least as I see it—is the way things are.

Which of these positions, if any, is the right one? The easy, comfortable answer is: Time will tell. But that will not do, for time will *not* tell. How things turn out in five, or twenty, or fifty years is not preordained. It will depend largely on what policies prevail in the West, and especially in the United States, in the meantime. Whatever the outcome, we shall never know for sure how things would have turned out had our policy choices been different. (To take an obvious example, who can say what Europe would have looked like in 1950 had Britain and France responded firmly when Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936? On the other hand, if they *had* so responded how could it ever have been proved subsequently that they had thus averted a world war?)

In any case, the United States will have to opt for some policy in the meantime, without waiting until all the evidence is in; and a decision to prevaricate will be a policy decision as much as any other. There is no escape. In the closing pages of *The Necessity for Choice*, Henry Kissinger writes somberly about "the tendency to recoil before the act of choosing among alternatives, which is inseparable from policy-making, and to ignore the tragic aspect of policy-making, which lies precisely in its unavoidable component of conjecture." In a time of ambiguous signals and conceptual confusion, those are words worth remembering.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SAIS REVIEW

VOLUME 9, ISSUE 2

A JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE OLD AND NEW

HIGH-TECH IS FOREIGN POLICY
Harold Brown

BUILDING A NEW CONSENSUS: CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
John Brademas, Harold Brown, Alexander Haig, Melvin Laird, Edmund Muskie, Charles Percy, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, and Cyrus Vance

A $100 BILLION UNDERSTANDING
Barry Blechman

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND MULTIPOLARITY—WHATEVER THAT IS
Alan Tonelson

DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS IN LATIN AMERICA
Stephen Winthrop

MORE THAN A JOURNAL, A RESOURCE!

SUBSCRIPTION RATES—

Institutions/Libraries
☐ one year $28
☐ two years $44
☐ three years $60

Students
☐ one year $12
☐ two years $21
☐ three years $28

Individuals
☐ one year $14
☐ two years $27
☐ three years $34

Overseas subscribers add:
☐ surface mail . . . . . $3.50/yr.
☐ air mail . . . . . $14/yr.

make checks payable to the SAIS Review, and mail to:

THE JOHNS HOPKINS FOREIGN POLICY INSTITUTE
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
1740 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conservative Thought At Its Best

"POLICY REVIEW is the most thoughtful, the most provocative, and the most influential publication on the intellectual right."

—Martin Peretz
Editor-in-Chief, The New Republic

"POLICY REVIEW is fast becoming a must-read in Washington and beyond.... It is one of the most effective publications around, reaching those who count."

—1989 Media Guide


policy REVIEW
The Art Of Governing
William J. Bennett
Justice Under Meese And Smith
Defeat In Angola/Nicaragua
Christian Roots Of The First Amendment
Stocks Populi, A Privatization Strategy
Sam Nunn's Good Idea
How Great Was Reagan?
policy REVIEW
Winter 1989 Number 47
Inside the Reaganista Revolution
Elliott Abrams
Gorbachev and American Strategy
Richard Pipes
So You Want to Run an Agency
Beyond Willie Horton
Richard B. Abell
In Praise of Corporate Raiders
Amar Bhide
Is George Bush Mr. Right?
Excerpts from Mandate for Leadership III
policy REVIEW
Conservatism and the Black Voter
America's Shame: The Homeless Mentally Ill
Line-Item Monarchism
The Man Who Brought the Deficit Down
Religion and the Fetus
A Doctor's Case for Random Drug Testing

"While championing staunchly conservative values, POLICY REVIEW breaks new ground by focusing on the future, not the status quo, providing the inside story on what's ahead."

—HUD Secretary Jack Kemp

Can You Afford Not To Subscribe?

Now available at special introductory prices—up to 26% off !

Name _____
(please print)
Address _____
City/State/Zip _____

☐ One year $16 (11% off) ☐ Two years $29 (19% off) ☐ Three years $40 (26% off)

Begin my subscription: ☐ Current issue ☐ Next issue ☐ Payment Enclosed ☐ Bill Me

Bill my: ☐ Visa ☐ Master Card ☐ American Express

Card Number _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

Please make checks payable to: Policy Review, 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, DC, 20002. Add $8.00 postage per year for foreign air-speeded delivery.

The Flagship Publication of The Heritage Foundation

policy REVIEW

SSB89F

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fall 1987-Summer 1989 Index

(Issues 9-16)

Abbajay, Stephanie; Funny Business (15) Spring 89

Adelman, Kenneth; Things I Learned as a Diplomat (12) Summer 88

Barnes, Fred; A Passion for the Half-Truth (16) Summer 89

Bell, Coral; 'Negotiation From Strength' the Second Time Around (11) Spring 88

Beloff, Max; The View from St. James Square (12) Summer 88

Bernstein, Alvin H.; Vietnam: A Military Post-Mortem (10) Winter 87/8

Bertram, Christoph; The Iklé-Wohlstetter Report: The Wrong Tree (12) Summer 88

Bloom, Allan; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89

Breslauer, George W.; All Gorbachev's Men (12) Summer 88

Brimelow, Peter; Canada (9) Fall 87

Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Sentiment and Strategy: The Imbalance in America's Third World Policy (12) Summer 88

Bugajski, Janusz; The Bird in Moscow's Cage (12) Summer 88

Campbell, Kurt M. and Richard N. Haas; South Africa: The Perils of Parallels (10) Winter 87/8

Campbell, Kurt M.; The Soviets Go Galluping (16) Summer 89

*Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (*Transcript from *The Fifth Estate);* Feasting on Famine (9) Fall 87

Chickering, A. Lawrence; Life Without Marx (14) Winter 88/9

Clemens, Walter C., Jr.; Estonia, A Place to Watch (13) Fall 88

Coffey, John W.; The U.S. and NATO (9) Fall 87

Cohen, Eliot A.; Through the Fog of War (15) Spring 89

Cohen, Stephen Philip; Balancing Interests: The U.S. and the Subcontinent (9) Fall 87

Coleman, Peter; Sidney Hook and Cultural Freedom (9) Fall 87

Crowell, Lorenzo M.; The War Colleges Debate (10) Winter 87/8

Culp, Christopher L.; The Coordination of Economies (13) Fall 88

David, Steven R.; Africa: Moscow's Dubious Investment (12) Summer 88

Dunlop, John B. and Henry S. Rowen; Gorbachev *versus* Ligachev (11) Spring 88

Eagleburger, Lawrence S.; Comments on Sommer (11) Spring 88

Eberstadt, Mary Tedeschi; Don't Blame Democracy First (15) Spring 89

Eberstadt, Mary Tedeschi; Obituary for an Agenda (12) Summer 88

Eberstadt, Nick; Four Myths about Africa (10) Winter 87/8

Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose; 'What Does the *Post* Say?' (11) Spring 88

Falcoff, Mark; Chile: The Autumn of the Patriarch (14) Winter 88/9

Falcoff, Mark; Learning to Love the Missile Crisis (16) Summer 89

Feldman, Harvey J.; Taiwan: The Great Step Forward (9) Fall 87

Firestone, Thomas; Four Sovietologists: A Primer (14) Winter 88/9

Frankel, Benjamin; Notes on the Nuclear Underworld (9) Fall 87

Fraser, Malcolm; Changing South Africa (9) Fall 87

Friedberg, Aaron L.; The Making of American National Strategy, 1948-88 (11) Spring 88

Frost, Gerald; Margaret and Mikhail: The Odyssey of an Odd Couple (13) Fall 88

Fukuyama, Francis; The End of History? (16) Summer 89

Fuller, Graham E.; The Case for Optimism (12) Summer 88

Gaddis, John Lewis; Containment and the Logic of Strategy (10) Winter 87/8

Gaffney, Frank J., Jr.; A Policy Abandoned (11) Spring 88

Garfinkle, Adam M.; ABM—The Wrong Debate (11) Spring 88

Gellner, Ernest; Munich in Prague (13) Fall 88

Gerson, Allan; Terrorism and Turtle Bay (11) Spring 88

Glynn, Patrick; The Sarajevo Fallacy (9) Fall 87

Goldman, Christopher H. and Robert B. Shepard; P.W. Botha's Foreign Policy (15) Spring 89

Gray, Colin S.; NATO: Time to Call It a Day? (10) Winter 87/8

Haass, Richard N.; Dealing with Friendly Tyrants (15) Spring 89

Haass, Richard N. and Kurt M. Campbell; South Africa: The Perils of Parallels (10) Winter 87/8

Hanke, Steve H.; U.S.-Japanese Trade: Yes, Blame America First (10) Winter 87/8

Harries, Owen; The Coming Dominance of the Pacific (11) Spring 88

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Harries, Owen; 'Exporting Democracy'—and Getting it Wrong (13) Fall 88
Hartley, Anthony; After 1992: Multiple Choice (15) Spring 89
Hassner, Pierre; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89
Hawkins, William R.; Strategy and 'Freedom of Navigation' (12) Summer 88
Hendrickson, David C.; No Exit (13) Fall 88
Henninger, Daniel; Bipartisan Incoherence (14) Winter 88/9
Himmelfarb, Gertrude; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89
Hollander, Paul; Socialist Prisons and Imprisoned Minds (10) Winter 87/8
Iklé, Fred Charles; Discriminate Deterrence: A Response to Critics (13) Fall 88
Jackson, Bruce P. and Simon P. Worden; Space, Power, and Strategy (13) Fall 88
Katz, Mark; Camels and Commissars (14) Winter 88/9
Keegan, John; Right Man, Wrong Book (10) Winter 87/8
Khalilzad, Zalmay; Afghanistan: Anatomy of a Soviet Failure (12) Summer 88
el-Khazen, Farid; The Rise and Fall of the PLO (10) Winter 87/8
Kindleberger, Charles P.; The One and Only Marshall Plan (11) Spring 88
Krakowski, Elie; The Afghanistan Deception (14) Winter 88/9
Krauthammer, Charles; Regaining the Initiative (12) Summer 88
Kristol, Irving; Comments on Sommer (11) Spring 88
Kristol, Irving; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89
Latynski, Maya and S. Enders Wimbush; The Mujahideen and the Russian Empire (11) Spring 88
Layne, Christopher; Continental Divide: Time to Disengage in Europe (13) Fall 88
Ledeen, Michael A.; Secrets (10) Winter 87/8
Lefever, Ernest W.; Backward, Christian Soldiers! (14) Winter 88/9
Legge, Michael; Burden-sharing: The View from London (12) Summer 88
Leiken, Robert S.; Earthquake in Mexico (14) Winter 88/9
Lellouche, Pierre; The Iklé-Wohlstetter Report: Why Europe Still Matters (12) Summer 88
Lin, Chong-Pin; From Panda to Dragon: China's Nuclear Strategy (15) Spring 89
Livingston, Robert G.; A Wounded Nation (10) Winter 87/8
Luttwak, Edward N.; Do We Need a New Grand Strategy? (15) Spring 89
Martin, Laurence; The Iklé-Wohlstetter Report: Sharpening the Question (12) Summer 88
McConnell, Scott; The Liberal Abdication (14) Winter 88/9
McCord, William; Explaining the East Asian 'Miracle' (16) Summer 89
McCord, William; The State of Denmark (12) Summer 88
Menges, Constantine C.; Sanctions '86: How the State Department Prevailed (13) Fall 88
Miller, Stephen; What Price 'Differentiation'? (13) Fall 88
Millett, Allan R. and Williamson Murray; Lessons of War (14) Winter 88/9
Morris, Stephen J.; Ho Chi Minh, Pol Pot, and Cornell (16) Summer 89
Mount, Ferdinand; Thatcher's Decade (14) Winter 88/9
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89
Munson, Steven C.; Armand's Story (9) Fall 87
Munson, Steven C.; Big Brother's Little Book (12) Summer 88
Murray, Williamson and Allan R. Millett; Lessons of War (14) Winter 88/9
Murray, Williamson; The War Colleges Debate (10) Winter 87/8
Nagorski, Andrew; Down and Out in Moscow and Omsk (14) Winter 88/9
Nettler, Gwynne; Canada (9) Fall 87
Nye, Joseph S., Jr., William J. Perry, James A. Schear, and Brent Scowcroft; SDI and Arms Control (9) Fall 87
Odom, William E.; Pakistan and the Asian Balance (15) Spring 89
Ornstein, Norman J. and Mark Schmitt; Foreign Policy and the Election (11) Spring 88
Payne, James L.; Wrong Numbers: Lies and Distortions about Defense Spending (14) Winter 88/9
Perle, Richard; Burden-sharing: The View from Washington (12) Summer 88
Perle, Richard; Strobe Light (15) Spring 89
Perlmutter, Amos; Dissent on Iran (10) Winter 87/8
Perlmutter, Amos; Now Go It Alone: Israel and the West Bank (13) Fall 88
Perry, William J., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., James A. Schear, and Brent Scowcroft; SDI and Arms Control (9) Fall 87
Pilon, Juliana Geran; The Empire Strikes Out (16) Summer 89
Pipes, Daniel; Terrorism: the Syrian Connection (15) Spring 89

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pipes, Daniel; The Unacknowledged Partnership (10) Winter 87/8
Podhoretz, John; Broadway's Walk in the Woods (12) Summer 88
Prizel, Ilya; Latin America: The Long March (12) Summer 88
Prowse, Stephen D.; The Iklé-Wohlstetter Report: What the Report Says (12) Summer 88
Puddington, Arch; The Soul of the Left's Machine (13) Fall 88
Purcell, Susan Kaufman; Is Cuba Changing? (14) Winter 88/9
Rodman, Peter W.; The Case for Skepticism (12) Summer 88
Rodman, Peter W.; Shawcross and the Shah (15) Spring 89
Rose, Gideon; Crimes & Blunders (11) Spring 88
Rose, Gideon; When Presidents Break the Law (9) Fall 87
Rosen, Stephen Peter; Strategic Implications of AIDS (9) Fall 87
Rowen, Henry S. and John B. Dunlop; Gorbachev *versus* Ligachev (11) Spring 88
Rudney, Robert; Dump the WEU (13) Fall 88
Rudney, Robert; France: Preparing for European Leadership (9) Fall 87
Schear, James A., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William J. Perry, and Brent Scowcroft; SDI and Arms Control (9) Fall 87
Schiff, Ze'ev; U.S. and Israel: Friendship under Strain (10) Winter 87/8
Schifter, Richard; Human Rights in the Reagan Years: A Reply to Irving Kristol (9) Fall 87
Schmitt, Gary J.; Why Commissions Don't Work (15) Spring 89
Schmitt, Mark and Norman J. Ornstein; Foreign Policy and the Election (11) Spring 88
Scowcroft, Brent, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., William J. Perry, and James A. Schear; SDI and Arms Control (9) Fall 87
Seabury, Paul; The Solvency Boys (13) Fall 88
Seitz, Russell; Lost in Translation (12) Summer 88
Seltzer, Judith R.; Getting the Birth Dearth Right (11) Spring 88
Sestanovich, Stephen; Introduction to Special Supplement: The Empire's New Clothes (12) Summer 88
Sestanovich, Stephen; Response to Fukuyama (16) Summer 89
Shepard, Robert B. and Christopher H. Goldman; P.W. Botha's Foreign Policy (15) Spring 89
Snyder, Jed C.; The Rights and Wrongs of Mr. Layne (13) Fall 88
Sofaer, Abraham D.; International Law and the Use of Force (13) Fall 88
Sommer, Theo; Through German Eyes (11) Spring 88
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut; Comments on Sommer (11) Spring 88
Stempf, Tory; Tibet and the American Conscience (11) Spring 88
Tanham, George K.; Subverting the South Pacific (11) Spring 88
Tonelson, Alan A.; Manifesto for Democrats (16) Summer 89
Tucker, Robert W.; Detente: The Old and the New (12) Summer 88
Tucker, Robert W.; The INF Debate: The *NOs* Have It (10) Winter 87/8
Ulam, Adam; Keeping Them Honest: A Tribute to Leo Labedz (14) Winter 88/9
Van Creveld, Martin; The War Colleges Debate (10) Winter 87/8
Van den Haag, Ernest; Why Gorbachev Won't Make It (13) Fall 88
Weidenbaum, Murray; Why Defense Spending Doesn't Matter (16) Summer 89
Weiner, Lauren; The (Latin) American Way (16) Summer 89
Weingarten, Joel; The Illusion of 'Land for Peace' (16) Summer 89
Weltman, John J.; The Short Unhappy Life of Maritime Strategy (15) Spring 89
Wildavsky, Aaron; The Triumph of Ronald Reagan (14) Winter 88/9
Wilson, Heather; Calling the Tune in Vienna (16) Summer 89
Wimbush, S. Enders and Maya Latynski; The Mujahideen and the Russian Empire (11) Spring 88
Wisgerhof, Paul R.; Look, No Ships! (10) Winter 87/8
Wolfowitz, Paul; Southeast Asia: Deferring Hard Choices (12) Summer 88
Worden, Simon P. and Bruce P. Jackson; Space, Power, and Strategy (13) Fall 88

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Read the magazine that shapes the minds of the people who shape our world.

Discover for yourself the excitement of exploring today's most critical topics with today's most articulate and influential writers and thinkers. Subscribe to Commentary, the magazine that has illuminated every aspect of America's political, social, and cultural life. The magazine for those who take the world, and their role in it, very seriously.

Commentary
The forum for today's most vital issues.

"COMMENTARY is very, very important for the life of the United States, for the West, and, I am convinced, for freedom."
–HON. JEANE KIRKPATRICK

"The affirmation of the West and its values, which was there in the first lines Norman Podhoretz wrote as Editor of COMMENTARY, has never faltered and has hugely strengthened both the West and those values."
–SENATOR DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

"Norman Podhoretz and COMMENTARY have ennobled this society. They have asked the right questions. They have usually given the right answers."
–HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER



SUBSCRIPTION APPLICATION

Commentary
165 East 56th Street, New York, NY 10022

☐ Yes! Please enter my one-year subscription–12 monthly issues–to Commentary for just $39–a full $6 off the newsstand rate. Add $8 for foreign and Canadian subscriptions (U.S. dollars only).

Must reading for today's best informed people.

Name _____ (Please Print)
Address _____
City _____
State _____ Zip _____
Signature _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED